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In this thesis, we will consider games with large structures in the sense that the play-
er/state space can be uncountable. We first propose a condition called ”setwise coarse-
ness” and prove several regularity properties (convexity, compactness and preservation
of upper hemicontinuity) of conditional distributions/expectations of correspondences in
various contexts as our mathematical preparations. Based on this condition, new results
on large games/economies, Bayesian games and stochastic games are presented.
The classical Lebesgue unit interval is widely used to model a continuum of agents.
However, it has been pointed out that the Lebesgue unit interval does not have a number
of desirable properties in various situations as an agent space, and di↵erent approaches
have been proposed to resolve those problems. In Chapter 2, we will separate the concept
of an agent space with the concept of the characteristics type space which is generated by
the mapping of agents’ characteristics. The “setwise coarseness” condition is proposed,
which requires that the agent space is strictly richer than the characteristics type space
on any nontrivial collection of agents. We will show that this condition is more general
than all the special approaches mentioned above, and it can be used to handle the failure
of the Lebesgue unit interval. More importantly, the optimality of the setwise coarseness
condition will be illustrated by showing its necessity in deriving certain results in general
equilibrium theory and game theory.
The theory of correspondences has important applications in a variety of areas. How-
ever, basic regularity properties on the distributions of correspondences/integrals of
Banach valued correspondences such as convexity, closeness, compactness and preser-
vation of upper hemicontinuity may all fail when the underlying probability space is
the Lebesgue unit interval. In Chapter 3, we show that all these properties could be
retained based on the setwise coarseness condition. If the range of the correspondence
is the Euclidean space Rn, we can further extend the standard results on integrals of
correspondences to the conditional expectations of correspondences. In addition, we not
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only generalize the classical results on distributions/integrals of correspondences to the
case of conditional distributions/expectations, but also demonstrate the necessity of the
relevant condition.
Since Harsanyi (1967–68), games with incomplete information have been widely s-
tudied and found applications in many fields. If players’ information is di↵use, positive
results have been obtained when all players’ action spaces are finite and the information
structure is disparate. In Chapter 4, we extend this result to two directions and ob-
tain the existence of pure strategy equilibria in the following frameworks: (1) Bayesian
games with general action spaces; and (2) Bayesian games with interdependent payo↵s
and correlated types.
Beginning with Shapley (1953), the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria
in discounted stochastic games has remained an important problem. However, no general
existence result, except for several special classes, has been obtained in the literature so
far. The main result in Chapter 5 is to show the existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibria in stochastic games under a general condition called “(decomposable) coarser
transition kernels” by establishing a new connection between the equilibrium payo↵
correspondences in stochastic games and a general result on the conditional expectations
of correspondences. The proof is remarkably simple and our theorems cover various
previous existence results. The minimality of our condition is also illustrated from a
technical point of view.
Chapter 1
Introduction
Games with large structures can arise in many situations.1 For example, to describe
the competitive market in which the influence of every particular participant becomes
negligible, one needs to model the interaction of many agents. New phenomena can be
discovered in large games/economies while they may not necessarily occur in the case of
a fixed finite number of agents. A well-known example is the Edgeworth conjecture that
the set of core allocations tends to coincide with the set of competitive equilibria as the
number of agents goes to infinity, while the latter set is in general strictly smaller than
the former one if one only focuses on a finite economy (see Debreu and Scarf (1963)).2
Another example is Bayesian games, in which if information is assumed to be su -
ciently disparate among players and its distribution is su ciently di↵use, then random-
ization, which has limited appeal in many practical situations, can be eliminated and
players might restrict their attention to pure strategies.3 In addition, equilibrium exis-
tence and characterization results of discounted stochastic games is a very active area
of research. Recently, due to the increasing usefulness of stochastic games in modeling
economic situations, much attention has been given to it in the setting with uncountable
states.4
While the existence of equilibrium is usually easy to obtain in finite games, the prob-
lem is in general significantly harder when one considers games with large structures.
1For “games with large structure”, we mean that some components (players, actions, states) of the
game can be very large (may be uncountable).
2For more discussion of mass phenomena in economics, see Khan and Sun (2002).
3See, for example, Milgrom and Weber (1985), Radner and Rosenthal (1982) and Khan, Rath and
Sun (2006).
4See Du e et al. (1994), Duggan (2012) and Levy (2013) among others.
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To prove the equilibrium existence, one usually works with an equilibrium-related cor-
respondence. If the regularity properties (convexity, compactness and preservation of
upper hemicontinuity) of the correspondence can be established, then the standard fixed
point method is applicable. However, these regularity properties could fail if the game
under consideration has a large structure, and the equilibrium existence is then prob-
lematic. As a result, new mathematical results on the theory of correspondences must
be proved first as the foundation to adopt the fixed point method.
In this thesis, we will consider various games with large structures. We shall first pro-
pose an appropriate condition called “setwise coarseness” and prove regularity properties
of the conditional distributions/expectations of correspondences in various contexts as
our mathematical preparations. Based on this condition, new existence results in large
games/economies, Bayesian games and stochastic games are presented.
1.1 Modeling Infinitely Many Agents
In a vast literature of economics, one needs to model the interaction of many agents in
order to discover mass phenomena that do not necessarily occur in the case of a fixed
finite number of agents. As pointed out by von Neumann and Morgenstern (1953),
When the number of participants becomes really great, some hope emerges
that the influence of every particular participant will become negligible, and
that the above di culties may recede and a more conventional theory become
possible. Indeed, this was the starting point of much of what is best in
economic theory.
The classical Lebesgue unit interval is usually used to avoid complicated combinatorial
arguments that may involve multiple steps of approximations for a large but finite num-
ber of agents.5 As a result, a general atomless measure space of agents is often referred
to as a continuum of agents .
However, it has been pointed out that the Lebesgue unit interval does not have a
number of desirable properties in various situations as an agent space. For example, (1)
large economies may not have the determinateness property in the sense that economies
5For some classical references, see, for example, Milnor and Shapley (1961), Aumann (1964), Hilden-
brand (1974) and Hammond (1979).
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with the same distribution on agents’ characteristics may not have the same set of distri-
butions of Walras allocations; (2) pure-strategy Nash equilibria may not exist in a large
game with uncountably many actions. To resolve those problems, di↵erent approaches
have been proposed, such as distributional equilibria, standard representations, hyperfi-
nite agent spaces, saturated probability spaces, and agents spaces with the condition of
“many more agents than strategies”.6
In Chapters 2, we will separate the concept of an agent space with the concept of
the characteristics type space which is generated by the mapping of agents’ character-
istics. The “setwise coarseness” condition is proposed, which requires that the agent
space is strictly richer than the characteristics type space on any nontrivial collection of
agents. We will show that this condition is more general than all the special approaches
mentioned in the end of the last paragraph. We will also show that it can be used to
handle the failure of the Lebesgue unit interval. In addition, the optimality of the set-
wise coarseness condition will be illustrated by showing its necessity in deriving certain
results in general equilibrium theory and game theory.
1.2 Conditional Distributions/Expectations of Cor-
respondences
The theory of correspondences, which has important applications in a variety of areas
(including optimization, control theory and mathematical economics), has been stud-
ied extensively in recent years. However, basic regularity properties on the distribu-
tions of correspondences/integrals of Banach valued correspondences such as convexity,
closeness, compactness and preservation of upper hemicontinuity may all fail when the
underlying probability space is the Lebesgue unit interval.7
To resolve these issues, various conditions have been proposed.8 In particular, Sun
(1996, 1997) considered a class of rich measure spaces, the so-called Loeb measure s-
paces constructed from the method of nonstandard analysis. Keisler and Sun (2009)
then showed that the abstract property of saturation on a probability space is not only
6See Mas-Colell (1984), Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1974), Khan and Sun (1999), Keisler and
Sun (2009) and Rustichini and Yannelis (1991).
7See Sun (1996, 1997) and Keisler and Sun (2009) for examples.
8For some recent development, see for example, Sun (1996, 1997), Sun and Yannelis (2008), Podczeck
(2008), Keisler and Sun (2009) and Khan and Zhang (2012).
4 Chapter 1. Introduction
su cient but also necessary for any of these regularity properties for distributions of cor-
respondences to hold. Furthermore, Sun and Yannelis (2008) found that all the existing
results for Bochner/Gel0fand integrals of Banach valued correspondences in Loeb spaces
can be easily transferred to results on saturated spaces via the saturation property, and
Podczeck (2008) proved the convexity and compactness results over general saturated
probability spaces without appealing to the existing relevant results on Loeb spaces.
To be precise, consider a correspondence F from an atomless probability space
(T, T , ) to the Polish space X. Let R(T ,G)F be the set of all µf |G such that f is a
measurable selection of F , where µf |G is the regularly conditional distribution induced
by f given some sub- -algebra G of T . If G is the trivial  -algebra, then R(T ,G)F is re-
duced to be D(T ,G)F , the set of distribution of the correspondence F . Similarly, one can
define the integral/conditional expectation of a correspondence.
In applications, one often encounters measure spaces that are countably generated,
while a saturated probability space is necessarily rich in the sense that any of its non-
trivial sub-measure space is not countably generated module null sets. To reconcile this
possibility of non-absolute richness, we will study the regularity properties relying on
the condition of “setwise coarseness”, which means that T does not coincide with G
when they are restricted on any non-trivial set in T .
Restricting the correspondence F to be G-measurable and assuming that G is setwise
coarser than T , we are able to show that (1) the setwise coarseness condition is both
necessary and su cient for all the regularity properties on the distributions of corre-
spondences; (2) these regularity properties can be extended to regular conditional dis-
tributions of correspondences; (3) the su ciency and necessity of the setwise coarseness
condition can be also demonstrated for the regularity properties of the Bochner/Gel0fand
integrals and conditional expectations of Banach valued correspondences. Furthermore,
if the range of the correspondence F is the Euclidean space Rn, then we can allow the
correspondence F to be T -measurable, hence extend the standard results on integrals
of correspondences.
Therefore, we not only generalize the classical results on distributions/integrals of
correspondences to the case of conditional distributions/expectations, but also demon-
strate the necessity of the relevant condition.
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1.3 Games with Incomplete Information
Since Harsanyi (1967–68), games with incomplete information have been widely studied
and found applications in many fields. Various kinds of hypotheses are proposed on
the formulation of such games to guarantee the existence of pure strategy equilibria. In
particular, if players’ information is di↵use, positive results have been obtained when all
players’ action spaces are finite and the information structure is disparate; see Radner
and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Khan, Rath and Sun (2006).
These results lead to natural conjectures in two directions: can one obtain the existence
of pure strategy equilibria in the following frameworks: (1) Bayesian games with general
action spaces; and (2) Bayesian games with interdependent payo↵ and correlated types?
To resolve the first problem, the purification method is adopted as the main tool
on Loeb/saturated probability spaces; see Loeb and Sun (2006) and Wang and Zhang
(2012). Nevertheless, these results rely on the condition that the probability spaces are
saturated, and hence cannot contain any countably-generated part. Since the widely
used information spaces are usually Polish spaces, the assumption of saturated proba-
bility spaces will be violated in various applications. In Chapter 4, we shall distinguish
di↵erent roles of the di↵useness of information and describe the strategy-relevant and
payo↵-relevant di↵useness of information separately. The relation between these two
kinds of di↵useness is characterized by the “relative di↵useness” assumption, which
basically says that the strategy-relevant di↵useness is essentially richer than the payo↵-
relevant di↵useness on any nonnegligible information subset. Based on this assumption,
we are able to prove the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with general ac-
tion spaces without invoking any existence result of behavioral/distributional strategy
equilibria.
For the second problem, there is a substantial literature on the equilibrium existence
results of Bayesian games with finite actions; see, for example, Radner and Rosenthal
(1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Khan, Rath and Sun (2006) and Barelli and Duggan
(2013). In Chapter 4, we formulate the notion of “inter-player information” to describe
the influence of player i’s private information in other players’ payo↵s. The condition
of “coarser inter-player information” is proposed and we show that this condition is not
only su cient but also necessary for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium, while
interdependent payo↵s and correlated types are allowed in our setting. In particular,
the purification results will be presented for both problems.
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1.4 Discounted Stochastic Games
Beginning with Shapley (1953), the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in
discounted stochastic games has remained an important problem. Given that stochastic
games with general state spaces have found applications in various areas of economics,
the issue on the existence of an equilibrium in stationary strategies for such games has
received considerable attention in the last two decades; see Nowak and Raghavan (1992),
Du e et al. (1994), Duggan (2012) and Levy (2013). However, no general existence
result, except for several special classes, has been obtained in the literature so far.
Our main purpose is to show the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in
stochastic games under a general condition called “(decomposable) coarser transition k-
ernels” by establishing a new connection between the equilibrium payo↵ correspondences
in stochastic games and a general result on the conditional expectations of correspon-
dences. The proof is remarkably simple and our theorems cover previous existence
results for stochastic games considered in Nowak and Raghavan (1992), Du e et al.
(1994), Nowak (2003) and Duggan (2012), while no product structure is imposed on the
state space. We also illustrate the minimality of our general condition from a technical
point of view.
1.5 Organization
The main results in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 are based on the papers He, Sun and Sun
(2013), He and Sun (2014) and He and Sun (2013a,b,c,d).
This thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we propose a condition called
“setwise coarseness” and illustrate its usefulness in large games and economies. Chap-
ter 3 establishes regularity properties (convexity, compactness and preservation of upper
hemicontinuity) of conditional distributions/expectations of correspondences, which will
serve as our mathematical tools to prove the equilibrium existence results. In Chapter 4,
we study games with incomplete information and show the existence of pure-strategy e-
quilibria in various settings. In Chapter 5, we present the existence of stationary Markov
perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games.
1.5. Organization 7
8 Chapter 1. Introduction
Chapter 2
Modeling Infinitely Many Agents
2.1 Introduction
Every economic model involves economic agents. When a model considers a fixed finite
number of agents, the most natural agent space is the set {1, 2, . . . , n} for some positive
integer n. In a vast literature in economics, one also needs to model the interaction
of many agents in order to discover mass phenomena that do not necessarily occur in
the case of a fixed finite number of agents. A well-known example is the Edgeworth
conjecture that the set of core allocations will shrink to the set of competitive equilibria
as the number of agents goes to infinity though the former set is in general strictly bigger
than the latter set for an economy with a fixed finite number of agents.1
To avoid complicated combinatorial arguments that may involve multiple steps of
approximations for a large but finite number of agents, it is natural to consider economic
models with an infinite number of agents. The mathematical abstraction of an atomless
(countably-additive) measure space of agents provides a convenient idealization for a
large but finite number of agents. The archetype space in such a setting is the classical
Lebesgue unit interval.2 That is why a general atomless measure space of agents is often
referred to as a continuum of agents in a large literature in economics.3
1See, for example, Debreu and Scarf (1963), Hildenbrand (1974) and Anderson (1978). Here are a
few recent references on related models with large but finite number of agents, McLean and Postlewaite
(2002, 2004), Serrano, Vohra and Volij (2001), Xiong and Zheng (2007).
2For some classical references, see, for example, Milnor and Shapley (1961), Aumann (1964), Hilden-
brand (1974) and Hammond (1979).
3Economic models with a continuum of agents have continued to be widely used in various fields of
economics. For some recent references, see, for example, Azevedo, Weyl and White (2013) and Hara
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However, it has also been found that the Lebesgue unit interval does not have a num-
ber of desirable properties in various situations as an agent space. First, it is pointed out
in general equilibrium theory that large economies may not have the determinateness
property; namely, large economies with the same distribution on agents’ characteristics
may not have the same set of distributions of Walras allocations. Second, pure-strategy
Nash equilibria may not exist in a large game with uncountably many actions. Third,
dissonance has also been found between a large game and its discretized versions. In ad-
dition, from a mathematical point of view, some regularity properties (such as convexity,
compactness, purification, and upper-semicontinuity) of the distribution of correspon-
dences and of the integration of correspondences in an infinite-dimensional setting fail
to hold when the underlying measure space is the Lebesgue unit interval. To resolve
those problems, di↵erent approaches have been proposed, such as distributional equi-
libria, standard representations, hyperfinite agent spaces, saturated probability spaces,
and agents spaces with the condition of “many more agents than strategies”.4
A basic and natural question arises: which measure spaces are most suitable for
modeling many economic agents? A key point in this paper is to separate the concept
of an agent space with the concept of the characteristics type space which is generated
by the mapping of agents’ characteristics. The “setwise coarseness” condition proposed
here requires that the agent space is strictly richer than the characteristics type space
on any nontrivial collection of agents. We will show that this condition is more general
than all the special approaches mentioned in the end of the last paragraph. We will also
show that it can be used to handle the failure of the Lebesgue unit interval as discussed
above.
More importantly, we illustrate the optimality of the setwise coarseness condition by
showing its necessity in deriving certain results in general equilibrium theory and game
theory. The first question we consider is the determinateness of general equilibrium in
large economies. As pointed out in Kannai (1970, p. 811), Ge´rard Debreu remarked that
there exists a serious di culty with large economies in the sense that large economies
with the same distribution on agents’ characteristics do not have the same set of distribu-
tions for the core allocations (i.e., Walras allocations); Kannai (1970, p. 811) presented
a concrete example illustrating this point. It was then conjectured by Robert Aumann
(2005) in general equilibrium theory, Mailath, Postlewaite and Samuelson (2013), Yannelis (2009), Yu
(2014) and Sun and Zhang (2014) in game theory, Du e, Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen (2005) and Du e and
Strulovici (2012) in finance.
4Detailed discussions and references about problems with the Lebesgue unit interval and di↵erent
approaches for handling them will be given in Section 2.3 below.
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that the closure of the sets of distributions for the core allocations are the same for
large economies with the same distribution on agents’ characteristics; see Kannai (1970,
p. 813). That conjecture was resolved in Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1974). To
show that the distribution of agents’ characteristics is a concise and accurate description
of a large economy, Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1974) used the approach of stan-
dard representations to obtain exact equivalence instead of “same closure” in Aumann’s
conjecture. As shown in Proposition 2 below, it is easy to see that our setwise coarseness
condition is su cient for such a result. The surprising point is that our condition is also
necessary for the exact determinateness property (see Theorem 1 below).
In terms of optimality for the setwise coarseness condition, the second question we
consider involves games with many agents. Motivated by the consideration of social
identities as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000) and Brock and Durlauf (2001), Khan et
al. (2013) introduced a general class of large games in which agents have names and
determinate social-types and/or biological traits. For such large games, they showed the
nonexistence of Nash equilibria with the Lebesgue unit interval as an agent space, and
characterized the existence via a saturated agent space. In addition, we note that the
existence of Nash equilibria is also a key issue for the determinateness property in large
games. Khan and Sun (1999, p. 472) presented an example of two large games with the
same distribution on agents’ characteristics where one has a Nash equilibrium while the
other does not! It implies that the closures of the sets of distributions for the Nash equi-
libria in these two large games are never equal. Thus, the determinateness property even
fails in an approximate sense in terms of the closures. Khan and Sun (1999) resolved the
relevant issues by working with a hyperfinite Loeb counting measure. Our Propositions 3
and 4 show that the existence of Nash equilibria and exact determinateness property in
large games follow easily from the setwise coarseness condition. The optimality of such
a condition is demonstrated in the sense that it is necessary for obtaining each of these
two results (Theorem 2 and Proposition 4).
The rest is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce the condition of setwise
coarseness for agent spaces, and show that it is equivalent to three other conditions. The
setwise coarseness condition is then used to obtain positive results in large economies
and games while the corresponding results fail when the Lebesgue unit interval is used as
an agent space. In Section 2.3, we show that the condition of setwise coarseness is more
general than various approaches proposed to handle the failure of the Lebesgue unit
interval. In Section 2.4, we show that the setwise coarseness condition is necessary in
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deriving positive results for large economies and games mentioned in Section 2.2. Some
technical proofs are collected in Section 2.5. This chapter is based on the paper He, Sun
and Sun (2013).
2.2 Characterizations of the Agent Space
2.2.1 Setwise Coarseness
A typical economic model starts with an agent space. Each agent is described by some
characteristics, such as strategy/action set, payo↵, preference, endowment/income, in-
formation, social or biological traits and etc. The mapping for the characteristics of all
the agents will generate a sub- -algebra on the agent space. Thus it is natural to restrict
our attention to a sub- -algebra that is to be used in modeling agents’ characteristics.
The corresponding restricted probability space on such a sub- -algebra will be called
the characteristics type space. In this section, we will introduce several conditions on
these two probability spaces and show their equivalence.
Let (⌦,F , P ) be an atomless probability space with a complete countably-additive
probability measure P .5 Let G be a sub- -algebra of F . The probability spaces (⌦,F , P )
and (⌦,G, P ) will be used to model the agent space and the characteristics type space
respectively. For any nonnegligible subset D 2 F , the restricted probability space
(D,GD, PD) is defined as follows: GD is the  -algebra {D \ D0 : D0 2 G} and PD the
probability measure re-scaled from the restriction of P to GD. Furthermore, (D,FD, PD)
can be defined similarly.
Let X, Y denote Polish spaces (complete separable metrizable topological spaces),
and M(X) the space of all Borel probability measures on X with the weak topology.
We recall that M(X) is again a Polish space. For any µ 2 M(X ⇥ Y ), let µX be the
marginal of µ on X.
Now we are ready to present the following definition.
Definition 1. (1) G is said to be setwise coarser than F if for every D 2 F with
P (D) > 0, there exists an F-measurable subset D0 of D such that P (D04D1) > 0
for any D1 2 GD.6
5A probability space (⌦,F , P ) (or its  -algebra) is atomless if for any nonnegligible subset E 2 F ,
there is a F-measurable subset E0 of E such that 0 < P (E0) < P (E).
6This condition was called “nowhere equivalence” in He, Sun and Sun (2013), see also He and Sun
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(2) F is conditional atomless over G if for every D 2 F with P (D) > 0, there exists
an F-measurable subset D0 of D such that on some set of positive probability,
0 < P (D0 | G) < P (D | G).
(3) F is said to be relatively saturated with respect to G if for any Polish spaces X
and Y , any measure µ 2M(X ⇥ Y ), and any G-measurable mapping f from ⌦ to
X with P   f 1 = µX , there exists an F-measurable mapping g from ⌦ to Y such
that µ = P   (f, g) 1.
(4) G admits an atomless independent supplement in F if there exists another sub-
 -algebra H of F such that (⌦,H, P ) is atomless, and for any C1 2 G and C2 2 H,
P (C1 \ C2) = P (C1)P (C2).
When (⌦,F , P ) and (⌦,G, P ) model the respective spaces of agents and charac-
teristics types. The condition that G is setwise coarser than F implies that for any
nonnegligible set D of agents, FD is always essentially richer than GD.7
These four conditions characterize the relation between F and G from di↵erent as-
pects, and the following proposition shows that they are equivalent given that G is
countably generated. Note that a probability space (or its  -algebra) is said to be
countably generated if its  -algebra can be generated by countably many measurable
subsets together with the null sets.
Proposition 1. Let (⌦,F , P ) be an atomless probability space, and G a sub- -algebra
of F . If G is countably generated,8 then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) G is setwise coarser than F .
(ii) F is conditional atomless over G.
(iii) F is relatively saturated with respect to G.
(iv) G admits an atomless independent supplement in F .
(2014).
7Condition (2) is simply called “F is atomless over G” in Definition 4.3 of Hoover and Keisler
(1984). The concept of “relative saturation” refines the concept of “saturation” used in Corollary 4.5(i)
of Hoover and Keisler (1984).
8The implication “(iii))(iv)” may not be true without the condition that “G is countably generated”,
for example, if G is saturated and F = G, the statement (iii) holds while the statement (iv) is certainly
false. Other implications are still true even though G is not countably generated.
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The following lemma shows that for any atomless measure space, we can always find
an atomless sub- -algebra, which is setwise coarser than the original  -algebra.
Lemma 1. Let (⌦,F , P ) be an atomless probability space. Then there exists a sub- -
algebra G ✓ F such that G is atomless, countably generated, and admits an atomless
independent supplement in F .
The next lemma shows that if G is setwise coarser than F under a probability mea-
sure P , then G will be setwise coarser than F under any measure which is absolutely
continuous with respect to P .
Lemma 2. Let (⌦,F , P ) be an atomless probability space, and P 0 a probability measure
on (⌦,F) which is absolutely continuous with respect to P . If G is setwise coarser than
F under the probability measure P , then G is also setwise coarser than F under the
probability measure P 0.
2.2.2 Applications
In this section, we present two applications to illustrate the usefulness of the set-
wise coarseness condition. Throughout this section, we assume that G is a countably-
generated sub- -algebra of F . All proofs will be given in Section 2.5.
Large economies
Let Rl+ be the commodity space, P the set of preference relations % on Rl+, and Pmo
the set of monotonic preference relations (i.e., x   y and x 6= y implies x   y). We
endow the set Pmo with the metric of closed-convergence; for details, see Hildenbrand
(1974). A distribution on Pmo⇥Rl+ then means a probability measure on the  -algebra
B(Pmo ⇥ Rl+) of Borel sets in Pmo ⇥ Rl+. A large economy is a measurable mapping
E(!) = (%!, e(!)) from an atomless agent space (⌦,F , P ) to Pmo ⇥ Rl+ such that the
mean endowment
R
⌦ e dP is finite.
An integrable function f from (⌦,F , P ) to Rl+ is called a Walras allocation for the
economy E if there is a price vector p 2 Rl+, p 6= 0 such that
(i) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, f(!) 2 D(p, E(!)), where D(p, E(!)) is the set of all
maximal elements for %! in the budge set {x 2 Rl+ : p · x  p · e(!)};
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(ii)
R
⌦ f dP =
R
⌦ e dP .
The set of all F -measurable Walras allocations of the economy E is denoted byW (E).
Let DW (E) denote the set of distributions of all Walras allocations in W (E).
A basic observation in Kannai (1970) is that the set of distributions of Walras allo-
cations is not completely determined by the distribution of agents’ characteristics; i.e.,
for two atomless economies E1 and E2 such that P  E 11 = P  E 12 , DW (E1) and DW (E2)
could be di↵erent. This problem can be resolved easily by using the setwise coarseness
condition.
Proposition 2 (Exact determinateness). For any two G-measurable economies E1 and
E2 with the same distribution, DW (E1) and DW (E2) are the same provided that G is
setwise coarser than F .
Large games with traits
Motivated by the consideration of social identities as in Akerlof and Kranton (2000)
and Brock and Durlauf (2001), Khan et al. (2013) provided a treatment of large games
in which individual players have names as well as traits, and a player’s dependence on
society is formulated as a joint probability measure on the space of actions and traits.9
The agent space is modeled by an atomless probability space (⌦,F , P ). Let A be
a compact metric space which is the common action space for all the players, and T a
complete separable metrizable space representing the traits of agents, which is endowed
with a Borel probability measure ⇢. Let M(T ⇥ A) be the space of Borel probability
distributions on T ⇥ A, and M⇢(M ⇥ A) the subspace of M(T ⇥ A) such that for any
⌫ 2M⇢(T ⇥ A), its marginal probability ⌫T on T is ⇢. The set M⇢(T ⇥ A) will be the
space of societal responses. The space of agents’ payo↵s V is the space of all continuous
functions on the product space A⇥M⇢(T ⇥ A), endowed with its sup-norm topology.
A large game with traits is a measurable function G from ⌦ to T ⇥ V such that
P  G 11 = ⇢, where Gi is the projection of G on its i-th coordinate, i = 1, 2.10 A Nash
equilibrium of a game G is an F -measurable function g : ⌦! A such that for P -almost
9For some recent applications of large games, see Angeletos, Hellwig and Pavan (2007), Guesnerie
and Jara-Moroni (2011), Peters (2010) and Rauh (2007).
10It generalizes the standard model of large games as surveyed in Khan and Sun (2002); in particular,
a large game is a large game with traits when the trait space is a singleton.
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all ! 2 ⌦, and with v! abbreviated for G2(!), and ↵ : ⌦! T abbreviated for G1,
v!
 
g(!), P   (↵, g) 1    v!  a, P   (↵, g) 1  for all a 2 A.
The next proposition shows that if we distinguish the agent space (⌦,F , P ) and the
characteristics type space (⌦,G, P ), then we will be able to obtain the existence of Nash
equilibria for large games with traits via the setwise coarseness condition.
Proposition 3. If G is setwise coarser than F , then any G-measurable large game with
traits has an F-measurable Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Unification
As discussed in the introduction, the “setwise coarseness” condition provides a unifica-
tion for various approaches that have been proposed to handle the failure of the classical
Lebesgue unit interval as an agent space. In this section, we shall discuss such a unifi-
cation in details.
2.3.1 Distributional Equilibria
In the standard approach, a large economy/game is described by a measurable map-
ping from the agent space to the space of characteristics, and an equilibrium alloca-
tion/strategy profile is a measurable mapping from the agent space to the commodi-
ty/action space. In Hildenbrand (1974), the distributional approach was introduced in
terms of the distribution of agents’ characteristics without an explicit agent space, and
the notion of Walras equilibrium distribution was proposed as a probability distribution
on the product space of characteristics and commodities. The same idea was used in Mas-
Colell (1984) for the notion of Nash equilibrium distribution in large games. Note that
the joint distribution of a large economy/game and its equilibrium allocation/strategy
profile will automatically give an equilibrium distribution. In the following, we shall
illustrate the point that given any large economy/game g as in Hildenbrand (1974) and
Mas-Colell (1984), any equilibrium distribution ⌧ associated with the corresponding dis-
tribution of g can be realized as the joint distribution of g and f , where f is a measurable
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equilibrium allocation/strategy profile for the large economy/game g.11
Distributional approach in large economies
Large economies are defined in Section 2.2.2, and we shall follow the notations there.
For every price vector p 2 Rl+ and t 2 Pmo ⇥ Rl+, recall that D(p, t) is the demand
correspondence when the price is p and the characteristic is t. Define a subset Ep of
(Pmo ⇥ Rl+)⇥ Rl+ as follows:
Ep =
 
(t, x) 2 (Pmo ⇥ Rl+)⇥ Rl+ : x 2 D(p, t)
 
.
Definition 2. A Walras equilibrium distribution for the distribution µ of agents’
characteristics is a Borel probability measure ⌧ on (Pmo ⇥ Rl+)⇥ Rl+ with the following
properties:
1. the marginal distribution of ⌧ on the space of characteristics is µ;
2. there exists a price vector p 2 Rl+ and p 6= 0 such that ⌧(Ep) = 1;
3.
R
Pmo⇥Rl+ x dµ =
R
Rl+
x d⌫, where ⌫ is the marginal distribution of ⌧ on the commod-
ity space, i.e., mean supply equals mean demand.
The following corollary is a direct consequence of the relative saturation property.12
Suppose that E is a G-measurable economy with the agent space (⌦,F , P ). Under the
setwise coarseness condition, every Walras equilibrium distribution ⌧ of P   E 1 can be
realized by an F -measurable Walras allocation f such that ⌧ is the joint distribution of
(E , f).
Corollary 1. Suppose that E is a G-measurable economy from (⌦,F , P ) to Pmo ⇥ Rl+.
If G is setwise coarser than F , then for each Walras equilibrium distribution ⌧ of the
distribution P   E 1, there exists an F-measurable Walras allocation f such that P  
(E , f) 1 = ⌧ .
11For some additional references on the distributional approach and its applications, see Acemoglu
and Wolitzky (2011), Eeckhout and Kircher (2010), Green (1984) and Noguchi and Zame (2006). The
idea to obtain a measurable equilibrium allocation/strategy profile as described above also applies to
the equilibrium distributions considered in all those papers.
12Recall that the relative saturation property is equivalent to the setwise coarseness condition, as
shown in Proposition 1.
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Distributional approach in large games
Suppose that A is a compact metric space and U is the space of all continuous functions
on the product space A⇥M(A) endowed with the sup-norm topology.
Definition 3. A measure game with the action space A is a Borel probability measure
◆ 2M(U).
A Nash equilibrium distribution of a measure game ◆ is a Borel probability
measure ⌧ 2M(U ⇥ A) such that ⌧U = ◆, and
⌧
 
(u, x) : u(x, ⌧A)   u(a, ⌧A) for all a 2 A
 
= 1,
where ⌧U and ⌧A are the marginal distributions of ⌧ on U and A respectively.
The following corollary is a parallel result of Corollary 1 in the setting of large games.
Corollary 2. Let ◆ 2 M(U) be a measure game, ⌧ 2 M(U ⇥ A) its Nash equilibrium
distribution. Let G be a G-measurable game from (⌦,F , P ) to U such that P  G 1 = ◆.
If G is setwise coarser than F , then there exists an F-measurable Nash equilibrium
g : ⌦! A such that P   (G, g) 1 = ⌧ .
2.3.2 Standard Representation
To obtain the exact determinateness property for large economies, Hart, Hildenbrand
and Kohlberg (1974) modeled the agent space as the product space of the space of
characteristics and (I,B, ⌘), where (I,B, ⌘) is the Lebesgue unit interval. Suppose that
% is a distribution of agents’ characteristics. The atomless measure space of agents is
given by (Pmo ⇥ Rl+)⇥ I with the product measure P = %⌦ ⌘. The mapping E% is the
projection: E%(-, e, i) = (-, e) for every (-, e, i) 2 Pmo⇥Rl+⇥I. The economy E% is the
so-called “standard representation” of %. Given an large economy E0, then E%0 denotes
the standard representation of P   E 10 . Hart, Hildenbrand and Kohlberg (1974) showed
that DW (E%1 ) and DW (E%2 ) are identical if P   E 11 = P   E 12 .
Note that this result is actually a special case of Proposition 2. In the construction of
the standard representation, the  -algebra induced by E% is B(Pmo⇥Rl+)⌦{I, ;}, which
admits an atomless independent supplement {Pmo ⇥ Rl+, ;} ⌦ B in B(Pmo ⇥ Rl+) ⌦ B.
Hence B(Pmo⇥Rl+)⌦{I, ;} is setwise coarser than B(Pmo⇥Rl+)⌦B. By Proposition 2,
DW (E%1 ) and DW (E%2 ) are identical if P   E 11 = P   E 12 .
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Here is a related result in Noguchi (2009, Corollary 1) which uses the idea of standard
representation in the setting of large games. Suppose that A is a compact metric action
space and U is the space of all continuous functions on the product space A ⇥M(A)
endowed with the Borel  -algebra B(U). Let ◆ 2M(U) be a measure game and ⌧ a Nash
equilibrium distribution of ◆. Let ⇡ be the projection from U ⇥ I to U . It is claimed
in Corollary 1 of Noguchi (2009) that there exists a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium f
from U ⇥ I to A such that (◆⌦ ⌘)(⇡, f) 1 = ⌧ . Note that this result is a special case of
Corollary 2 by taking ⌦ = U ⇥ I, F = B(U)⌦ B and G = B(U)⇥ {;, I}.
2.3.3 Hyperfinite Agent Space
In a finite-agent model, {1, 2, . . . , n} is used to label the agents with the counting prob-
ability. A Loeb counting probability space as introduced in Loeb (1975) can be viewed
as an equivalence class of the sequence of finite counting probability spaces, which is
the head-counting measure in the infinite setting. By its construction, Loeb counting
probability spaces have the property of asymptotic implementability, which means that
one can go back and forth between exact results on Loeb counting probability spaces
and approximate results for the asymptotic large finite case. The Lebesgue unit interval
does not have this property. In fact, economists argued that the interest in an ideal
economic model is proportional to how much new information can be derived for the
asymptotic large but finite case. Thus, a Loeb counting probability space is a more
appropriate agent space than the Lebesgue space, which is the main theme of Khan and
Sun (1999).13
Loeb counting probability spaces have the following homogeneity property; see Propo-
sition 9.2 of Keisler (1984). A probability space (⌦,F , P ) is said to be homogeneous if for
any two random variables x and y on ⌦ with the same distribution, there is a P -almost
surely bijection h from ⌦ to ⌦ which preserves F -measurability and P -measures, such
that x(!) = y(h(!)) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. Based on the homogeneity property, we
can prove the following simple lemma, which shows that any of the countably-generated
sub- -algebras is setwise coarser than the  -algebra in Loeb counting probability space.
Lemma 3. Let (⌦,F , P ) be a Loeb counting probability space, and G a countably-
generated sub- -algebra of F . Then G admits an atomless independent supplement H in
13For some other early references on the use of hyperfinite agent spaces, see Brown and Robinson
(1975), Brown and Loeb (1976), and Anderson (1988).
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F , and hence G is setwise coarser than F .
Proof. Since G is countably generated, there exists a mapping g : ⌦ ! ([0, 1],B, µ)
which generates G, where B is the Borel  -algebra on [0, 1] and µ = P   g 1. By the
atomlessness property of (⌦,F , P ), there exists a mapping (g0, f 0) : ⌦! [0, 1]⇥[0, 1] such
that P   (g0, f 0) 1 = µ⌦ ⌘, where ⌘ is the Lebesgue measure. Note that g and g0 share
the same distribution on F . By the homogeneity property, there is an F -measurable,
measure-preserving, P -almost surely bijection h on ⌦ such that g = g0 h. Let f = f 0 h.
Then (g, f) induces the distribution µ ⌦ ⌘, and hence the  -algebra H generated by f
is independent of G.
2.3.4 Saturated Agent Space
The following concept of a saturated probability space was introduced in Hoover and
Keisler (1984).
Definition 4. An atomless probability space (S,S, Q) is said to have the saturation
property for a probability measure µ on the product of Polish spaces X ⇥Y if for every
random variable f : S ! X which induces the distribution as the marginal measure of µ
over X, then there is a random variable g : T ! Y such that the induced distribution of
the pair (f, g) on (S,S, Q) is µ.
(S,S, Q) is said to be saturated if for every Polish spaces X and Y , (S,S, Q) has
the saturation property for every probability measure µ on X ⇥ Y .
As noted in Hoover and Keisler (1984), any atomless Loeb space is saturated. It is
pointed out in Keisler and Sun (2009) that one can usually transfer a result on Loeb
spaces to a result on saturated probability spaces via the saturation property. On the
other hand, one can also obtain the necessity of saturation in various contexts.
The following is an obvious corollary of Proposition 1.
Corollary 3. Let (⌦,F , P ) be a atomless probability space. Then the following are
equivalent.14
1. (⌦,F , P ) is saturated.
14Condition (3) is called @1-atomless in Hoover and Keisler (1984), and the equivalence between (1)
and (3) is shown in Corollary 4.5(i) therein. For additional equivalent conditions, see Fact 2.5 in Keisler
and Sun (2009).
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2. Any countably-generated sub- -algebra of F is setwise coarser than F .
3. F is conditional atomless over any countably-generated sub- -algebra.
4. F is relatively saturated with respect to any countably-generated sub- -algebra.
5. Any countably-generated sub- -algebra admits an atomless independent supplement
in F .
The following corollary shows that if (⌦,F , P ) is saturated under a probability mea-
sure P , then (⌦,F , P 0) is also saturated under any measure P 0 which is absolutely
continuous with respect to P . It is a simple consequence of Lemma 2 and Corollary 3.
Corollary 4. Suppose that P 0 is a probability measure on (⌦,F), which is absolutely
continuous with respect to P on (⌦,F). If (⌦,F , P ) is saturated, then so is (⌦,F , P 0).
Proposition 3 above together with Theorem 2 and Remark 1 below show that any
G-measurable large game with/without traits has an F -measurable Nash equilibrium if
and only if G is setwise coarser than F . The following result clearly follows from that
characterization and Corollary 3.15
Corollary 5. Let (⌦,F , P ) be an atomless agent space. Any large game with/without
traits G has a Nash equilibrium if and only if (⌦,F , P ) is saturated.
It is well-known that the Lebesgue unit interval is countably generated, and hence
not saturated. However, one can extend the Lebesgue unit interval (I,B, ⌘) to a satu-
rated probability space (I,F , ⌘0) as in Kakutani (1944). Since B is countably generated,
B admits countably-generated atomless independent supplements in F . Let H be such
an atomless independent supplement. Thus, for any B-measurable large game, Proposi-
tion 3 implies that there always exists a  (B [H)-measurable Nash equilibrium. Note
that  (B [H) is countably generated. Example 3 of Rath, Sun and Yamashige (1995)
showed the nonexistence of Nash equilibrium for a large game with the Lebesgue unit
interval as the agent space. Khan and Zhang (2012) presented a countably-generated
Lebesgue extension as the agent space such that the large game in Rath, Sun and Ya-
mashige (1995, Example 3) will have a Nash equilibrium. Their result is a special case of
Proposition 3 since their countably-generated Lebesgue extension includes an atomless
independent supplement to B.
15For such results, see Keisler and Sun (2009) and Khan et al. (2013) in the setting of large games
and large games with traits respectively.
22 Chapter 2. Modeling Infinitely Many Agents
2.3.5 Many More Players than Strategies
Rustichini and Yannelis (1991) proposed the following “many more players than strate-
gies” condition which aims to solve the convexity problem of the Bochner integral of a
correspondence from a finite measure space to an infinite-dimensional Banach space,16
and Yannelis (2009) used this condition to prove the existence of equilibrium.
For any given atomless agent space (⌦,F , P ), let L1(P ) denote the Banach space of
all essentially bounded functions endowed with the norm k ·k1, and L1E (P ) the subspace
of L1(P ) with the elements which vanish o↵ E. Let card(K) denote the cardinality of
the set K.
Assumption 1 (Many more players than strategies). (⌦,F , P ) is a measure space






As discussed in Remark 4 of Rustichini and Yannelis (1991), with the continuum hy-
pothesis and the fact that an infinite-dimensional Banach space cannot have a countable
Hamel basis, this condition implies that for each E 2 F with µ(E) > 0, dim(L1E (P )) > c.
Thus any countably-generated sub- -algebra is setwise coarser than (⌦,F , P ). There-
fore, any result that holds on saturated probability spaces will automatically hold on an
agent space that satisfies the condition of “many more players than strategies”.
2.4 Necessity
In previous sections, we have shown that the setwise coarseness condition can be used
to handle the failure of the Lebesgue unit interval and is more general than various
approaches proposed for handling such failure. This raises the question of whether the
condition is optimal and, if so, then in what sense. The purpose of this section is to
point out that the setwise coarseness condition is optimal in the sense that it is necessary
to derive certain desirable properties that involve many economic agents. In particular,
we will focus on the following three results from general equilibrium theory and game
theory: (1) determinateness property in large economies, (2) existence of equilibria in
large games with traits, and (3) determinateness property in large games.17
16For further discussions on the relevance of this condition in general equilibrium theory, see Tourky
and Yannelis (2001).
17The proofs are given in Section 2.5.
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The following theorem demonstrates the necessity of setwise coarseness in deriving
the determinateness property in large economies as in Proposition 2.
Theorem 1. If for any two G-measurable economies E1 and E2 with the same distribu-
tion, we have DW (E1) = DW (E2), then G is setwise coarser than F .
The next theorem presents a converse of the result in Proposition 3. In particular,
it shows the necessity of setwise coarseness for the existence of Nash equilibria in large
games with traits.
Theorem 2. If any G-measurable large game with traits has an F-measurable Nash
equilibrium, then G is setwise coarser than F .
Remark 1. Since a large game can be viewed as a large game with traits where the
trait space is a singleton, the existence of Nash equilibrium in large games under the
setwise coarseness condition is trivial. In the proof of Theorem 2 below, we also show
the necessity of setwise coarseness for the existence of Nash equilibria in large games;
see Remark 2 in Section 2.5.
As noted in the introduction, Khan and Sun (1999) presented an example of two
large games G1 and G2 with the same distribution on agents’ characteristics such that
G1 has a Nash equilibrium but G2 does not. Thus, the determinateness property fails
more severely for large games. The following proposition characterizes the validity of
the determinateness property for large games via the setwise coarseness condition.
Proposition 4. G is setwise coarser than F if and only if D(G1) = D(G2) for any two
G-measurable large games G1 and G2 with the same distribution, where D(Gi) is the set
of distributions of F-measurable Nash equilibria in the game Gi for i = 1, 2.
2.5 Proofs
2.5.1 Proofs of Results in Section 2.2
Proof of Proposition 1. “(i))(ii)”: Suppose that F is not conditional atomless over G,
then there exists a set D 2 F with P (D) > 0 such that for any F -measurable subset D0
of D, we have P (D0 | G) = 0 or P (D0 | G) = P (D | G) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦. For such
an F -measurable set D0, let E = {! : P (D0 | G) = P (D | G)}. Then we have E 2 G
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and P (D0 | G) = P (D | G)1E = P (D \ E | G) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, where 1E is the







P (D0 | G) dP =
Z
⌦




1D\E dP = P (D \ E).
Next, we have
P (D0 \ Ec) =
Z
⌦
P (D0 \ Ec | G) dP =
Z
⌦




1EcP (D | G)1E dP = 0.
Let D00 = D0 \ Ec. Then D00 is a null set and (D0 \D00) ✓ D \ E, hence P (D0 \D00) =
P (D\E). Therefore, P (D04(D\E)) = 0, which contradicts with the assumption that
G is setwise coarser than F .
“(ii))(i)”: Suppose that G is not setwise coarser than F . Then there exists a set
D 2 F with P (D) > 0, for any F -measurable subset D0 of D, there exists a set E 2 G
such that P (D04(E\D)) = 0. Hence we have P (D0 | G) = P (E\D | G) = 1EP (D | G)
for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦, which contradicts with the assumption that F is conditional
atomless over G.
“(i))(iii)”: Suppose that G is setwise coarser than F . To prove the relative satu-
ration as in Definition 1 (3), we note that  (f) is also setwise coarser than F . Thus
F is conditional atomless over  (f). The claim then holds by referring to the proof of
Corollary 4.5 (i) in Hoover and Keisler (1984) (f and g here are x1 and x2 therein).
“(iii))(iv)”: Since G is countably generated, there exists a mapping f from ⌦ to
[0, 1] such that the  -algebra G is generated by f . Let ⌘ be the Lebesgue measure on
[0, 1], and µ = (P   f 1) ⌦ ⌘. Since F is relatively saturated with respect to G, there
exists an F -measurable mapping g from ⌦ to [0, 1] such that P   (f, g) 1 = µ. It is
clear that g is independent of f and generates an atomless  -algebra. Therefore, the
 -algebra generated by g is atomless and independent of G.
“(iv))(ii)”: This is exactly Lemma 4.4 (iv) of Hoover and Keisler (1984).
Proof of Lemma 1. Consider the product space (I ⇥ I,B ⌦ B, ⌘ ⌦ ⌘) of two Lebesgue
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unit intervals, where I = [0, 1], B is the Borel  -algebra, and ⌘ is the Lebesgue measure.
Since (⌦,F , P ) is atomless, there exists a measurable mapping h = (f, g) from ⌦ to
[0, 1]⇥ [0, 1] which induces ⌘⌦ ⌘. Then f and g are independent and generate atomless
sub- -algebras H and G of F respectively. It is clear that G is countably generated, and
admits an atomless independent supplement H in F .
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose G is not setwise coarser than F under P 0. Thus one can find
a set D0 2 F with P 0(D0) > 0, such that for any F -measurable subset D00 of D0, there
exists a set D01 2 GD0 with P 0(D004D01) = 0. Let f be the Radon-Nikodym derivative of
P 0 with respect to P , and E0 the set {! 2 ⌦ : f(!) > 0}.
Let D = D0 \ E0. Then we have










and hence P (D) > 0. For any P 0-null set B ✓ D (✓ E0), we have 0 = P 0(B) =
R
B f dP ,
and hence P (B) = 0.
Any F -measurable subset D0 of D is also a subset of D0. Hence there exists a set
E1 2 G such that P 0(D04(D0 \ E1)) = 0. Let E2 = D \ E1. Then E2 2 GD. We have
P 0(E2 \D0) = P 0((D \ E1) \D0)  P 0((D0 \ E1) \D0) = 0,
and
P 0(D0 \ E2) = P 0(D0 \ (D \ E1))
 P 0(D0 \ (D0 \ E1)) + P 0(D0 \ (D0 \D)) = 0.
Thus P 0(D04E2) = 0, which implies that P (D04E2) = 0. However, this contradicts
the statement that G is setwise coarser than F under P .
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose that E1 and E2 are two G-measurable economies with
the same distribution. Let f1 be an equilibrium of E1. Since P   E 11 = P   E 12 ,
by relative saturation, there exists an F -measurable mapping f2 : ⌦ ! Rl+ such that
P   (E1, f1) 1 = P   (E2, f2) 1. Therefore, f2 is an equilibrium of E2 with distribution
P   f 11 .
Proof of Proposition 3. Suppose that G is setwise coarser than F and G = (↵, v) : ⌦!
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T⇥V is a G-measurable game with traits. Pick any saturated probability space (S,S, Q).
Then there exists an S-measurable game with traits F = ( , u) from S to T⇥V such that
Q F 1 = P  G 1. Since (S,S, Q) is saturated, Theorem 1 of Khan et al. (2013) implies
that F has a Nash equilibrium f from S to A. Define ⌫ = Q  (F, f) 1 2M(T ⇥V⇥A).
If G is setwise coarser than F , and hence relatively saturated to G, then there exists an
F -measurable mapping g from ⌦ to A such that P   (G, g) 1 = ⌫.
We shall show that g is a Nash equilibrium of G. Towards this end, let ⇠ be the
marginal of ⌫ on T ⇥A, and {an : n 2 N} a countable dense subset of A. For any j 2 N,
define a function  j : A ⇥ V ! R as  j(a, ) =  (a, ⇠)    (aj, ⇠). It is clear that  j is
continuous. Next, define two more functions h1j : S ! R and h2j : ⌦ ! R as follows:
h1j(s) =  j(f(s), u(s)) and h2j(!) =  j(g(!), v(!)). Since P   (v, g) 1 = Q   (u, f) 1,
we have P   h 12j = Q   h 11j . Since f is a Nash equilibrium of the game F , h1j(s)   0 for
Q-almost all s 2 S, and hence h2j(!)   0 for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦.
Finally, by grouping countably many P -null sets together, we obtain that for P -
almost all !, v(!)(g(!), ⇠)   v(!)(aj, ⇠) for all j 2 N, which implies that v(!)(g(!), ⇠)  
v(!)(a, ⇠) for all a 2 A by the continuity of v(!). Therefore, g is a Nash equilibrium of
the game G.
2.5.2 Proof of Theorem 1
The result in the following lemma is well-known.18 Here we give a simple and direct
proof.
Lemma 4. If (⌅,⌃,⇤) is an atomless probability space and ⌃ is countably generat-
ed, then there exists a measure-preserving mapping  from (⌅,⌃,⇤) to the Lebesgue
unit interval (I,B, ⌘) such that for any E 2 ⌃, there exists a set E 0 2 B such that
⇤(E4  1(E 0)) = 0.
Proof. Since ⌃ is countably generated, based on Theorem 6.5.5 in Bogachev (2007),
there is a measurable mapping  1 from ⌅ to I such that  1 could generate the  -algebra
⌃. Since (⌅,⌃,⇤) is atomless, the induced measure ⇤    11 on I is atomless. Moreover,
by Theorem 16 (p. 409) in Royden (1988), (I,B,⇤    11 ) is isomorphic to the Lebesgue
18This result plays a key role in obtaining the necessity of saturation in Keisler and Sun (2009). See
Fremlin (1989) for a general result of this kind.
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unit interval (I,B, ⌘); denote this isomorphism by  2. Let  =  2    1, then  satisfies
the requirement.
Note that the probability space (⌦,G, P ) may not be atomless. There exist disjoint
G-measurable subsets ⌦1 and ⌦2 such that ⌦1 [ ⌦2 = ⌦, and P |⌦1 is the atomless part
of P , while P |⌦2 is the purely atomic part of P . Let P (⌦1) =  . If   = 0, then (⌦,G, P )
is purely atomic and the setwise coarseness condition is automatically satisfied. Thus
we only need to consider the case that 0 <    1. The lemma above shows that there
exists a measure-preserving mapping   : (⌦1,G⌦1 , P )! ([0,  ),B1, ⌘1) such that for any
E 2 G⌦1 , there exists a set E 0 2 B1 such that P (E4  1(E 0)) = 0, where B1 is B[0, ) and
⌘1 is the Lebesgue measure on B1.
Example 1. Fix a natural number n   1. The agent spaces for two-good economies
E1 and E2 are both denoted by (⌦,F , P ). In both economies, agents have the same
preference, and the indi↵erence curves are shown in Figure 1. For i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n, the
i-th segment Di is represented by y = x + 1   2i 12n , x 2 [2n+2i 14n , 6n+2i 14n ]. The dashed
lines Bl(p⇤) and Bh(p⇤) are orthogonal with respect to all Di, and ✓ is su ciently small.
Thus, the preference is well defined.








, if ! 2 ⌦1,
(0, 0), if ! 2 ⌦2,












, if ! 2 ⌦i1,
(0, 0), if ! 2 ⌦2,
where ⌦i1 =
 
! 2 ⌦1 :  (!) 2 [ i 12n  , i2n )
 
for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n. The set of endowments is
represented by the segment W : y = x for x 2 [1, 2]. Then the distributions of economies
E1 and E2 are the same.19
Now we will prove Theorem 1 based on this example.
19The example in Kannai (1970) is a special case of our example when n = 1 and (⌦,F , P ) is the
Lebesgue unit interval.






















Proof of Theorem 1. Consider Example 1 above. It is clear that both economies are
G-measurable. Since the distributions of economies E1 and E2 are the same, we have
that DW (E1) = DW (E2).














, if ! 2 ⌦i1,
(0, 0), if ! 2 ⌦2,
for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n.
When the price is p⇤, for agent ! 2 ⌦1, if his endowment is given by the point
L = (1, 1) (resp. H = (2, 2)), then his budget line is Bl(p⇤) (resp. Bh(p⇤)); if his
endowment is given by the point A 2 W which is between L and H, then his budget
line is BA(p⇤) which is parallel to Bl(p⇤) and Bh(p⇤). The best response for the agent
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! 2 ⌦1 must be the set of all intersections of his budget line and [1i2nDi.





 ⌘  ⇣2n+2i 14n + 2n  (!)    i 12n  ⌘ = 1  2i 12n ,
and hence f2(!) 2 Di. Thus, f2 induces a uniform distribution on Di with total measure
 






































4n + ↵ =   + ↵.
Similarly, we can check for the second good. Thus, the market clearing condition is
satisfied. Therefore, (p⇤, f2) is an equilibrium in the economy E2.
Then P   f 12 =  µ+ (1   ) (0,0), where µ is the uniform distribution on [1i2nDi
and  (0,0) is the Dirac measure at the point (0, 0).
Since E1 has an equilibrium allocation f1 with the same distribution of f2, there exist
2n disjoint F -measurable subsets E1, E2, . . . , E2n of ⌦1 such that f1(!) 2 Di if ! 2 Ei
for i = 1, . . . , 2n, and P   f 11 = P   f 12 . Let h be a Borel measurable mapping from









if (x, y) 2 Di for i = 1, 2, . . . , 2n. Then 1 P   f 11   h 1 is the uniform distribution on
[0,  )⇥ {1, . . . , 2n}.
Moreover, we shall show that in the economy E1, if the equilibrium allocation is f1,
then p⇤ must be the corresponding equilibrium price. We consider the price p0 = (a, b)
such that a > b > 0 (since the preference is monotonic, the equilibrium price for each
good must be positive). Given agent !L 2 ⌦1 and assume that his endowment is given
by the point L = (1, 1). Denote his budget line as Bl(p0) as shown in Figure 1. As can be
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seen, there is a sub-segment of D1 with positive length such that every point on this sub-
segment is an interior point of !L’s budget set. Since the preference is monotonic, every
point on this sub-segment cannot be a best response for agent !L, and hence cannot be
a best response for any agent ! 2 ⌦1. Thus, the probability measure induced by any
equilibrium allocation under the price p0 will assign zero probability on this sub-segment
of D1, which contradicts the condition that P   f 11 = P   f 12 =  µ+ (1   ) (0,0) such
that µ is uniform on [1i2nDi. Similarly, one can check that in the case p00 = (a, b) such
that 0 < a < b, the probability measure induced by any equilibrium allocation under
the price p00 will assign zero probability on a sub-segment of D2n with positive length,
which is also a contradiction.
Thus, we can focus on the equilibrium price p⇤ = (1, 1). As discussed above, for













Then we have h   f1(!) 2 {( (!), i)}2ni=1.
For any C 2 G⌦1 , by Lemma 4, there exists a set C1 2 B1 such that P (C4  1(C1)) =
0. Then we have







P (  2 C1) = 1
2n
P (C),
and hence P⌦1(Ej) =
1
2n . Therefore, Ej is independent of G⌦1 under P⌦1 for j =
1, 2, . . . , 2n.
Step 2. In the following, we will complete the proof by contradiction. Suppose that
G is not setwise coarser than F , then there exists a nonnegligible set D 2 F such that
for any L1 2 FD, there exists a set L2 2 GD, P (L14L2) = 0. If P (⌦2 \ D) > 0, then
G⌦2\D is purely atomic while F⌦2\D is atomless, which is a contradiction. Thus we can
assume that D is a subset of ⌦1. Choose a natural number 2n which is su ciently large
so that 12n <
1
2P
⌦1(D). Assume that E1, E2, . . . , E2n are the 2n sets obtained in Step 1.
Now we focus on the subset ⌦1. For P⌦1-almost all ! 2 ⌦1, we have







for j = 1, 2, . . . , 2n. Denote E = {! 2 ⌦1 : P⌦1(D | G⌦1) > 12P⌦1(D)}. Then it is





= 0. Thus for P⌦1-almost all ! 2 ⌦1, we have
1CjP
⌦1(D | G⌦1) = P⌦1(Cj \D | G⌦1) = P⌦1(Ej \D | G⌦1) < 1
2
P⌦1(D),
which implies P⌦1(Cj \ E) = 0.
Next we have,
P⌦1(D \ ([jCj)) =
Z
⌦1














P⌦1(D \ E) =
Z
⌦1













> 0, which contradicts that P⌦1(Cj \ E) = 0 for
j = 1, 2, . . . , 2n. Therefore, G is setwise coarser than F .
2.5.3 Proofs of Theorem 2 and Proposition 4
As in the proof of Theorem 1, we can also assume that ⌦ = ⌦1 [ ⌦2, where ⌦1,⌦2
are disjoint and G-measurable. Suppose that P |⌦1 is the atomless part of P and P |⌦2
is the purely atomic part of P , P (⌦1) =   2 (0, 1]. The mapping   : (⌦1,G⌦1 , P ) !
([0,  ),B1, ⌘1) is measure-preserving such that for any E 2 G⌦1 , there exists a set E 0 2 B1
such that P (E4  1(E 0)) = 0, where B1 is B[0, ) and ⌘1 is the Lebesgue measure on B1.
Let A1 = [0, 1], A2 = {0, 1, · · · , n  1} (n   2), and A0 = A1 ⇥ A2 with the induced
standard metric in R2. Let d(·, ·) be the Prohorov metric onM(A0). Define a probability
measure ⌘2 on A0 as follows. For any Borel measurable set E ✓ A1 and any j 2 A2,
⌘2(E ⇥ {j}) = 1n ⌘(E \ [0,  )). Let ⌘1 be a convex combination of ⌘2 and the Dirac
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measure concentrated at (1, n  1): ⌘1 =  ⌘2 + (1   ) (1,n 1).
Let f : A0 ⇥ [0, 1]! R be defined as follow. For any a1 2 A1, a2 2 A2 and b 2 [0, 1],
f((a1, a2), b) =
8>>><>>>:
0, if b = 0 or a1 = kb
( j({a2})  12)min{a1   (nk + j)b, (nk + j + 1)b  a1},
if a1 2 ((nk + j)b, (nk + j + 1)b)
for some k 2 N and j 2 A2. The function f is continuous on A0 ⇥ [0, 1].
Define a mapping u from [0,  ) to the space of continuous functions on A0 ⇥M(A0)
as follows.20 For any i 2 [0,  ), a1 2 A1, a2 2 A2 and ⌫ 2M(A0),





Example 2. Fix a natural number n   2. Let (⌦,F , P ) be the agent space, and A = A0
the action space. Define a G-measurable large game G : ⌦! U as follows:
G(!)((a1, a2), ⌫) =
8<:f((a1, a2), f0(⌫))  | (!)  a1|, if ! 2 ⌦1,|a1|+ |a2|, if ! 2 ⌦2,
for any (a1, a2) 2 A and ⌫ 2M(A).
Lemma 5. Suppose that there exists an F-measurable Nash equilibrium g for the above
large game G. Then there exists an F-measurable partition {E0, E1, . . . , En 1} of ⌦1
such that for each j = 0, 1, . . . , n   1, (1) P⌦1(Ej) = 1n , (2) Ej is independent of G⌦1
under the probability measure P⌦1.
Proof. Since u(i) is a continuous function on A ⇥M(A) for any i 2 I. Moreover, it is
clear that u is a continuous mapping from [0,  ) to U under the supremum norm, and
G is a constant function on ⌦2, hence G is a G-measurable game.
Suppose that g = (g1, g2) is an F -measurable Nash equilibrium of G. Let # = P  g 1.
We shall first consider # 6= ⌘1. Then d(#, ⌘1) 2 (0, 1]. Denote b0 = 1n d(#, ⌘1); then
b0  1n .
20The payo↵ function in our example for the case n = 2 is a variation of the payo↵ function used in
Example 3 of Rath, Sun and Yamashige (1995), see also Khan, Rath and Sun (1997).
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For each agent ! 2 ⌦2, since the payo↵ function is |a1| + |a2|, it is obvious that
g(!) = (1, n   1). Now, we consider the best response (a⇤1, a⇤2) for agent ! 2 ⌦1 with
 (!) 6= kb0 for any k 2 N. For any (x, j) 2 A with x 6=  (!),21
G(!)((x, j),#) G(!)(( (!), j),#)
= f((x, j), f0(#))  | (!)  x|  f(( (!), j), f0(#)) < 0.
Thus g1(!) = a⇤1 =  (!) regardless of the value of a
⇤
2. There is a unique pair (k, j
0) with
k 2 N and j0 2 A2 such that  (!) 2 ((nk + j0)b0, (nk + j0 + 1)b0). For any j 2 A2,
G(!)(( (!), j),#) = f(( (!), j), f0(#)). Its value is positive only if j = j0, and thus
g2(!) = a⇤2 = j
0. It is obvious that # coincides with ⌘1 on [ , 1]⇥ A2.
We will show that d(#, ⌘1) is at most (n  1)b0. Fix ✏ = (n  1)b0.
For j = 0, · · · , n   2, let W ⇥ {j} be the support of # on [0,  ) ⇥ {j}. The set
W should be the union of finite disjoint intervals; denote them by W1, . . . ,Wm in the
increasing order.22 The distance between W` and W`+1 is (n  1)b0 for ` = 1, . . . ,m  1.
It is clear that the length of W` is at most b0, ` = 1, . . . ,m.
Take a Borel set E ✓ [0,  ). Without loss of generality we may assume E does not
contain any endpoint of these subintervals. For 1  `  m   1, let E` = W` \ E, then
E`, E`+b0, . . . , E`+(n 1)b0 are all disjoint, and (E`+tb0)⇥{j} is included in (E⇥{j})✏
for any t = 0, . . . , n 1, where (E⇥{j})✏ is ✏-neighborhood of E⇥{j}. Since ⌘(Em)  b0
and ⌘1(D ⇥ {j}) = 1n⌘(D) for any Borel set D ✓ [0,  ), we have
#(E ⇥ {j}) =
m 1X
`=1




⌘(E`) + ⌘(Em)  n
m 1X
`=1





⌘1(E` ⇥ {j}) + ⌘1((E` + b0)⇥ {j}) + · · ·
+ ⌘1((E` + (n  1)b0)⇥ {j})
⌘
+ b0
 ⌘1 (E ⇥ {j})✏ + b0.
21When a2 and ⌫ are fixed, f is a Lipschitz function in terms of a1 with the Lipschitz constant
1
2 .
22For each ` = 1, . . . ,m, W` is in the form of W \ ((nk + j)b0, (nk + j + 1)b0) for some k.
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For j = n   1, let W 0 ⇥ {n   1} be the support of # on [0,  ) ⇥ {n   1}. The set
W 0 should be the union of finite disjoint intervals; denote them by W 01, . . . ,W
0
m in the
increasing order. The distance between {0} and W 01, and W 0` and W 0`+1 are all (n  1)b0
for ` = 1, . . . ,m   1. It is clear that the length of W 0` is at most b0, ` = 1, . . . ,m.
Take a Borel set E ✓ [0,  ). Without loss of generality we may assume E does not
contain any endpoint of the subintervals above. For 1  `  m, let E` = W 0` \ E, then
E`, E`   b0, . . . , E`   (n   1)b0 are all disjoint, and (E`   tb0) ⇥ {n   1} is included in
(E ⇥ {n  1})✏ for any t = 0, . . . , n  1. We have
#(E ⇥ {n  1}) =
mX
`=1











⌘1(E` ⇥ {n  1}) + ⌘1((E`   b0)⇥ {n  1}) + · · ·
+ ⌘1((E`   (n  1)b0)⇥ {n  1})
⌘
 ⌘1 (E ⇥ {n  1})✏ \ {(1, n  1)} .
Given any Borel set C ✓ A. Suppose that C = [0kn 1Ck⇥{k}, where C0, · · · , Cn 1 ✓




#(Ck ⇥ {k}) =
n 1X
k=0












 ⌘1(C✏) + (n  1)b0 = ⌘1(C✏) + ✏.
Hence d(#, ⌘1)  (n  1)b0 = n 1n d(#, ⌘1), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, the only possibility is that # = ⌘1. Then f(a, f0(#)) = 0 for any a 2 A
and G(!)((a1, a2),#) =  | (!)  a1| for any ! 2 ⌦1. The best response correspondence
is H(!) = {( (!), 0), · · · , ( (!), n 1)} for each ! 2 ⌦1 and {(1, n 1)} for each ! 2 ⌦2.
By the definition of Nash equilibria, g(!) 2 H(!) for P -almost all ! 2 ⌦.
For any C 2 G⌦1 , by Lemma 4, there exists an C1 2 B1 such that P (C4  1(C1)) = 0.
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Define Dj = {! 2 ⌦1 : g(!) = ( (!), j)} for j 2 A2. Thus we have
P (Dj \ C) = P (Dj \   1(C1)) = P (g 2 (C1 ⇥ {j}))





P (  2 C1) = 1
n
P (C),
and hence P⌦1(Dj) =
1
n . Therefore, Dj is independent of G⌦1 under P⌦1 for any j 2
A2.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. Firstly we will show the existence of an F -measurable partition
{E0, E1, . . . , En 1} of ⌦1 such that for each j = 0, 1, . . . , n  1, (1) P⌦1(Ej) = 1n , (2) Ej
is independent of G⌦1 under the probability measure P⌦1 .
Consider the game G in Example 2. Define a game with traits G0 = (↵, v) from ⌦ to
T ⇥V , where T is a singleton, ↵ is a constant mapping, and v(!)(a, ⌫) = G(!)(a, ⌫A) for
! 2 ⌦. Then G0 is G-measurable. For the new game G0, there exists an F -measurable
mapping g0 which is a Nash equilibrium of G0. It is easy to see that g0 is also a Nash
equilibrium of the game G because of the construction of the payo↵ function v. There-
fore, Lemma 5 implies the existence of an F -measurable partition {E0, E1, . . . , En 1} of
⌦1 such that for each j = 0, 1, . . . , n   1, (1) P⌦1(Ej) = 1n , (2) Ej is independent of
G⌦1 under the probability measure P⌦1 . Then we can follow the step 2 in the proof of
Theorem 1 to show that G is setwise coarser than F .
Remark 2. In Remark 1 we claimed that G is setwise coarser than F provided that
any G-measurable large game has an F-measurable Nash equilibrium. This result follows
from Lemma 5 and Step 2 in the proof of the necessity part of Theorem 1.
Next we present another large game F with traits such that the action space is finite
and the trait space is uncountable. We shall show that Theorem 2 can be also proved
via this game.
Example 3. Fix a natural number n   2. Let (⌦,F , P ) be the agent space, T = A1 the
trait space with the measure ⇢, and A = A2 the action space. The restricted measure ⇢
on [0,  ) is the Lebesgue measure, and the restricted measure ⇢ on [ , 1] is (1    ) n 1.
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The large game F = (↵, v) with traits is defined as follows:
↵(!) =
8<: (!), if ! 2 ⌦1,1, if ! 2 ⌦2,
and,
v(!)(a, ⌫) =
8<:f( (!), a, f0(⌫)), if ! 2 ⌦1,|a|, if ! 2 ⌦2,
for any a 2 A and ⌫ 2M⇢(T ⇥ A).
Lemma 6. Suppose that there exists an F-measurable Nash equilibrium f for F . Then
there exists a F-measurable partition {E0, . . . , En 1} of ⌦1 such that for each j =
0, . . . , n 1, (1) P⌦1(Ej) = 1n , (2) Ej is independent of G⌦1 under the probability measure
P⌦1.
Proof. Suppose f is an F -measurable Nash equilibrium for the G-measurable large game
F with traits. Let # = P   (↵, f) 1 and b0 = 1n d(#, ⌘1).
Suppose b0 > 0. Note that for agent ! 2 ⌦1 such that  (!) 6= kb0 for any k 2 N and
s 2 A, the best response must be j0 such that  (!) 2 ((nk + j0)b0, (nk + j0 + 1)b0) for
some k 2 N. (↵, f) = g for P -almost all !, where g is the best response in the proof of
the case “# 6= ⌘1” in Lemma 5, which is impossible.
Thus # = ⌘1, which means that f0(#) = 0. Then for agent ! 2 ⌦1, any a 2 A is a
best response, while for agent ! 2 ⌦2, 1 is the best response. We regard (↵, f) as the
function g in the proof of Lemma 5 for the case “# = ⌘1”. The rest is clear.
Then we can follow the argument in the proof of Theorem 1 and show that G is
setwise coarser than F .
Proof of Proposition 4. First, we assume that G is setwise coarser than F . Given any
two G-measurable games G1 and G2 such that P   G 11 = P   G 12 . Suppose that
  2 D(G1), then there is an F -measurable mapping f1 from ⌦ to A such that f1 is an
equilibrium of the game G1 and P   f 11 =  . By the relative saturation property, there
is an F -measurable mapping f2 from ⌦ to A such that P   (G2, f2) 1 = P   (G1, f1) 1. It
is easy to see that f2 is an equilibrium of the game G2, and hence   = P   f 12 2 D(G2).
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Conversely, recall that ⌦1 and ⌦2 are two disjoint G-measurable sets such that P |⌦1
is the atomless part of P and P |⌦2 is the purely atomic part of P . By Lemma 1, there
is an atomless  -algebra H1 on ⌦1 such that H1 ✓ G⌦1 and H1 is setwise coarser than
G⌦1 . Let H =  (H1 [ G⌦2). Then H is setwise coarser than F .
For any G-measurable large game G, since H⌦1 is atomless and H⌦2 coincides with
G⌦2 , there is a H-measurable game G1 such that P   G 11 = P   G 1. Since H is
setwise coarser than F , G1 has an F -measurable equilibrium g1. By the condition that
D(G1) = D(G), D(G) is nonempty. Thus, the G-measurable large game G has an
F -measurable equilibrium. By Remark 2, we know that G is setwise coarser than F .





The theory of correspondences, which has important applications in a variety of areas
(including optimization, control theory and mathematical economics), has been stud-
ied extensively in recent years. However, basic regularity properties on the distribu-
tions of correspondences/integrals of Banach valued correspondences such as convexity,
closeness, compactness and preservation of upper hemicontinuity may all fail when the
underlying probability space is the Lebesgue unit interval; see Sun (1996, 1997) and
Keisler and Sun (2009) among others. These issues are resolved in Sun (1996, 1997)
by considering a class of rich measure spaces, the so-called Loeb measure spaces con-
structed from the method of nonstandard analysis. It is further shown in Keisler and
Sun (2009) that the abstract property of saturation on a probability space is not only
su cient but also necessary for any of these regularity properties for distributions of cor-
respondences to hold. Furthermore, Sun and Yannelis (2008) found that all the existing
results for Bochner/Gel0fand integrals of Banach valued correspondences in Loeb spaces
can be easily transferred to results on saturated spaces via the saturation property, and
Podczeck (2008) proved the convexity and compactness results over general saturated
probability spaces without appealing to the existing relevant results on Loeb spaces.1
1For some related results, see Knowles (1975), Diestel and Uhl (1977, p. 263), Rustichini and Yannelis
(1991), Sun (1992), Khan and Zhang (2012) and Khan and Sagara (2013, 2014a,b) among others.
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As noted in Hoover and Keisler (1984) and Fajardo and Keisler (2002), a saturated
probability space is necessarily rich with measurable sets in the sense that any of its
nontrivial sub-measure space is not countably generated module null sets. However, in
applications, one often encounters measure spaces that are countably generated (thus
not saturated). To reconcile this possibility of non-absolute richness, we consider the
condition of “setwise coarseness” proposed in Chapter 2, which captures in a certain
sense relative richness.
The first aim of this chapter is to study all the regularity properties on the (condi-
tional) distribution of a correspondence under the condition of setwise coarseness. If a
correspondence G is F -measurable, its selections are allowed to be T -measurable and F
is setwise coarser than T , then Theorem 3 below shows that the regularity properties
on the distribution of a correspondence could be retained for the distribution of G. Fur-
thermore, Theorem 4 shows the setwise coarseness condition can be derived from any
of those regularity properties. It is easy to see that an atomless probability space is
saturated if and only if any countably generated sub- -algebra is setwise coarser than
itself. Thus, Theorems 3 and 4 here sharpen the corresponding results in Keisler and
Sun (2009). Furthermore, we extend those regularity properties to regular conditional
distribution of a correspondence. Based on the setwise coarseness condition, we show
that the set of regular conditional distributions induced by all the T -measurable se-
lections of an F -measurable correspondence will satisfy the usual regularity properties
of convexity, closeness, compactness and preservation of upper hemicontinuity. Since
the results for distribution of a correspondence are direct consequences of those results
for the regular conditional distribution of a correspondence, the necessity of the set-
wise coarseness condition thus follows from any of the regularity properties on regular
conditional distribution of a correspondence.
The second aim is to explore the regularity properties on the (conditional) expecta-
tion of a correspondence. Theorem 6 below shows that the regularity properties could be
retained for the (Bochner/Gel0fand) conditional expectations of a Banach valued corre-
spondence based on the setwise coarseness condition. Furthermore, Theorem 7 demon-
strates that the setwise coarseness condition can be derived from any of those regularity
properties. Since the results for integrals of correspondences are direct consequences of
those results for the conditional expectations of correspondences, the regularity proper-
ties for Bochner/Gel0fand integrals of Banach valued correspondences is straightforward
given the regularity properties on conditional expectations of correspondences.
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The last aim of this chapter is to extend the classical results on integrals of corre-
spondences (in Rn)2 to the case of conditional expectations of correspondences. For a
correspondence F from an atomless probability space (T, T , ) to the Euclidean space
Rn, let I(T ,G)F be the set of all E(f |G) such that f is an integrable selection of F , where
E(f |G) is the conditional expectation of f on some given sub- -algebra G of T . By
the classical Lyapunov Theorem, the atomless property of (T, T , ) implies the convex-
ity of I(T ,G)F if G is the trivial  -algebra {T, ;}. However, it is easy to see that such
a convexity result fails when we work with a general sub- -algebra G of T .3 Similar-
ly, some other common regularity properties, such as compactness and preservation of
upper hemicontinuity, also fail to hold in the general case. Based on the condition of
setwise coarseness, Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976) established the equivalence of I(T ,G)F
and I(T ,G)co(F ) for any measurable, integrably bounded and closed valued correspondence F ,
where co(F )(t) is the convex hull of F (t) for each t 2 T . We show that I(T ,G)F is convex
for any correspondence F if and only if G is setwise coarser than T . We also prove
that this condition is necessary and su cient for the weak/weak⇤ compactness of I(T ,G)F
for any integrably bounded and compact valued correspondence F . A similar necessity
and su ciency result holds for the property on preservation of upper hemicontinuity.
Therefore, we characterize the properties of convexity, compactness and preservation
of upper hemicontinuity for conditional expectations of correspondences in Rn via the
setwise coarseness condition.
The rest is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides mathematical preparations for
the results of the chapter. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 shows that the setwise coarseness is
both su cient and necessary for the regularity properties of conditional distributions
of correspondences/conditional expectations of Banach valued correspondences. In Sec-
tion 3.5, we extend the classical results on integrals of correspondences (in Rn) to the
case of conditional expectations of correspondences. This chapter is based on the papers
He and Sun (2013a,b,d).
2See, for example, Aumann (1965) and Hildenbrand (1974).
3Suppose that F (t) = {0, 1} for all t 2 T , which is a measurable, integral bounded and compact
valued correspondence. Given G = T , then the conditional expectation of F conditional on G is the set
of all integrable selections, which is not convex.
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3.2 Preliminary
Throughout this section, the triples (T, T , ) will denote an atomless probability space
with a complete countably additive probability measure  . The usual Lebesgue unit
interval is denoted by (I, I, ⌘), i.e., the unit interval I = [0, 1] endowed with the Borel
 -algebra I and the Lebesgue measure ⌘. Hereafter, let X and Y be Polish spaces,
and M(X), M(Y ) the spaces of all Borel probability measures endowed with the weak
topology. Then M(X) and M(Y ) are again Polish spaces.
A correspondence F from T to X is a mapping from T to the family of nonempty
subsets of X, i.e., P(X)   ;. A correspondence F from (T, T , ) to X is said to be
measurable if {t 2 T : F (t) \ E 6= ;} 2 T for each closed subset E ✓ X. A mapping
f : T ! X is called a selection of F if f(t) 2 F (t) for  -almost all t 2 T . The
correspondence F is said to be closed (resp. compact, convex) valued if F (t) is a closed
(resp. compact, convex) subset of X for all  -almost all t 2 T .
A correspondence F from a topological space Y to another topological space Z is
said to be upper-hemicontinuous at y0 2 Y if for any open set OZ that contains F (y0),
there exists an open neighborhood OY of y0 such that 8y 2 OY , F (y) ✓ OZ . F is
upper-hemicontinuous if it is upper-hemicontinuous at every point y 2 Y .
Every Polish space admits a (not necessarily complete) totally bounded metric (see
Billingsley (1968)). Suppose d is a totally bounded metric on the Polish spaceX, the dis-
tance between a point a 2 X and a nonempty set B ✓ X is d(a,B) = infb2B d(a, b). The
Hausdor↵ semidistance between two nonempty sets A and B is  (A,B) = supa2A d(a,B),
the Hausdor↵ distance between A and B is defined as ⇢(A,B) = max{ (A,B),  (B,A)}.
Let FX be the hyperspace of nonempty closed subsets of X endowed with the topology
induced by the metric ⇢.
The characterization of the measurability of correspondences with compact range in
terms of mappings taking values in the hyperspace FX is well known. The following
lemma from Sun (1996) considered the case with the range of Polish spaces.
Lemma 7. 1. The hyperspace FX with the metric ⇢ is a Polish space.
2. If F is a closed valued correspondence from T to X, then F is a measurable cor-
respondence if and only if F is a measurable mapping from T to FX .
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3.3 Regular Conditional Distributions of Correspon-
dences
In this section, we shall consider (regular conditional) distributions of correspondences.
3.3.1 Distributions of Correspondences
Let (T, T , ) be a probability space, F a sub  -algebra of T , and X a Polish space. If
F is a correspondence from T to X, then
DTF = { f 1 2M(X) : f is a T -measurable selection of F};
and
DFF = { f 1 2M(X) : f is an F -measurable selection of F}.
The superscript will be omitted when the  -algebra to be considered is clear.
Theorem 3. Suppose that (T, T , ) and (T,F , ) are both atomless,4 F ✓ T is countably
generated and F is setwise coarser than T , then we have the following properties.
A1 For any closed valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, DTF is convex.
A2 For any closed valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, DTF is closed.
A3 For any compact valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, DTF is com-
pact.
A4 Let F be a compact valued correspondence from T to X, Y is a metric space, G is
a closed valued correspondence from T ⇥ Y to X, such that
a 8(t, y) 2 T ⇥ Y , G(t, y) ✓ F (t);
b 8y 2 Y , G(·, y) (denoted as Gy) is F-measurable from T to X;
c 8t 2 T , G(t, ·) (denoted as Gt) is upper-hemicontinuous from Y to X;
Then H(y) = DTGy is upper-hemicontinuous from Y to M(X).
A5 Let G be a measurable mapping from (T,F , ) to the space M(X) of probability
measures on X. Then there is a T -measurable mapping f from T to X such that:
4The condition that (T,F , ) is atomless can be relaxed, see Remark 3.
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a for every Borel set B in X,  f 1(B) =
R
T G(t)(B) d (t);
b for each t 2 T , f(t) 2 suppG(t), where suppG(t) is the support of the proba-
bility measure G(t) on X.
Remark 3. The condition that (T,F , ) is atomless is not necessary, we do this for
simplicity. If (T,F , ) is not atomless, then T can be partitioned into an atomless part
T1 and a purely atomic part T2. On T2, we can find a countably generated atomless
 -algebra F2 such that F2 ✓ T T2 and F2 is setwise coarser than T T2; see Lemma 1.
Denote F 0 =  {FT1 ,F2}. Then F ✓ F 0, F 0 is atomless and countably generated, and F 0
is setwise coarser than T . Any F-measurable correspondence must be also measurable
with respect to F 0,we can apply Theorem 3 to (T,F 0, ).
Proof of Theorem 3. Let   = {(x,E) 2 X ⇥ FX : x 2 E}. Then f is a selection of F if
and only if  (f, F ) 1( ) = 1.
A1. For any µ1, µ2 2 DTF and 0  ↵  1, µ = ↵µ1 + (1   ↵)µ2. there are two
T -measurable selections f1 and f2 of F such that µi =  f 1i for i = 1, 2. Define
⌧i =  (fi, F ) 1 for i = 1, 2, ⌧ = ↵⌧1 + (1   ↵)⌧2, then ⌧X = ↵µ1 + (1   ↵)µ2 = µ and
⌧FX =  F
 1. Because of the relative saturation property, there exists a T -measurable
function f , such that  (f, F ) 1 = ⌧ , hence  f 1 = µ.
Since ⌧i( ) = 1 for i = 1, 2, we have ⌧( ) = 1. Thus f is a T -measurable selection
of F and ↵µ1 + (1  ↵)µ2 2 DTF , which implies that DTF is convex.




F , where D
F
F denotes the
closure of DFF .
First we show DTF ✓ DFF .
8µ 2 DTF , suppose µ =  f 1, where f is a T -measurable selection of F . For any open
set O ✓ X, µ(O) =  (t : f(t) 2 O)   (t : F (t) \ O 6= ;) =  (F 1(O)). Proposition
3.5 of Keisler and Sun (2009) gives a powerful characterization of Borel probability
measures for the closure of DFF . In particular, the Borel probability measure µ belongs
to the closure of DFF if and only if
µ(O)   (F 1(O)) for any open set O in X. (3.1)
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So µ 2 DFF , i.e, DTF ✓ DFF .
Conversely, 8µ 2 DFF , 9{µn}1n=1 ✓ DFF , µn ! µ. Suppose µn =  f 1n , where {fn}
is a sequence of F -measurable selections of F . Since the family {µ1, · · · , µn, · · · } is
tight, the sequence { (fn, F ) 1}1n=1 is also tight. Therefore, it has a subsequence, say
{ (fn, F ) 1}1n=1 itself, which converges weakly to some measure ⌧ such that ⌧X = µ.
Thus, 1   ⌧( )   lim sup  (fn, F ) 1( ) = 1.
Because of the relative saturation property, there exists a T -measurable mapping f
such that  (f, F ) 1 = ⌧ and  f 1 = µ, which implies that f is a T -measurable selection
of F . Therefore, µ =  f 1 2 DTF and DFF ✓ DTF .
As a result, DTF = DFF , D
T
F is closed.
A3. In the proof of Theorem 4 of Sun (1996), it was shown that DFF is relatively
compact. Thus, DTF = DFF is closed and relatively compact, and hence compact.
A4. Since F is compact valued and G(·, y) is a closed subset of F (·) for every
y 2 Y , G(·, y) is also compact valued. Because of (A3), H(·) is a compact valued
correspondence.
To show H is upper-hemicontinuous, if yn ! y, µn 2 H(yn) = DTGyn , µn ! µ, we
need to show µ 2 DTGy = H(y).
Since µn 2 DTGyn = DFGyn , 9{µmn }1m=1 ✓ DFGyn such that µmn weakly converges to µn
as m ! 1. 9mn dependent on n, d(µmnn , µn) < 1n . Suppose gn is an F -measurable





Let J(t) = {(gn(t), yn)}n2N, then J is a compact valued F -measurable correspon-
dence from T to X ⇥ Y , and DTJ is compact. Since  (gn, yn) 1 weakly converges to
µ⇥  y 2 DTJ , J has a T -measurable selection (g, y) such that  (g, y) 1 = µ⇥  y. Since
Gt(·) is upper-hemicontinuous for all t 2 T , g is a T -measurable selection of Gy and
µ 2 DTGy . Thus, H is upper-hemicontinuous.
A5. Since G is F -measurable, the function t ! G(t)(B) is F -measurable for each
Borel set B inX. Let F be the correspondence from T ! X, such that F (t) = suppG(t),
then F is a closed valued F -measurable correspondence.
G(t)(F (t)) = 1, 8t. For every open set O in X, we have F 1(O) = {t : F (t) \ O 6=
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;} = {t : G(t)(O) > 0}. ) F 1(O) is F -measurable.
Define µ(O) =
R








  (G(t)(O) > 0) =  (F 1(O)).
) µ belongs to the closure of DFF , i.e, µ 2 DTF . There exists a T -measurable selection f
of F , such that  f 1 = µ. The proof completes.
Remark 4. In Keisler and Sun (2009), they prove that the above properties hold if
the underlying probability space is saturated. This result is clear based on our theorem,
besides that we need an additional condition in Property A1 that the correspondence is
closed valued.
3.3.2 Converse Results for Distributions of Correspondences
In this section, we show that each of the properties A1-A5 in Theorem 3 implies the
setwise coarseness condition, which extends the corresponding results in Section 3.3 of
Keisler and Sun (2009).
Theorem 4. Let (T, T , ) be an atomless probability space, F a countably generated
sub- -algebra of T and X a fixed Polish space. Then F is setwise coarser than T given
any of the following conditions.
B1 For any closed valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X,5 DTF is convex.
B2 For any closed valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, DTF is closed.
B3 For any compact valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, DTF is com-
pact.
B4 For any closed valued correspondence G from T ⇥Y to X (Y is a Polish space) such
that there exists a compact valued correspondence F from T to X and
a 8(t, y) 2 T ⇥ Y , G(t, y) ✓ F (t);
b 8y 2 Y , G(·, y) (denoted as Gy) is F-measurable from T to X;
5Note that in the proof we only need F to be finitely valued.
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c 8t 2 T , G(t, ·) (denoted as Gt) is upper-hemicontinuous from Y to X.
H(y) = DTGy is upper-hemicontinuous from Y to M(X).
B5 For any F-measurable mapping G from T to M(X), there is a T -measurable map-
ping f from T to X such that:
1. for every Borel set B in X,  f 1(B) =
R
T G(t)(B) d (t),
2. for each t 2 T , f(t) 2 suppG(t), where suppG(t) is the support of the
probability measure G(t) on X.
In the above theorem we assume that X is a fixed Polish space, the following lemma
enables us to consider the real line.
Lemma 8. Suppose that K is an uncountable compact subset of the Polish space X and
A is a compact interval of the real line. (T, T , ) is atomless, F ✓ T , and F is countably
generated. If for any finitely valued F-measurable correspondence G : T ! K, DTG is
convex, then for any finitely valued F-measurable correspondence F : T ! A, DTF is also
convex.
Proof. Following the argument in Section 6 of Rath, Sun and Yamashige (1995), there
exist a continuous onto mapping  2 : K ! A and a Borel measurable mapping  1 : A!
K such that  2( 1(a)) = a for all a 2 A.
For any µ1, µ2 2 DTF , ↵ 2 [0, 1], there exist two T -measurable selections f1 and f2
of F , such that  f 1i = µi for i = 1, 2. Define G =  1   F , then G is an F -measurable
correspondence from T to K. Define gi =  1   fi and ⌫i =  g 1i for i = 1, 2, then
⌫1, ⌫2 2 DTG ; since DTG is convex, there exists a T -measurable selection g of G such that
 g 1 = ↵⌫1 + (1   ↵)⌫2. Define f =  2   g, for any t, f(t) =  2(g(t)) 2  2(G(t)) =
 2( 1(F (t))) = F (t), hence f is a T -measurable selection of F .
In addition,  f 1 =  g 1  12 = (↵⌫1 + (1   ↵)⌫2)  12 = ↵⌫1  12 + (1   ↵)⌫2  12 =
↵ g 11  
 1
2 + (1   ↵) g 12   12 = ↵ f 11   11   12 + (1   ↵) f 12   11   12 = ↵ f 11 + (1  
↵) f 12 = ↵µ1 + (1  ↵)µ2, thus DTF is convex.
Proof of Theorem 4.
If (T,F , ) is purely atomic, we are done. Suppose that T can be partitioned into
two disjoint parts T1 and T2, such that FT1 is atomless and FT2 is atomic, T = T1 [ T2.
 (T1) = 1   .
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Recall that (I, I, ⌘) denotes the Lebesgue unit interval. Since (T1,FT1 , ) is atomless
and FT1 is countably generated, by Lemma 4, there is a measure preserving mapping
  : (T1,FT1 , )! (( , 1], I1, ⌘1)6, such that for any E 2 FT1 , there exists a set E 0 2 I1,
 (E4  1(E 0)) = 0. Moreover, let  (t) =  2 for any t 2 T2.
B1: Based on Lemma 8, we can work with some compact interval A.
For any n   1, let A = [ n, n], F (t) = { (t) + i : 0  i  n   1} [ {  (t)   i :
0  i  n   1}. Let µ+i =  (  + i) 1 and µ i =  (     i) 1, then the sup-
port of µ+i concentrates on the [i, i + 1] and vanishes outside, the support of µ
 
i con-
centrates on the [ i   1, i] and vanishes outside, 0  i  n   1. Since DTF is









  2 DTF . On ([0in 1(  + i, 1 + i]) [
([0in 1[ 1  i,     i)), µ is uniform with density 12n . This implies that there ex-
ists a function f and 2n T -measurable disjoint sets E+i , E i for 0  i  n  1, such that
µ =  f 1,  
 [1in 1(E+i [ E i )  = 1, and
f(t) =
8<: (t) + i, t 2 E+i  (t)  i, t 2 E i
for some 0  i  n  1. Let E1+i = E+i \ T1 and E1 i = E i \ T1 for 0  i  n  1.
For any set E 2 FT1 , there exists E 0 2 I1, such that  (E4  1(E 0)) = 0.  (E1+0 \
E) =  (E1+0 \   1(E 0)) =  (f 2 E 0) = µ(E 0) = 12nµ+0 (E 0) = 12n (  2 E 0) = 12n (E),
hence  (E1+0 ) =  (E
1+
0 \ T1) = 12n (T1) = 1  2n . Therefore, E1+0 is independent of FT1
under the probability measure  T1 and of measure 1  2n under  . Similarly we could prove
that all E1+i and E
1 
i have the same property, 0  i  n  1.
Then repeating the argument of Step 2 in the proof of Theorem 1, we could show
that F is setwise coarser than T .
B2. Suppose that K is an uncountable compact subset of X and there exists a point
a 2 X \K, (T1, T T1 , T1) is the rescaled atomless probability space.
Firstly, we claim that for any FT1-measurable closed-valued correspondence F1 from
T1 to K, DT
T1
F1 is closed. For any {µn} ✓ DT
T1
F1 such that µn ! µ, we need to show
µ 2 DT T1F1 . Extend the correspondence F1 to the whole space T by letting G(t) =
6I1 is the restriction of I on ( , 1] and ⌘1 is the Lebesgue measure.
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8<:F1(t), t 2 T1{a}, t 2 T2 , G is F -measurable and closed valued. Then (1    )µn +   {a} 2 DTG
for every n 2 N; indeed, for any T -measurable selection fn of F1 such that  T1f 1n = µn,
we extend fn to be a mapping gn from T to X by letting gn(t) =
8<:fn(t), t 2 T1a, t 2 T2 ,
then gn is a T -measurable selection of G and  g 1n = (1    )µn +   {a}. It is clear
that (1    )µn +   {a} ! (1    )µ +   {a} as n ! 1, thus (1    )µ +   {a} 2 DTG
because DTG is closed. Therefore, there exists a T -measurable selection g of G such that
 g 1 = (1   )µ +   {a}. Let f be the restriction of g on T1, then f is a T -measurable













F1 ; follow the same argument in the proof of Theorem 3 (A2), we have
DT T1F1 ✓ DF
T1
F1
. Therefore, DT T1F1 = D
FT1
F1
. For any µ1, µ2 2 DT T1F1 and any 0  ↵  1, let
µ = ↵µ1 + (1   ↵)µ2. µ1 and µ2 are two Borel measures satisfying (3.1), so µ satisfies
(3.1). Because of Proposition 3.5 of Keisler and Sun (2009), µ belongs to DFT1F1 = D
T T1
F1 ,
which implies that DT T1F1 is convex.
Thirdly, consider the correspondence F constructed in the proof of (B1) with the
restricted domain T1. Recall that  1 is the Borel measurable mapping form A to K in
the proof of Lemma 8. Let F2(t) =  1   F (t), since F (t) only contains finite elements
for every t, F2(t) also contains finite elements and is closed valued, thus DT
T1
F2 is con-
vex. Repeat the argument in the proof of Lemma 8, one can show that DT T1F is convex.
Following the proof of (B1), FT1 is setwise coarser than T T1 , which implies that F is
setwise coarser than T since F is atomic on T2.
B3. If DTF is compact, it is certainly closed. Thus by repeating the argument in (B2),
one can show that for any FT1-measurable compact valued correspondence F1 from T1 to
X with its range in an uncountable compact set K, DT T1F1 is convex. Since the composi-
tion of  1 and the correspondence F constructed in the proof of (B1) is indeed compact
valued, F is setwise coarser than T .
B4. Fix n   1, A = [ n, n].7 Define a sequence of correspondences {Gk}k2N as
7For the proof of (B4), we only consider the Euclidean space for simplicity. Similar technical argu-
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follow: Gk(t) = { (t)}, if  (t) 2 [0,  ); Gk(t) = {2n[ (t)       (1    )( i2k + m2nk )] +
  + (1    ) i2k + m, 2n[ (t)       (1    )( i2k + m2nk )]       (1    ) i2k   m}, if  (t) 2
[ +(1  )( i2k+ m2nk ),  +(1  )( i2k+ m+12nk )) for some 0  m  n 1, 0  i  2k 1 and i
is even; Gk(t) = {2n[ (t)   (1  )( i2k+ m2nk )]+ +(1  ) i 12k +m, 2n[ (t)   (1 
 )( i2k +
m
2nk )]    (1  ) i 12k  m}, if  (t) 2 [ +(1  )( i2k + m2nk ),  +(1  )( i2k + m+12nk ))
for some 0  m  n  1, 0  i  2k   1 and i is odd. Let G0(t) = { (t) +m : 0  m 
n  1} [ {  (t) m : 0  m  n  1}. Gk is F -measurable for k = 0, 1, · · · .
For each k 2 N, gk(t) is defined as follow: gk(t) =  (t), if  (t) 2 [0,  ); gk(t) =
2n[ (t)      (1   )( i2k + m2nk )] +   + (1   ) i2k +m, if  (t) 2 [  + (1   )( i2k + m2nk ),   +
(1  )( i2k+m+12nk )) for some 0  m  n 1, 0  i  2k 1 and i is even; gk(t) =  2n[ (t) 
  (1  )( i2k+ m2nk )]   (1  ) i 12k  m, if  (t) 2 [ +(1  )( i2k+ m2nk ),  +(1  )( i2k+m+12nk ))
for some 0  m  n   1, 0  i  2k   1 and i is odd. Then gk is an F -measurable
selection of Gk. There exists a probability measure 9µ 2M(A) such that µ =  g 1k for
all k, and µ is uniform restricted on ([0in 1(  + i, 1 + i])[ ([0in 1[ 1  i,     i))
with density 12n .
Now let Y = {0, 1, 12 , · · · } endowed with the usual metric and G a correspondence
from T ⇥ Y to X such that for all t 2 T , G(t, 0) = G0(t) and G(t, 1k ) = Gk(t) for all
k 2 N. G satisfies the condition (B4), thus µ 2 DTG0 . Follow the argument in (B1), we
could show that F is setwise coarser than T .









, where  1 and  2
below are defined in the proof of Lemma 8. G1 is F -measurable. There exists a T -
measurable mapping f1 such that f1(t) 2 { 1( (t) + i),  1(  (t)   i) : 0  i  n   1}











. Let f =  2   f1. then f
is a T -measurable selection of F (t), where F is the correspondence constructed in the
proof of (B1). For every Borel set B ✓ A,















 ( + i) 1 +  (    i) 1  (B) = µ(B),
ments as in Lemma 8 are needed for a fixed Polish space.
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where µ is the measure constructed in the proof of (B1), then  f 1 = µ. Thus, F can
be shown to be setwise coarser than T by repeating the proof of (B1).
3.3.3 Regular Conditional Distributions of Correspondences
In this section we show that the corresponding results of Theorem 3 still hold if we
consider the regular conditional distributions.
Let (T, T , ) be an atomless probability space and F a sub- -algebra of T . Denote
Cb(X) as the set of all bounded continuous function from X to R for some Polish space
X.
The following definition is standard, see Bogachev (2007).
Definition 5. An F-measurable transition probability from T to X is a mapping   :
T !M(X) such that  (·, B) : t!  (t, B) is F-measurable for every B 2 B(X).
The set of all F-measurable transition probabilities from T to X is denoted by RF(X),
and RF when it is clear.
Definition 6. A sequence { n} in RF is said to weakly converge to some   2 RF














c(t, x) (t, dx)] d (t).
The weak topology on RF is defined as the weakest topology for which the functional
  ! RT [RX c(t, x) (t, dx)] d (t) is continuous for every bounded Carathe´odory function
c.
By Theorem 2.1.3 of Castaing, de Fitte and Valadier (2004), we have the following
lemma.















for every E 2 F and c 2 Cb(X).
8c(·, x) is F-measurable for each x 2 X and c(t, ·) is continuous for each t 2 T .
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If f is a T -measurable mapping from T to X, then µf |F denotes the regular condi-
tional distribution (RCD) of f given F .9 That is, µf |F is a mapping from T ⇥ B(X) to
[0, 1] such that
1. µf |F(t, ·) is a probability distribution on X for any t 2 T ;
2. given any Borel subset B ✓ X, µf |F(·, B) = E[1B(f)|F ]  -a.e.
Let F be a correspondence from T to X. Then
R(T ,F)F = {µf |F : f is a T -measurable seclection of F},
which is the set of all RCDs induced by T -measurable selections of F conditional on F .
Theorem 5. Suppose that (T, T , ) is atomless and F is a countably generated sub- -
algebra of T . If F is setwise coarser than T , then for any sub- -algebra G of F , we
have the following results.
C1 For any closed valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, R(T ,G)F is con-
vex.
C2 For any closed valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, R(T ,G)F is weakly
closed.
C3 For any compact valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, R(T ,G)F is
weakly compact.
C4 Let F be a compact valued F-measurable correspondence from T to X, Z is a metric
space, G is a closed valued correspondence from T ⇥ Z to X, such that
a 8(t, z) 2 T ⇥ Z, G(t, z) ✓ F (t);
b 8z 2 Z, G(·, z) (denoted as Gz) is F-measurable from T to X;
c 8t 2 T , G(t, ·) (denoted as Gt) is upper-hemicontinuous from Z to X;
Then H(z) = R(T ,G)Gz is upper-hemicontinuous from Z to RG.
C5 For any G 2 RF , there exists a T measurable mapping g such that µg|F = G.
9Since X is a Polish space endowed with the Borel  -algebra, the RCD µf |F always exists; see
Durrett (2010).
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Remark 5. The property (C5) in the above theorem was proved in Lemma 4.4 (iii) of
Hoover and Keisler (1984). Thus the property (A5) of Theorem 3 is a special case by
taking G as the trivial  -algebra. We will give an alternative proof for the property (C5).
Proof. Given a sub- -algebra G ✓ F and an F -measurable correspondence F . Suppose
that  is a mapping from T to some Polish space Y such that G is induced by  , ⌘=   1.
Then F1 = ( , F ) is an F -measurable correspondence from T to Y ⇥X. Let g = ( , f)
be a T -measurable selection of F1 and ⌫( ,f) =  g 1. Then ⌫( ,f)Y = ⌘. SinceX and Y are
both Polish spaces, there exists a family of Borel probability measures {#( ,f)(y, ·)}y2Y
(which is ⌘-a.e. uniquely determined) in M(X) which is a disintegration of ⌫( ,f).
Define a transition probability µf from T to M(X) as µf (t, B) = #( ,f)( (t), B) for
any t 2 T and Borel set B ✓ X. Define
R = {µf : f is a T -measurable selection of F},
we shall prove that R coincides with R(T ,G)F .
Fix an arbitrary T -measurable selection f of F . For any E 2 G, there exists a Borel
subset E 0 ✓ Y such that  (E4  1(E 0)) = 0. For any Borel subset B of X,Z
E
µf (t, B) d (t) =
Z
E




#( ,f)(y, B) d⌘(y) = ⌫( ,f)(E 0 ⇥ B) =  (E \ f 1(B))
Thus µf (·, B) = E[1B(f)|F ] = µf |F(·, B)   a.e., which implies that R = R(T ,G)F .
C1. Suppose that f1 and f2 are two T -measurable selections of F and 0  ↵  1.
Since DTF1 is convex, there exists a T -measurable selection f of F such that  ( , f) 1 =
↵ ( , f1) 1 + (1   ↵) ( , f2), i.e., ⌫( ,f) = ↵⌫( ,f1) + (1   ↵)⌫( ,f2). To show µf |G =
↵µf1|G + (1   ↵)µf2|G, it is equivalent to show µf = ↵µf1 + (1   ↵)µf2 . For any E 2 G,








= ↵⌫( ,f1)(E 0 ⇥ B) + (1  ↵)⌫( ,f2)(E 0 ⇥ B)
= ⌫( ,f)(E 0 ⇥ B) =
Z
E
µf (t, B) d (t).
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Therefore, R(T ,G)F is convex.
C2. Suppose that fn is a T -measurable selection of F for each n 2 N and {µfn|G}
is weakly convergent to some µ in RG. Define the probability measure ⌫ 2M(Y ⇥X)
through ⌫(E 0 ⇥ B) = R  1(E0) µ(t, B) d (t), where E 0 and B are Borel sets in Y and X.




























c(y, x) d⌫(y, x),
which implies that ⌫( ,fn) weakly converges to ⌫. The first equality is the disintegra-
tion; the second equality is changing of variables; the third equality is due to the weak
convergence; the last equality is due to the definition of ⌫.
Since ⌫( ,fn) 2 DTF1 for every n 2 N and DTF1 is closed, ⌫ 2 DTF1 ; i.e., there ex-
ists a T -measurable selection f of F such that ⌫ =  ( , f) 1 = ⌫( ,f). Therefore,
µ = µf |G 2 R(T ,G)F , R(T ,G)F is closed.
C3. Suppose {fn} is a sequence of T -measurable selections of F , we need to show
that there exists a subsequence of {µfn|G}1n=1 which weakly converges to some element
in R(T ,G)F .
Since DTF1 is compact, there is a subsequence of {fn}, say {fn} itself, and a T -
measurable selection f of F , such that  ( , fn) 1 weakly converges to  ( , f) 1. For





c(x)µfn(t, dx)] d (t) =
Z
E0⇥X










c(x)µf (t, dx) d (t).
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By Lemma 9, µfn|G =) µf |G, R(T ,G)F is compact.
C4. Suppose zn ! z0 and µgn|G =) µ, where {gn} are T -measurable selections of
Gzn . We will show that µ 2 R(T ,G)Gz0 .
Define the measure ⌫ and ⌫n in M(Y ⇥X) as









where E 0 and B are Borel sets in Y and X. Follow the step in the proof of (C2), we can
show that there is a subsequence of {⌫n}, say {⌫n} itself, which weakly converges to ⌫.
Define  (t, z) = ( (t), G(t, z)), then ( , gn) is a T -measurable selection of ( , Gzn)
and ⌫n =  ( , gn) 1. SinceDT z is upper hemicontinuous from Z toM(Y⇥X), ⌫ 2 DT z0 .
That is, there is a T -measurable selection g of Gz0 such that ⌫ =  ( , g) 1. It is easy
to verify that µ = µg|G 2 R(T ,G)Gz0 .
Therefore, H(z) is upper hemicontinuous.
C5. Suppose  1 is a mapping from T to Y such that F is induced by  1, ⌘1=   11 .
Since G is F -measurable, the function t ! G(t)(B) is F -measurable for each Borel
set B in X. Let N be the correspondence from T ! X such that N(t) = supp G(t),
N1 = ( 1, N), then N1 is a closed valued F -measurable correspondence.
For every Borel set BX in X and BY in Y , define
⌫(BX ⇥ BY ) =
Z
  11 (BY )
G(t)(BX) d (t).
Then For every open set OX in X and OY in Y ,
⌫(OX ⇥OY ) =
Z




  11 (OY )\{t:G(t)(OX)>0}
G(t)(OX) d (t)
  (  11 (OY ) \ {t : G(t)(OX) > 0})
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=  (N 11 (OX ⇥OY )).
Therefore, ⌫ belongs to the closure of DFN1 , i.e, ⌫ 2 DTN1 . There exists a T -measurable
selection g of N , such that  ( 1, g) 1 = ⌫. For any E 2 F , there exists a Borel set E 0









0) \ g 1(B)  =  (g 1(B) \ E).
The proof completes.
Note that in the proof of Theorem 5 (C5), the mapping g constructed indeed satisfies
the following property: for  -a.e. t 2 T , g(t) 2 suppG(t), we now show that this
property is also implied by the conclusion of (C5).
Corollary 6. Given G 2 RF and a T -measurable mapping g. If µg|F = G, then for
 -a.e. t 2 T , g(t) 2 suppG(t).







1D(t)1B(x)G(t, dx) d (t). (3.2)
Define a mapping c from T ⇥X to R as c(t, x) = 1suppG(t)(x). Then c is positive and
F ⌦ B(X)-measurable, and hence an increasing limit of a sequence of simple functions.
Equation 4.3 holds for every rectangle, thus we haveZ
T





c(t, x)G(t, dx) d (t) = 1
by the monotone convergence theorem. Thus, c(t, g(t)) = 1 for  -a.e. t 2 T and the
proof completes.
Remark 6. Note that we have extensively used Theorem 3 in the proof of Theorem 5.
However, Theorem 3 is indeed a direct corollary of the Theorem 5 if we choose G to be
the trivial  -algebra.
The following is an easy corollary of Theorem 4.
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Corollary 7. Let (T, T , ) be an atomless probability space and F a countably generated
sub- -algebra of T . Then F is setwise coarser than T if given any  -algebra G ✓ F ,
one of the following conditions holds.
D1 For any closed valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, R(T ,G)F is con-
vex.
D2 For any closed valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, R(T ,G)F is closed.
D3 For any compact valued F-measurable correspondence F from T to X, R(T ,G)F is
compact.
D4 For any closed valued correspondence G from T ⇥ Y to X such that there exists a
compact valued correspondence F from T to X and
a 8(t, z) 2 T ⇥ Z, G(t, z) ✓ F (t);
b 8z 2 Z, G(·, z) (denoted as Gz) is F-measurable from T to X;
c 8t 2 T , G(t, ·) (denoted as Gt) is upper-hemicontinuous from Z to X;
H(z) = R(T ,G)Gz is upper-hemicontinuous from Z to RG.
D5 For any G 2 RF , there exists a T -measurable mapping g such that µg|F = G.
3.4 Conditional Expectations of Banach Valued Cor-
respondences
3.4.1 Basic Definitions
Throughout this section, we assume that X is a separable Banach space endowed with
its norm k · k, and X⇤ has the Radon-Nikody´m property.
Given a function f from (T, T , ) to X, if it can be approximated in norm by a
sequence of simple functions and kfk is integrable on the space T , then f is said to be
Bochner integrable. A function f from a probability space (T, T , ) to the norm dual
X⇤ of a Banach space X is said to be Gel0fand integrable if for each x 2 X, f(·)(x) is
integrable over (T, T , ). The Gel0fand integral of f is the unique element x⇤ in X⇤ such
that x⇤(x) =
R
T f(·)(x) d  for all x 2 X and x⇤ is also denoted by
R
T f d .
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For 1  p  1, a correspondence F is said to be p-integrably bounded if there is a
real valued function h on (T, T , ) such that hp is integrable and sup{kxk : x 2 F (t)} 
h(t) for  -almost all t 2 T . If p = 1, then we say F is integrably bounded.




f d (t) : f is a G-measurable Bochner integrable selection of F},




f d (t) : f is a G-measurable Gel0fand integrable selection of F},
the integral is Gel0fand integral.
For p   1, assume that LGp (T,X) denotes the set of all G-measurable Bochner inte-
grable mappings from T to X under the usual norm; that is, for 1  p <1,








LG1(T,X) = {f : f is G-measurable, 9c > 0, such that   (t : kf(t)k < c) = 1}.
Since X is separable, it is routine to check that LGp (T,X) is also a separable Banach
space for 1  p < 1 under the condition that G is countably generated. As X⇤ has
the Radon-Nikody´m property, by Theorem 1 of Diestel and Uhl (1977, p.98), LGq (T,X
⇤)
consists of the continuous linear functionals of LGp (T,X) for 1  p <1, where 1p+ 1q = 1.
If F is a correspondence from T to X, then for any sub- -algebra G of T , denote
CI(T ,G)F = {E(f |G) : f is a T -measurable Bochner integrable selection of F},
where E(f |G) is the conditional expectation of f given G and the conditional expectation
takes the Bochner integral.
If F is a correspondence from T to X⇤, then for any sub- -algebra G of T , denote
CG(T ,G)F = {E(f |G) : f is a T -measurable Gel0fand integrable selection of F},
3.4. Conditional Expectations of Banach Valued Correspondences 59
where E(f |G) is the conditional expectation of f given G and the conditional expectation
takes the Gel0fand integral.
3.4.2 Regularity Properties
Below we shall state the properties of convexity, compactness and preservation of upper
hemicontinuity for conditional expatiations of correspondences.
Theorem 6. If F is setwise coarser than T , then for any sub- -algebra G of F , we have
the following properties.
A1 For any norm closed valued correspondence F from (T,F , ) to X, CI(T ,G)F is convex.
A2 For any p-integrably bounded, weakly compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X with 1  p <1, CI(T ,G)F is weakly compact in LGp (T,X).
A3 For any p-integrably bounded, weakly compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X with 1  p < 1, CI(T ,G)F = CI(T ,G)coF , where coF is the correspondence such
that for each t 2 T , coF (t) is the norm closure of the convex hull of F (t).
A4 Suppose that G is a p-integrably bounded, weakly compact valued correspondence
from (T,F , ) to X with 1  p < 1. Let F be a weakly closed valued correspon-
dence from T ⇥ Y ! X (Y is a metric space). If
1. F (t, y) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T ;
2. 8y 2 Y , F (·, y) is F-measurable;
3. 8t 2 T , F (t, ·) is weakly upper hemicontinuous;
then H(y) = CI(T ,G)Fy is weakly upper hemicontinuous in L
G
p (T,X).
A5 For any norm closed valued correspondence F from (T,F , ) to X⇤, CG(T ,G)F is
convex.
A6 For any p-integrably bounded, weak⇤ compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X⇤ with 1 < p  1, CG(T ,G)F is weak⇤ compact in LGp (T,X⇤).
A7 For any p-integrably bounded, weak⇤ compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X⇤ with 1 < p  1, CG(T ,G)F = CG(T ,G)w⇤ coF , where w⇤ coF is the correspondence
such that for each t 2 T , w⇤   coF (t) is the weak⇤ closure of the convex hull of
F (t).
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A8 Suppose that G is a p-integrably bounded, weak⇤ compact valued correspondence from
(T,F , ) to X⇤ with 1 < p  1. Let F be an weak⇤ closed valued correspondence
from T ⇥ Y ! X⇤ (Y is a metric space). If
1. F (t, y) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T ;
2. 8y 2 Y , F (·, y) is F-measurable;
3. 8t 2 T , F (t, ·) is weak⇤ upper hemicontinuous;
then H(y) = CG(T ,G)Fy is weak
⇤ upper hemicontinuous in LGp (T,X
⇤).
Proof. Given a sub- -algebra G of F and an F -measurable correspondence F . Suppose
that f is a T -measurable Bochner integrable selection of F . By the definition of regular
conditional distribution, E(f |G)(t) = RX IXµf |G(t, dx) for  -almost all t 2 T , where IX
is the identity mapping on X and µf |G is the regular conditional distribution generated
by f given the sub- -algebra G.
Since X is separable, the unit ball of X⇤ is metrizable under the weak⇤ topology
(see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 6.30)), and hence separable. Then there is
a countable dense set {x⇤m}m2N in the unit ball of X⇤. It is shown in Sun (1997, the
proof of Theorem 3) that the Borel  -algebras on X generated by the norm topology,





2m |x⇤m(x   y)| for any x, y 2 X. Let (Z, ⇢w) be the completion of the
metric space (X, ⇢w).
A1. The correspondence F is F -measurable from T to the Polish space X. Given two
T -measurable Bochner integrable selections f1, f2 of F and 0  ↵  1. Since R(T ,G)F is
convex, there exists a T -measurable selection f of F such that µf |G = ↵µf1|G+(1 ↵)µf2|G.










↵µf1|G(t, dx) + (1  ↵)µf2|G(t, dx) 
= ↵E(f1|G)(t) + (1  ↵)E(f2|G)(t).
That is, CI(T ,G)F is convex.
A2. By Eberlein-Smulian Theorem (see Theorem 6.34 in Aliprantis and Border
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(2006)), it is su cient to show that CI(T ,G)F is weakly sequentially compact in L
G
p (T,X).
That is, given an arbitrary sequence of T -measurable Bochner integrable selections
{fn}n2N of F and let gn = E(fn|G) for each n 2 N, there is a subsequence of {gn}n2N
which weakly converges in LGp (T,X) to some point in CI
(T ,G)
F .
For the case p = 1, since the sequence {fn}n2N is integrably bounded and F is weakly
compact valued, it is relatively weakly compact in LT1 (T,X) (see Corollary 2.6 in Diestel,
Ruess and Schachermayer (1993)). Without loss of generality, assume that fn weakly
converges to some f0 2 LT1 (T,X). Then gn weakly converges to E(f0|G) in LG1 (T,X).
For the case 1 < p < 1, since the p-integrably boundedness implies the inte-
grably boundedness, we have that the sequence {fn}n2N is relatively weakly compact
in LT1 (T,X). Combining Theorem 2.1 and Corollary 3.4 in Diestel, Ruess and Schacher-
mayer (1993), we have that the sequence {fn}n2N is relatively weakly compact in LTp (T,X).
Without loss of generality, assume that fn weakly converges to some f0 2 LTp (T,X).
Then gn weakly converges to E(f0|G) in LGp (T,X).
Since the correspondence F is compact valued from (T,F , ) to the Polish space
(Z, ⇢w), R(T ,G)F is compact by Theorem 5 (C3). Thus, there is a T -measurable Bochner
integrable selection f of F and a subsequence of {fn}n2N, say itself, such that µfn|G
weakly converges to µf |G as n!1.
For each m 2 N, x⇤m is uniformly continuous on (X, ⇢w), and hence has a unique
continuous extension x⇤m on (Z, ⇢w). Given any ' from (T,G, ) to X⇤ such that '(t) 2
{x⇤m}m2N for  -almost all t 2 T , denote Em = {t 2 T : '(t) = x⇤m}. Let 'm(t) =
1Em(t) · x⇤m. Then ' =
P
m2N 'm, and 'm is G-measurable since Em 2 G for each
m 2 N. We can define a mapping   from (T,G, ) to the space of continuous functions
on (Z, ⇢w) by letting  (t) = x⇤k if '(t) = x
⇤
k for some k 2 N. For each m 2 N,  m can be
extended for 'm similarly.
Fix m 2 N. Denote  nm(t) =  m(t, fn(t)) and  m(t) =  m(t, f(t)). Given any
bounded continuous function c on R,Z
R
c(a)    ( nm) 1 (da) =
Z
T
c( m(t, fn(t))) d (t) =
Z
T
c(1Em(t) · x⇤m(fn(t))) d (t)
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c(a)    ( m) 1 (da)
Therefore,     ( nm) 1 weakly converges to       1m as n!1.
Since F is integrably bounded, the sequence { nm} is uniformly integrable. By The-






T  m d . By domi-






T  d , where  
n(t) =  (t, fn(t)) and  (t) =  (t, f(t)).
For  -almost all t 2 T ,Z
T
 (t) d (t) =
Z
T
 (t, f(t)) d (t) =
Z
T
























where g = E(f |G). Similarly, we could show that RT  n(t) d (t) = RT '(t, gn(t)) d (t)









By Lemma 10 below, the set of all such ' separates points in LGp (T,X). Then we have
E(f0|G) = g, which implies that CI(T ,G)F is weakly compact.
A3. We shall show that CI(T ,G)coF = coCI
(T ,G)
F . It is obvious that coCI
(T ,G)
F ✓ CI(T ,G)coF ,
we only need to consider the converse direction.
Suppose that f0 is a T -measurable Bochner integrable selection of coF and g0 =




















Fix ✏ > 0 and k 2 LT1 (T,R+). Let  (t) = [supx2F (t) '(t, x)  ✏k(t), supx2F (t) '(t, x)],
by Theorem 8.2.9 of Aubin and Frankowska (1990), there exists a T -measurable selection
f of F such that for  -almost all t 2 T ,







'(t, x) d  
Z
T














that is, '(g0)  supg2CI(T ,G)F '(g). Since ' is arbitrary, we have '(g0)   infg2coCI(T ,G)F '(g).
By separation theorem, g0 2 coCI(T ,G)F and hence CI(T ,G)coF ✓ coCI(T ,G)F . That is,
CI(T ,G)coF = coCI
(T ,G)
F .
Since CI(T ,G)F is convex and weakly compact, by Mazur’s Theorem (see Royden and
Fitzpatrick (2010, p. 292)), coCI(T ,G)F = CI
(T ,G)
F . Moreover, CI
(T ,G)
coF is also weakly
compact and convex, thus we have CI(T ,G)coF = CI
(T ,G)
F .
A4. By (A2), CI(T ,G)G is weakly compact. Since the weak topology on a weakly
compact set in a separable Banach space is metrizable, CI(T ,G)Fy is a compact valued
correspondence from Y to the compact metric space. Let {gn}1n=0 be a sequence in
LGp (T,X) and {yn}1n=0 a sequence in Y . Suppose that gn 2 CI(T ,G)Fyn for each n   1,
w   limn!1 gn = g0 and limn!1 yn = y0. We have to show that g0 2 CI(T ,G)Fy0 .
First g0 2 w   lim supn!1CI(T ,G)Fyn . For each t 2 T , since the correspondence F (t, ·)
is weakly upper hemicontinuous, w   lim supn!1 F (t, yn) ✓ F (t, y0). By Proposition 5,
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Since X is separable, there is a countable dense set {xm}m2N in the unit ball of X









for each pair of x⇤ and y⇤ in X⇤. Let (Z⇤, dw) be the completion of (X⇤, dw).
A5. The proof follows a similar argument in the proof of Theorem 6 (A1) with some
minor modifications.




show that it is weak⇤ closed.
Let {fn}n2N be a collection of T -measurable Gel0fand integrable selections of F and
gn = E(fn|G) for each n 2 N. Without loss of generality, assume that gn weak⇤ converges
to some g0 2 LGp (T,X⇤).
Since the correspondence F is compact valued from (T,F , ) to the Polish space
(Z⇤, dw), R(T ,G)F is compact by Theorem 5 (C3). Thus, there is a T -measurable Gel0fand
integrable selection f of F and a subsequence of {fn}n2N, say itself, such that µfn|G
weakly converges to µf |G as n!1.
Given any ' from (T,G, ) to X such that '(t) 2 {xm}m2N for  -almost all t 2 T .









where g = E(f |G). By Lemma 11, g0 = g 2 CG(T ,G)F , and hence CG(T ,G)F is weak⇤ closed.
A7. Suppose that there is a T -measurable Gel0fand integrable selection f of w⇤ coF
such that g = E(f |G) /2 CG(T ,G)F .
By (A6), CG(T ,G)F is a weak
⇤ compact set in LGp (T,X
⇤). Moreover, LGq (T,X) is
separable with 1p +
1
q = 1. Thus, we can choose a countable dense set {'m}m2N in the
unit ball of LGq (T,X) such that the weak
⇤ topology is metrizable on any norm bounded
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subset of LGp (T,X
















⇤). Let (L⇤, uw) be the completion of (LGp (T,X
⇤), uw).
Since g /2 CG(T ,G)F and CG(T ,G)F is weak⇤ compact in (L⇤, uw), uw(g, CG(T ,G)F ) >





2n for n su ciently large. That is, for any g












Define a mapping h from LGp (T,X
⇤) to Rn such that h(g) = ('⇤⇤1 (g), · · · ,'⇤⇤n (g)) for




. Define a new cor-
respondence F1 from T to Rn: F1(t) = {(a1, . . . , an) : ai = x⇤('i(t)), i = 1, . . . , n, x⇤ 2
F (t)}. Then F1 is F -measurable. By Filippov’s implicit function theorem, any mea-





= GTF1 . Since h is continuous, F1 is compact valued in R
n. It is easy to
see that h(w⇤   coF (t)) = coF1(t) = co(F1(t)) for any t 2 T . By Theorem 4 of Hilden-




, which is a
contradiction.
A8. CGTFy is a closed valued correspondence from Y to a weak
⇤ compact set. Let
{yn}n2N be a sequence in Y with limn!1 yn = y0, and {fn}n2N a sequence of Gel0fand
integrable functions such that fn is a T -measurable selection of F (·, yn) for each n 2 N.
Assume that gn ! g0 in the weak⇤ topology for some g0 2 LGp (T,X⇤), where gn =
E(fn|G) for each n 2 N.
For  -almost all t 2 T , the topological limit superior of the sequence {F (t, yn)}n2N in
(Z, dw) is still the same as w⇤  lim supn!1 F (t, yn) in X⇤. Since F (t, y) is weak⇤ upper
hemicontinuous at y0, w⇤  lim supn!1 F (t, yn) ✓ F (t, y0). By Theorem 5 (C4), there is
a subsequence of {fn}n2N, say itself, and a T -measurable Gel0fand integrable selection
f of Fy0 such that µ
fn|G weakly converges to µf |G.
As in the proof of (A2), given any ' from (T,G, ) to X such that '(t) 2 {xm}m2N
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where g = E(f |G). By Lemma 11, g0 = g 2 CG(T ,G)Fy0 .
Lemma 10. Suppose that   is the set of all mappings ' from (T,G, ) to X⇤ such
that '(t) 2 {x⇤m}m2N for  -almost all t 2 T , where {x⇤m}m2N is defined in the proof of
Theorem 6. Then the set   separate points in LGp (T,X) for 1  p <1.
Proof. Given two di↵erent mappings f1, f2 2 LGp (T,X), there exists a constant ✏ > 0 and








q = 1. Without
loss of generality, we could assume that g 2 LG1(T,X⇤) and essentially bounded by 1.
For each m 2 N, let Dm = {t 2 T : |x⇤m(fi(t))  g(t, fi(t))| < ✏3 ; i = 1, 2}. Since
{x⇤m}m2N is dense under the weak⇤ topology in the unit ball of X⇤, [m2NDm = T .
Define a mapping ' 2   such that '(t) = x⇤m when t 2 Dm \ ([0km 1Dk), where





















The proof of the following lemma is an analogy of Lemma 10.
Lemma 11. Suppose that   is the set of all mappings ' from (T,G, ) to X such
that '(t) 2 {xm}m2N for  -almost all t 2 T , where {xm}m2N is defined in the proof of
Theorem 6. Then the set   separate points in LGp (T,X
⇤) for 1 < p  1.
Proposition 5. Suppose that G is a measurable weakly compact valued correspondence
from (T,F , ) to X which is integrably bounded by some h 2 LTp for 1  p < 1.
Let {Fn}1n=1 be a sequence of measurable correspondences from (T,F , ) to X such that
Fn(t) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T and n   1. Let F0 = w   lim supn!1 Fn. Then
w   lim supn!1CI(T ,G)Fn ✓ CI(T ,G)F0 .
Proof. Pick a sequence {fn}n2N of Bochner integrable functions such that fn is a selection
of Fn for each n   1 and w   limn!1 gn = g0, where gn = E(fn|G) for each n 2 N. As
in the proof of Theorem 6, the space X is endowed with the metric ⇢w and the Polish
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space (Z, ⇢w) is the completion of (X, ⇢w). The topological limit superior of the sequence
{Fn(t)}1n=1 in (Z, ⇢w) is still the same as w   lim supn!1 Fn(t).
By Theorem 5 (C4), there is a subsequence of {fn}1n=1, say itself, and a T -measurable
selection f of F0 such that µfn|G weakly converges to µf |G. As in the proof of Theo-
rem 6 (A2), we could show that limn!1 '(gn) = '(g) for each ' 2  , where   is the
same as in Lemma 10, g = E(f |G) and 1p + 1q = 1. By Lemma 10,   separates points in
LGp (T,X), we have g0 = g 2 CI(T ,G)F0 .
In Theorem 6, if we take the sub- -algebra G to be the trivial  -algebra, then the
conditional expectation reduces to be the infinite dimensional integral, and we have the
following immediately corollary.
Corollary 8. If F is setwise coarser than T , then we have the following properties.
B1 For norm closed valued correspondence F from (T,F , ) to X, ITF is convex.
B2 For any p-integrably bounded, weakly compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X with 1  p <1, ITF is weakly compact.
B3 For any p-integrably bounded, weakly compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X with 1  p <1, ITF = ITcoF .
B4 Suppose that G is a p-integrably bounded, weakly compact valued correspondence from
(T,F , ) to X with 1  p < 1. Let F be a weakly closed valued correspondence
from T ⇥ Y ! X where Y is a metric space. If
1. F (t, y) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T ;
2. 8y 2 Y , F (·, y) is F-measurable;
3. 8t 2 T , F (t, ·) is weakly upper hemicontinuous;
then H(y) = ITFy is weakly upper hemicontinuous.
B5 For any norm closed valued correspondence F from (T,F , ) to X⇤, GTF is convex.
B6 For any p-integrably bounded, weak⇤ compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X⇤ with 1 < p  1, GTF is weak⇤ compact.
B7 For any p-integrably bounded, weak⇤ compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X⇤ with 1 < p  1, GTF = GTw⇤ coF .
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B8 Suppose that G is a p-integrably bounded, weak⇤ compact valued correspondence from
(T,F , ) to X⇤ with 1 < p  1. Let F be a weak⇤ closed valued correspondence
from T ⇥ Y ! X, where Y is a metric space. If
1. F (t, y) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T ;
2. 8y 2 Y , F (·, y) is F-measurable;
3. 8t 2 T , F (t, ·) is weak⇤ upper hemicontinuous;
then H(y) = GTFy is weak
⇤ upper hemicontinuous.
Then we consider the norm compactness and preservation of norm upper hemiconti-
nuity for infinite dimensional integrations of correspondences.
Proposition 6. If F is setwise coarser than T , then we have the following properties.
B9 For any integrably bounded, norm compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X, ITF is norm compact.
B10 Suppose that G is an integrably bounded, norm compact valued correspondence from
(T,F , ) to X. Let F be a norm closed valued correspondence from T ⇥ Y ! X,
where Y is a metric space. If
1. F (t, y) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T ;
2. 8y 2 Y , F (·, y) is F-measurable;
3. 8t 2 T , F (t, ·) is norm upper hemicontinuous;
then H(y) = ITFy is norm upper hemicontinuous.
Proof. B9. Pick a sequence of T -measurable Bochner integrable selections {fn}n2N of
F . Let xn =
R
T fn(t) d (t) for each n 2 N. We need to show that there is a subsequence
of {xn}n2N which converges to some point in ITF .
Follow a similar argument as in the proof for Theorem 2 of Sun (1997), we can shown
that ITF is totally bounded and hence relatively compact. Without loss of generality,
assume that {xn}n2N converges to some point x0 2 X. By Theorem 3 (A3), DTF is
compact. Let µn =     f 1n . There is a subsequence of {µn}n2N, say itself, which weakly
converges to some µ0 2 DTF ✓M(X). Suppose that µ0 =    f 10 , where f0 is a Bochner
integrable selection of F . Given any continuous linear functional x⇤ on X, since x⇤   fn
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is uniformly integrable and     f 1n   (x⇤) 1 weakly converges to     f 10   (x⇤) 1, by
Theorem 5.4 of Billingsley (1968, p.32), we haveZ
T
x⇤   fn d (t)!
Z
T
x⇤   f0 d (t).
Thus, x⇤(x0) = x⇤(
R
T f0(t) d (t)), which implies that x0 =
R




B10. By (B9), we know that ITFy is a norm compact valued correspondence from Y
to the compact space ITG . Let {xn}1n=0 be a sequence in X and {yn}1n=0 be a sequence
in Y . Suppose that xn 2 ITFyn for each n   1, limn!1 xn = x0 and limn!1 yn = y0. We
have to show that x0 2 ITFy0 .
First x0 2 lim supn!1 ITFyn . For each t 2 T , since the correspondence F (t, ·) is norm
upper-hemicontinuous, lim supn!1 F (t, yn) ✓ F (t, y0). By Proposition 7, we have that
x0 2 ITlim supn!1 Fyn ✓ ITFy0 .
Remark 7. Note that the requirement of the Radon-Nikody´m property on X⇤ is not need-
ed in Corollary 8 and Proposition 6. In the case that G is non-trivial, this requirement is
to guarantee that LGq (T,X
⇤) consists of the continuous linear functionals of LGp (T,X) for
1  p <1, where 1p + 1q = 1. When G is the trivial  -algebra, LGq (T,X⇤) and LGp (T,X)
are simply X⇤ and X, such an additional assumption is hence unnecessary.
Proposition 7. Suppose that {Fn}1n=1 is a sequence of measurable correspondences from
(T,F , ) to X. Let G be a measurable, norm compact valued correspondence from
(T,F , ) to X which is integrably bounded by some T -measurable real valued integrable
function h. Let F0 = lim supn!1 Fn. If Fn(t) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T and n   1,
then lim supn!1 I
T
Fn ✓ ITF0.
Proof. Suppose that {An}n2N is a sequence of sets in a compact metric space and A0 is
compact. Due to Theorem 1 in Hildenbrand (1974, p.17), lim supn!1An ✓ A0 if and
only if the Hausdor↵ semi-distance  (An, A0) goes to 0 as n!1. Since F0(t) is norm
compact, we have that
lim
n!1
 (Fn(t), F0(t)) = 0
for each t 2 T .
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By Proposition 4.3 of Sun (1997), limn!1  (ITFn , I
T
F0) = 0. By Proposition 6 (B9),
ITF0 is norm compact, hence we have lim supn!1 I
T
Fn ✓ ITF0 .
3.4.3 Converse Results
In this section, we show that the the setwise coarseness condition is necessary in the
sense that it is implied by each of the properties in Theorem 6.
Theorem 7. The  -algebra F is setwise coarser than T if given any sub- -algebra
G ✓ F , one of the following conditions holds.
C1 For any norm closed valued correspondence F from (T,F , ) to X, CI(T ,G)F is convex.
C2 For any p-integrably bounded, weakly (resp. weak⇤) compact valued correspondence
F from (T,F , ) to X (resp. X⇤) with 1  p < 1 (resp. 1 < p  1), CI(T ,G)F
(resp. CG(T ,G)F ) is weakly (resp. weak
⇤) compact in LGp (T,X).
C3 For any integrably bounded, norm compact valued correspondence F from (T,F , )
to X, ITF is norm compact.
C4 For any p-integrably bounded, weakly (resp. weak⇤) compact valued correspondence
F from (T,F , ) to X (resp. X⇤) with 1  p <1 (resp. 1 < p  1), CI(T ,G)F =





C5 For any weakly (resp. weak⇤) closed valued correspondence F from T ⇥ Y to X
(resp. X⇤) such that there is a p-integrably bounded, weakly (resp. weak⇤) compact
valued correspondence G from (T,F , ) to X (resp. X⇤) with 1  p < 1 (resp.
1 < p  1),
1. F (t, y) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T ;
2. 8y 2 Y , F (·, y) is F-measurable;
3. 8t 2 T , F (t, ·) is weakly (resp. weak⇤) upper hemicontinuous;
H(y) = CI(T ,G)Fy (resp. CG
(T ,G)
Fy
) is weakly (resp. weak⇤) upper hemicontinuous in
LGp (T,X).
C6 For any norm closed valued correspondence F from T ⇥ Y to X such that there is
an integrably bounded, norm compact valued correspondence G from (T,F , ) to
X,
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1. F (t, y) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T ;
2. 8y 2 Y , F (·, y) is F-measurable;
3. 8t 2 T , F (t, ·) is norm upper hemicontinuous;
H(y) = ITFy is norm upper hemicontinuous.
In the proof below, we only prove for the weak/norm topology, the similar conclusion
for the weak⇤ topology can be shown following the same idea.
Proof. If (T,F , ) is purely atomic, we are done. Suppose that T can be partitioned into
two disjoint parts T1 and T2, such that FT1 is atomless and FT2 is atomic, T = T1 [ T2.
 (T1) = 1   , 0    < 1.
Let (I, I, ⌘) be the Lebesgue unit interval. Since (T1,FT1 , ) is atomless and FT1 is
countably generated, by Lemma 4, there is a measure preserving mapping   : (T1,FT1 , )!
(( , 1], I1, ⌘1),10 such that for any E 2 FT1 , there exists a set E 0 2 I1,  (E4  1(E 0)) =
0. Moreover, let  (t) =  2 for any t 2 T2.
Assume that n is a nonnegative integer and l 2 [0, 1] is a real number. The binary
representation of n and l are given as follow:





+ · · · ,
where n0, n1, . . . , na 2, l0, l1, . . . 2 {0, 1} and na 1 = 1. Then the n-th Walsh function
Wn from (I, I, ⌘) to {1, 1} is given by
Wn(l) = ( 1)n0l0+n1l1+···+na 1la 1
and further W0(l) = 1. {Wn(l)}1n=0 is a complete orthogonal basis of L2(I, ⌘), see Walsh
(1923). Define En = {l 2 [0, 1] : Wn(l) = 1} for each integer n   0. Since W0(l) = 1 for
any l 2 [0, 1], and {Wn(l)}1n=0 are orthogonal, we will have ⌘(En) = 12 for each integer
n   1.
Given an infinite dimensional Banach space X, there exists a sequence of pairs
{(x⇤n, xn)}1n=0, such that x⇤n 2 X⇤, xn 2 X, x⇤m(xn) = 0 if m 6= n, and x⇤n(xn) = 1
for all n, (see. for example, Lindenstrauss and Tzafriri (1977, Proposition 1.f.3)).
10I1 is the restriction of I on ( , 1] and ⌘1 is the Lebesgue measure.
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C1. Choose G as the trivial  -algebra; that is G = {T, ;}.








1   ),   < l  1
0, l 2 [0,  ]
.
It is easy to see that fj is Bochner integrable in X.11 Let ej =
R
I fj(l) d⌘ =
xj 1
kxj 1k
and F (t) = {0, f1    (t), · · · , fk    (t)} for t 2 T .




j=1 ej 2 ITF . Thus, we have k + 1 disjoint T -measurable sets S0, S1, · · · , Sk ✓ T1
and a T -measurable selection f of F such that RT f d  = 1k+1Pkj=1 ej, [0jkSj = T1
and
f(t) =
8<:0, if t 2 S0 [ T2;fj( (t)), if t 2 Sj for j = 1, · · · , k.
Then there exist disjoint sets H0, H1, · · · , Hk ✓ ( , 1] such that  [Sj4  1(Hj)] = 0 for

























For each n   0, define En = {l 2 ( , 1] : l  1   2 En} and Ecn = {l 2 ( , 1] : l  1   2 Ecn}.




   ⌘  Hj \ Ecn  = 1k + 1  ⌘(En)  ⌘(Ecn)  .
Choosing n = 0, ⌘(Hj) =
1  
k+1 .
Moreover, for any n, ⌘
 
Hj \ En
   ⌘  Hj \ Ecn  is a constant for all 0  j  k. For






1   ). Then {sm(t)}1m=0 is a sequence of Bochner
integrable simple function, and limm!0
R 1
0 kfj(t)  sm(t)k d⌘(t) = 0.
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n   1, since
















Define Dn =   1(En) for each n, then  (Dn) =       1(En) = ⌘(En) = 1  2 . So
 (Sj \Dn) =  (  1(Hj) \Dn) =       1(Hj \ En) = ⌘(Hj \ En) = 11  ⌘(Hj)⌘(En) =
1
1   (Sj) (Dn) for any n 2 N and 0  j  k. Thus, for each 0  j  k and n 2 N, Sj
is independent of Dn under the probability measure  T1 , and hence independent of F
under the probability measure  T1 .
Following a similar argument in the Step 2 of the proof for Theorem 1, we could
show that F is setwise coarser than T .
C2-C3. Fix k   1. For each 1  j  k and m   1, let fmj from I to the space








1   ),   < l  1






j (l) d⌘ for each 1  j  k. Let Fm = {0, fm1    , · · · , fmk    }. By




1 , · · · , Smk ✓ T1
and a T -measurable selection fm of Fm such that RT fm d  = 1k+1Pkj=1 ej, where
fm(t) =
8<:0, if t 2 Sm0 [ T2;fmj ( (t)), if t 2 Smj for j = 1, · · · , k.
Consider the correspondence F in the proof of (C1). Since F is norm (resp. weakly)
compact valued, ITF is norm (resp. weakly) compact. Define a mapping g
m as follow:
gm(t) =




m d  2 ITF . Note that
R
T g
m d  both norm and weakly converges to 1k+1
Pk
j=1 ej,
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thus 1k+1
Pk
j=1 ej 2 ITF . Repeat the argument in the proof of (C1), we are done.
C4. Consider the correspondence F in the proof of (C1). Since ITF = I
T
















T fj( (t)) d  2 ITcoF = ITF . Repeat the
argument in the proof of (C1), we are done.
C5-C6. Fix k   1 and m   1. Recall the correspondence Fm defined in the proof of
(C2-C3), we have shown that 1k+1
Pk
j=1 ej 2 ITFm . Let Y be the space {0, 1, 12 , · · · , 1m , · · · }
endowed with the usual metric. Let   be the correspondence from T ⇥Y to X such that
for each t 2 T ,  (t, 1m) = Fm(t) for m   1 and  (t, 0) = F (t) defined in (C1). Then
  satisfies conditions. Thus, 1k+1
Pk
j=1 ej 2 IT 0 . Repeat the argument in the proof of
(C1), we are done.
3.5 Conditional Expectations of Correspondences in
Rn
3.5.1 Basic Definitions
Suppose that G is a sub- -algebra of T . For any correspondence F from T to Rn, let
I(T ,G)F = {E(f |G) : f is an integrable selection of F},
where the conditional expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure  .
Let LGp (T,Rn) and LG1(T,Rn) be the set of all G-measurable mappings from T to Rn
with the usual norm. That is,
LGp (T,Rn) =
(









LG1(T,Rn) = {f : f is G-measurable and essentially bounded under  },
where k·k is the usual norm in Rn and 1  p <1. By the Riesz Representation Theorem
(see Theorem 13.26-28 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)), LGq (T,Rn) can be viewed as the
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dual space of LGp (T,Rn), where 1p +
1





In this section, we will show that the condition of setwise coarseness is su cient and
necessary for the validity of several regularity properties for conditional expectations of
correspondences (convexity, compactness and preservation of upper hemicontinuity).
The su ciency part of the following theorem is due to Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976,
Theorem 1.2), while the necessity part is from He and Sun (2013c, Proposition 1).
Theorem 8. I(T ,G)F = I(T ,G)co(F ) for any T -measurable, integrably bounded and closed valued
correspondence F if and only if G is setwise coarser than T .
By the Kuratowski-Ryll-Nardzewski Selection Theorem (see Aliprantis and Border
(2006, Theorem 18.13)), I(T ,G)F is nonempty for any T -measurable, integrably bounded
and closed valued correspondence F .
If G is setwise coarser than T , then the convexity of I(T ,G)F for any correspondence F
is a simple corollary of Theorem 8. It can be also shown that this condition is necessary
for such convexity property.
Corollary 9. The set I(T ,G)F is convex for any correspondence F if and only if G is
setwise coarser than T .
Next, we consider the weak/weak⇤ compactness of I(T ,G)F for a correspondence F .
Theorem 9. The set I(T ,G)F is weakly compact (resp. weak⇤ compact) in LGp (T,Rn) when
1  p < 1 (resp. p = 1, and G is countably generated) for any p-integrably bounded
and closed valued correspondence F if and only if G is setwise coarser than T .12
The last property is the preservation of weak/weak⇤ upper hemicontinuity for con-
ditional expectations of correspondences.
Theorem 10. The following conditions are equivalent.
12The equivalence of compactness and sequential compactness in the weak topology of a Banach space
is important in the proofs of Theorems 9 and 10 below. Such an equivalence still holds for the weak⇤
topology of LG1(T,Rn) when G is countably generated.
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1. For any closed valued correspondence F from T ⇥ Y ! Rn (Y is a metric space)
such that there is a p-integrably bounded and compact valued correspondence G
from T to Rn and
a. F (t, y) ✓ G(t) for  -almost all t 2 T and all y 2 Y ;
b. F (·, y) is T -measurable for all y 2 Y ;
c. F (t, ·) is upper hemicontinuous for  -almost all t 2 T ;
H(y) = I(T ,G)Fy is weakly (resp. weak⇤) upper hemicontinuous in LGp (T,Rn) when
1  p <1 (resp. p =1, and G is countably generated).
2. G is setwise coarser than T .
Note that if 1 < p < 1, then LGp (T,Rn) is reflexive. Thus, the weak compactness
(resp. weak upper hemicontinuity) and the weak⇤ compactness (resp. weak⇤ upper
hemicontinuity) are equivalent in LGp (T,Rn) for 1 < p <1.
Remark 8. He and Sun (2013c) proved the existence of stationary Markov perfect equi-
libria in discounted stochastic games with coarser transition kernels by using Theorem 1.2
of Dynkin and Evstigneev (1976). Recall that P is an equilibrium payo↵ correspondence
from T ⇥V to Rn such that P (t, ·) is upper hemicontinuous and P (·, v) is T -measurable.
Let R(v) be the set of all selections of Pv for each v 2 V . The classical Fan-Glicksberg
Fixed Point Theorem is applied to the correspondence co(R), which is convex valued and
upper hemicontinuous, to obtain a selection v0 of coP (·, v0). Theorem 8 then implies the
existence of a selection v⇤ of P (·, v0) such that E(v0|G) = E(v⇤|G), which leads to the
existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. By Corollary 9, and Theorems 9
and 10, I(T ,G)Pv is convex, compact valued and upper hemicontinuous. Then the existence
result can be also proved by applying the Fan-Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem to the
correspondence I(T ,G)Pv .
3.5.3 Proofs
For a sequence of sets {Am}m2N in a topological space X, let Ls(Am) be the set of all x
such that for any neighborhood Ox of x there are infinitely many m with Ox \Am 6= ;.
The following lemma will be needed in the proofs of the main results.
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Lemma 12. Denote { m}m2N as a sequence of measurable and p-integrably bounded
mappings from an atomless probability space (T, T , ) to Rn, 1  p < 1. Let hm =
E( m|G) for each m 2 N, where G is a sub- -algebra of T . Assume that hm weakly
converges to some h0 2 LGp (T,Rn) as m!1. If G is setwise coarser than T , then there
exists a T -measurable mapping  0 such that




for  -almost all t 2 T ,
2. E( 0|G) = h0.
Proof. Since the sequence { m}m2N is p-integrably bounded in LTp (T,Rn), it has a weakly
convergent subsequence by the Riesz/Dunford-Pettis Weak Compactness Theorem in
Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, p.408/p.412). Without loss of generality, we assume



























Thus, hm weakly converges to E( |G) in LGp (T,Rn), which implies that h0 = E( |G).
In addition, { k, k+1, . . .} also weakly converges to   for each k 2 N. By Theorem 29
of Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, p.293), there is a sequence of convex combination of
{ k, k+1, . . .} that converges to   in Lp norm. For each k 2 N, assume that 'k is the
convex combination { k, k+1, . . .} such that k'k  kp  1k . Thus, there is a subsequence
of {'k}, say itself, which converges to    -almost everywhere.
Fix t 2 T such that 'k(t) converges to  (t). By Carathe`odary’s convexity theorem
(see Aliprantis and Border (2006, Theorem 5.32)), 'k(t) =
Pn
j=0 ↵jk jk(t), where
1. for each k 2 N, ↵jk   0 for any j and
Pn
j=0 ↵jk = 1;
2. for each k 2 N,  0k(t), . . . ,  nk(t) 2 { k(t), k+1(t), . . .}.
Without loss of generality, assume that for each 0  j  n, ↵jk ! ↵j and  jk(t) !
 j(t). Then ↵1, . . . ,↵n   0 and
Pn
j=0 ↵j = 1. Moreover,  j(t) 2 Ls( m(t)). Let
G(t) = Ls( m(t)). Then  (t) 2 co(G(t)).
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Since G is setwise coarser than T and G is measurable, integrably bounded and closed
valued, Theorem 8 implies that I(T ,G)G = I(T ,G)co(G). Thus, there exists a T -measurable
selection  0 of G such that E( 0|G) = E( |G) = h0, which completes the proof.
Proof of Corollary 9. First, we assume that G is setwise coarser than T . Pick two
measurable selections  1 and  2 of F . Let G(t) = { 1(t), 2(t)}. Then G is a T -
measurable, integrably bounded, closed valued correspondence. By Theorem 8, we have
I(T ,G)G = I(T ,G)co(G), which implies that I(T ,G)G is convex. For any ↵ 2 [0, 1], there exists a
T -measurable selection  0 of G such that E( 0|G) = ↵E( 1|G) + (1  ↵)E( 2|G). Since
 0 is also a selection of F , I(T ,G)F is convex.
Conversely, suppose that T has a G-atom D with  (D) > 0. Define a correspondence
F (t) =
8<:{0, 1} t 2 D;{0} t /2 D.
It is shown in Proposition 1 of He and Sun (2013c) that I(T ,G)F is not convex.13
Below we prove Theorem 9.
Proof of Theorem 9. Suppose that G is setwise coarser than T and 1  p < 1. It is
su cient to show that I(T ,G)F is weakly sequentially compact in LGp (T,Rn). Fix an arbi-
trary sequence of T -measurable selections { m}m2N of F . Let hm = E( m|G) for each
m 2 N. We need to show that there is a subsequence of {hm}m2N which weakly con-
verges in LGp (T,Rn) to some point in I(T ,G)F . Since the sequence { m}m2N is p-integrably
bounded, it has a weakly convergent subsequence due to the Riesz/Dunford-Pettis Weak
Compactness Theorem in Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, p.408/p.412). Without loss of
generality, assume that  m weakly converges to some   2 LTp (T,Rn). As shown in the
proof of Lemma 12, hm also weakly converges to E( |G) in LGp (T,Rn). By Lemma 12,
there exists a T -measurable selection  0 of Ls( m) such that E( 0|G) = E( |G). Since
F is compact valued, Ls( m(t)) ✓ F (t) for  -almost all t 2 T . Thus,  0 is a selection of
F , and we are done.
Next, we consider the case p =1 and G is countably generated. Since F is essentially
bounded by some positive constant C, I(T ,G)F is also norm bounded by C. By Alaoglu’s
13For simplicity, the target space of the correspondence is R. One can easily define a new correspon-
dence on Rn such that each of other n  1 dimensions only contains 0.
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Theorem (see Theorem 6.21 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)), the closed ball with radius
C (the C-ball) is weak⇤ compact in LG1(T,Rn). We only need to show that I(T ,G)F is
weak⇤ closed in the C-ball. Since G is countably generated, LG1 (T,Rn) is separable,
which implies that the C-ball is metrizable in the weak⇤ topology (see Theorem 6.30
of Aliprantis and Border (2006)). Suppose that { m} is a sequence of T -measurable
selections of F and hm weak⇤ converges to h0 2 LG1(T,Rn) as m ! 1, where hm =
E( m|G) for each m. Then hm also weakly converges to h0 in LG1 (T,Rn). Moreover,
the condition that F is 1-integrably bounded (i.e., essentially bounded) implies that
F is integrably bounded. By Lemma 12, there exists a T -measurable selection  0 of
Ls( m) such that h0 = E( 0|G). Since F is compact valued,  0(t) 2 Ls( m(t)) ✓ F (t)
for  -almost all t 2 T . That is,  0 is a T -measurable selection of F and h0 2 I(T ,G)F .
Therefore, I(T ,G)F is weak⇤ closed in the C-ball.
Conversely, suppose that T has a G-atom D with  (D) > 0. Consider the correspon-
dence F as defined in the proof of Corollary 9. Pick an orthonormal subset {'m}m2N of
LT D2 (D,R) on the atomless probability space (D, T D, D) such that 'm takes value in




2 t 2 D;
0 t /2 D.
Then  m is a T -measurable selection of F for each m 2 N.




D ! 0 as m!1, where 1E is the indicator function of the set E.













Given any nonnegative function  2 LT1 (T,R),  will be the increasing limit of a se-
quence of simple functions { k}k2N (finite linear combination of measurable indicator
functions). Fix any ✏ > 0. By the dominated convergence theorem, there exists a
positive integer K0 > 0 such that for each k   K0,
R
T |    k| d  < ✏. Then we have    Z
T














































| K0    | d .
The first and the third terms are less than ✏. By Equation (5.5) and the fact that  K0 is a
simple function, the second term goes to 0 asm!1. Hence, RT   m d ! 12 RT  1D d 
as m ! 1. Given any  2 LT1 (T,R), we can obtain
R
T   m d  ! 12
R
T  1D d  as
m ! 1 by writing  as the sum of its positive and negative parts. Therefore,  m
weak⇤ converges to   = 121D in L
T
1(T,R). Thus, E( m|G) 2 I(T ,G)F weak⇤ converges
to 12E(1D|G) in LG1(T,R) as shown in the proof of Lemma 12. It is shown in He and
Sun (2013c) that 12E(1D|G) /2 I(T ,G)F , which implies that I(T ,G)F is not weak⇤ compact in
LG1(T,R).
For 1  p < 1, just note that F is also p-integrably bounded, and  m weakly
converges to   = 121D in L
T
p (T,R).
Proof of Theorem 10. Suppose that G is setwise coarser than T and 1  p < 1. By
Theorem 9, we know that I(T ,G)G is weakly compact, and hence weakly sequentially
compact. Pick {ym}1m=0 ✓ Y and { m}m2N such that  m is a T -measurable selection
of Fym . Let hm = E( m|G) for each m 2 N. Suppose that hm weakly converges to
some h0 2 LGp (T,Rn) and ym converges to some y0 2 Y . By Lemma 12, there exists a
T -measurable selection  0 of Ls( m) such that h0 = E( 0|G).
Since Ft(·) is upper hemicontinuous for  -almost all t 2 T ,  0(t) 2 Ls( m(t)) ✓
Ls(Fym(t)) ✓ Fy0(t) for  -almost all t 2 T . That is,  0 is a T -measurable selection
of Fy0 and h0 2 H(y0). Therefore, H is weakly upper hemicontinuous. The case that
p =1 and G is countably generated follows from a similar argument by noting that any
closed ball in LG1(T,Rn) is metrizable.
Conversely, suppose that T has a G-atom D with  (D) > 0. Let G be the corre-
spondence as in Corollary 9
G(t) =
8<:{0, 1} t 2 D;{0} t /2 D.
Let Y = { 1m}m 1 [ {0} endowed with the usual metric, F (t, 0) = G(t) and F (t, 1m) =
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{ m(t)} for all t 2 T and m   1, where  m is the same as in the converse part of
the proof of Theorem 9. Then G is compact valued and bounded, and F (t, ·) is upper
hemicontinuous for all t 2 T .
Consider the correspondence G. For 1  p <1, since I(T ,G)G is p-integrably bounded,
it is relatively weakly sequentially compact in LGp (T,R) due to the Riesz/Dunford-Pettis
Weak Compactness Theorem in Royden and Fitzpatrick (2010, p.408/p.412), and hence
relatively weakly compact. For p =1, I(T ,G)G is relatively weak⇤ compact in LG1(T,Rn)
due to Alaoglu’s Theorem. Thus, H(y) is a subset of a fixed weakly (resp. weak⇤)
compact set for all y 2 Y when 1  p <1 (resp. p =1).
For the sequence { 1m}, 1m ! 0 and  m is a selection of F 1m . As shown in the
proof above, E( m|G) weakly (resp. weak⇤) converges to 12E(1D|G) in LGp (T,R) for
1  p < 1 (resp. p = 1), but there is no T -measurable selection  0 of G such that
E( 0|G) = 12E(1D|G). Therefore, 12E(1D|G) /2 H(0) = I(T ,G)F0 , which implies that H(y)
is neither weakly upper hemicontinuous in LGp (T,R) for 1  p < 1 nor weak⇤ upper
hemicontinuous in LG1(T,R).
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Chapter 4
Games with Incomplete Information
4.1 Introduction
Since Harsanyi (1967–68), games with incomplete information have been widely studied
and found applications in many fields. Various kinds of hypotheses have been proposed
on the formulation of such games to guarantee the existence of pure strategy equilibria.1
In particular, if players’ information is di↵use,2 positive results have been obtained
when all players’ action spaces are finite and the information structure is disparate;
see Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Radner and Rosenthal (1982). These results lead
to natural conjectures in two directions: can one obtain the existence of pure strategy
equilibria in the following frameworks: (1) Bayesian games with general action spaces;
and (2) Bayesian games with interdependent payo↵ and correlated types (even with
finite actions)?
For the first question, one may naturally expect that the existence result still holds
in games with incomplete information and general action spaces; for example, see Theo-
rem 6.2 of Fudenberg and Tirole (1991). Unfortunately, this existence result fails in the
setting with general action spaces; see Khan, Rath and Sun (1999). To solve this issue,
previous results rely on the condition that the information spaces are Loeb/saturated
probability spaces, which is su ciently rich in the sense that they cannot contain any
countably-generated part; see Loeb and Sun (2006) and Wang and Zhang (2012) among
1The increasing literature has widened significantly in recent years, as evidenced by Athey (2001),
Araujo and de Castro (2009), Reny (2011), etc.
2The information is said to be di↵use if every player’s private information space is atomless.
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others. Since the widely used information spaces are usually Polish spaces, the assump-
tion of saturated probability spaces will be violated in various applications. In this
chapter, we shall distinguish di↵erent roles of the di↵useness of information and retain
the existence of pure strategy equilibria without such restrictions.
In games with incomplete information, the private information will influence games
from two aspects: payo↵s and strategies. In the conventional approach, the di↵erent d-
i↵useness of information on these two aspects is usually considered from a unified point
of view. However, when making decisions, the player’s strategy-relevant di↵useness of
information could be much richer than that conveyed in the payo↵ functions.3 Therefore,
we suggest to describe the strategy-relevant and payo↵-relevant di↵useness of informa-
tion separately. The relation between these two kinds of di↵useness is characterized
by the “relative di↵useness” assumption, which basically says that the strategy-relevant
di↵useness is essentially richer than the payo↵-relevant di↵useness on any nonnegligible
information subset. Based on this assumption, we are able to prove the existence of
pure strategy equilibria in games with incomplete information and general action spaces
without invoking any existence result of behavioral/distributional strategy equilibria.
Towards the second question,4 We formulate the notion of “inter-player informa-
tion” to describe the influence of player i’s private information in other players’ payo↵s.
The condition of “coarser inter-player information” is proposed and we show that this
condition is not only su cient but also necessary for the existence of pure strategy equi-
librium. In particular, interdependent payo↵s and correlated types are allowed in our
setting.
To obtain the existence of pure strategy equilibria, the purification method is usu-
ally a powerful tool. A pure strategy profile is said to be a purification of a behavioral
strategy profile if the expected payo↵s/distributions of these two strategy profiles are
the same for all players. In the case of finite actions, as shown in Dvoretsky, Wald and
Wolfowitz (1951), this method ensures that a behavioral/distributional strategy equi-
librium has a payo↵/distribution equivalent pure strategy equilibrium when the private
information is di↵use and disparate; see, for example, Radner and Rosenthal (1982),
3A player may have richer di↵useness of information when making decisions: from a realistic point
of view, she can access to more information via communication, learning, etc.; from a technical point
of view, to guarantee the measurability of her payo↵ function, one may only need a sub- -algebra.
4There is a substantial literature studying the existence of pure strategy equilibrium in Bayesian
games with finite actions, see Radner and Rosenthal (1982), Milgrom and Weber (1985), Khan, Rath
and Sun (2006) and Barelli and Duggan (2013).
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Milgrom and Weber (1985) and Khan, Rath and Sun (2006).5 Since the existence of
behavioral/distributional strategy equilibria has been established with great generali-
ty (see, for example, Milgrom and Weber (1985), Balder (1988) and Fu (2008)), the
existence of pure strategy equilibria can be obtained via the purification method. How-
ever, the above results strictly depend on the assumptions on action spaces (finite or
countable) and information spaces (conditional independence).6
In this chapter, we will show that a purification exists for any behavioral strategy
profile in both settings discussed above. Consequently, the existence of pure strategy
equilibria can be also obtained. In addition, our purification result generalizes previ-
ous purification theorems, and any atomless probability space (e.g., the Lebesgue unit
interval) can be allowed.
The rest is organized as follows. In Section 4.2, we first prove the existence of pure
strategy equilibria for games with incomplete information and general action spaces di-
rectly, the notion of undistinguishable purification is then introduced and its existence is
presented. Section 4.3 deals with games with inter-player information and demonstrates
that the notion of coarser inter-player information is both su cient and necessary for
the existence of pure strategy equilibrium. This chapter is based on the papers He and
Sun (2013d) and He and Sun (2014).
4.2 Games with Incomplete Information and Gen-
eral Action Spaces
Games with incomplete information (henceforth games for short) can be described as
follows. Each player i observes an informational type ti, whose values lie in some mea-
surable space (Ti, Ti). After observing the type, player i selects an action ai from some
compact metric space Ai of feasible actions. We allow each player’s payo↵ to depend on
the actions chosen by all the players, and on her type as well. We define an information
5Note that a behavioral strategy in Radner and Rosenthal (1982) and Milgrom and Weber (1985)
is called a mixed strategy in Khan, Rath and Sun (2006), while a mixed strategy carries a di↵erent
meaning in the two former papers.
6For the case of countable actions, see Khan and Sun (1995). To obtain the purification results for
general action spaces, various assumptions have been proposed on the probability space (see Sun (1996),
Loeb and Sun (2006, 2009), Keisler and Sun (2009), Podczeck (2009) and Wang and Zhang (2012)).
Nevertheless, among all these results, the probability spaces have to be su ciently rich, in the sense
that they cannot contain any countably-generated part.
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structure   for the game which is a joint probability on T1 ⇥ T2 ⇥ · · ·⇥ Tn.
To be precise, a game with incomplete information   consists of five formal elements.
• The set of players: I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• The set of actions available to each player: {Ai}i2I . Each Ai is a compact metric
space endowed with the Borel  -algebra B(Ai). Let A = ⇥ni=1Ai and B(A) =
⌦i2IB(Ai).
• The (private) information space for each player: {Ti}i2I . Each Ti is endowed with
a  -algebra Ti. Let T = ⇥ni=1Ti and T = ⌦ni=1Ti.
• The payo↵ functions: {ui}i2I . Each ui is a mapping from A⇥ Ti to R.
• The information structure:  , a probability measure on the measurable space
(T, T ).
For payo↵ functions, we have the following standard assumption. Conditions (1) and
(2) describe the measurability and continuity respectively, and Condition (3) states an
integrably bounded restriction.
Assumption 2 (P). For each i 2 I, the payo↵ function ui satisfies the following re-
quirements:
(1) ui is B(A)⌦ Ti-measurable on A⇥ Ti.
(2) ui(·, ti) is continuous on A for all ti 2 Ti.
(3) ui is integrably bounded; that is, there is a real-valued integrable function hi on
(Ti, Ti, i), such that |ui(a, ti)|  hi(ti) for all (a, ti) 2 A⇥ Ti.
For each i 2 I, associated with the information structure   is a marginal probabil-
ity on each Ti which we denote by  i. For these probabilities, we have the following
assumption of independence.
Assumption 3 (I). The private information of each player is independent of all other
players’ private information, i.e.,   = ⌦ni=1 i.
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This assumption can be weakened and correlations of information are allowed.7 We
adopt this basic setup for the sake of simplicity.
For each player i 2 I, a behavioral strategy (resp. pure strategy) is a measur-
able function from Ti to M(Ai) (resp. Ai), where M(Ai) denotes the space of Borel
probability measures on Ai with the topology of weak convergence.8 The set of all be-





LTi0 (Ti, Ai)). As usual, we write t i for an information profile of all players other than
i, and T i for the space of all such information profiles. We adopt similar notations for
action profiles and strategy profiles.
Given a strategy profile f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) and a subset E 2 Ti, the expected payo↵






ui(a1, . . . , an, ti) ·
Y
j2I fj(tj, daj) d (t).
Taking E = Ti, U
Ti
i (f) is the expected payo↵ of player i, which is denoted by Ui(f) for
simplicity.
Given a strategy profile f , let





ui(a1, . . . , an, ti) ·
Y
j 6=i fj(tj, daj) ·
Y
j 6=i d j(tj).





V fi (ai, ti)fi(ti, dai) d i(ti) for any subset E 2 Ti.
A behavioral (resp. pure) strategy equilibrium is a behavioral (resp. pure) strategy
profile f ⇤ = (f ⇤1 , f
⇤
2 , . . . , f
⇤
n) such that f
⇤









LTi0 (Ti, Ai)) for each i 2 I.
4.2.1 Relative Di↵useness of Information
In this section, we will propose the “relative di↵useness” assumption as a characterization
of the relation between two kinds of di↵useness of information.
7For detailed discussions, see Section 4.2.4.
8That is, a behavioral strategy fi of player i is a transition probability with respect to (Ti, Ti) and
(Ai,B(Ai)) such that fi(ti, ·) is a probability measure on (Ai,B(Ai)), and fi(·, B) is a Ti-measurable
function on Ti for every B 2 B(Ai). A pure strategy can be viewed as a behavioral strategy by taking
it as a Dirac measure for almost every ti.
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For each i 2 I, let (Ti, Ti, i) be an atomless probability space with a complete
countably-additive probability measure  i. Let Fi be a sub- -algebra of Ti. The  -
algebras Ti and Fi will represent the di↵useness of information from the aspect of s-
trategies and from the aspect of payo↵s respectively.9 The probability spaces (Ti, Ti, i)
and (Ti,Fi, i) will be used to model the information space and the payo↵-relevant
information space respectively.
We shall introduce the assumption of relative di↵useness as follows.
Assumption 4 (RD). For each i 2 I, Ti is atomless and Fi is setwise coarser than Ti.
This assumption implies that on any nonnegligible set D ✓ Ti, T Di is always essen-
tially larger than FDi , which means that the strategy-relevant di↵useness of information
is richer.
4.2.2 Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria
In this section, we turn to the issue of the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games
with incomplete information and general action spaces. First, we need to modify As-
sumption (P) to make the statement consistent.
Assumption 5 (P’). For each i 2 I, suppose that Fi is a countably-generated sub- -
algebra of Ti.10 The payo↵ function ui satisfies the following requirements:
(1) ui is B(A)⌦ Fi-measurable on A⇥ Ti.
(2) ui(·, ti) is continuous on A for all ti 2 Ti.
(3) ui is integrably bounded; that is, there is a real-valued integrable function hi on
(Ti,Fi, i), such that |ui(a, ti)|  hi(ti) for all (a, ti) 2 A⇥ Ti.
9Fi could be regarded as the sub- -algebra generated by the payo↵ ui, in the sense that Fi is the
smallest  -algebra which can guarantee the measurability of ui, see Footnote 10 below.
10It is natural to assume the “countably-generated” condition. Note that ui is a Carathe´odory
function and can be regarded as a mapping ui from (Ti, Ti) to C(A,R), where C(A,R) is the space of
continuous functions from A to R endowed with the topology of uniform convergence and the resulting
Borel  -algebra BC(A,R). Then C(A,R) is a Polish space and BC(A,R) is countably generated, and the
 -algebra Fi induced by ui is also countably generated. In particular, Assumption (P’) is satisfied for
this specific  -algebra Fi, i 2 I (see Theorem 4.55 in Aliprantis and Border (2006)).
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The theorem on the existence of pure strategy equilibria is presented below. We will
provide a direct proof without invoking any existence result of behavioral/distributional
strategy equilibria.11
Theorem 11. In a game with incomplete information  , the action space Ai is uncount-
able for each i 2 I. If Assumptions (P’), (I) and (RD) hold, then there exists a pure
strategy equilibrium.12
Proof. To consider pure-strategy equilibria, we focus on the interim payo↵ function. For
each i 2 I, the interim payo↵ function Fi from Ti ⇥ Ai ⇥
 ⇥nj=1M(Aj)  to R is defined
as follows:
Fi(ti, ai, ⌧1, . . . , ⌧n) =
Z
A i
ui(ai, a i, ti) d⌧ i(a i).
It is clear that Fi is continuous on Ai ⇥
 ⇥nj=1M(Aj)  and Fi-measurable on Ti. For
each i 2 I, the best response correspondence Gi from Ti ⇥
 ⇥nj=1M(Aj)  to Ai is given
by
Gi(ti, ⌧i, . . . , ⌧n) = argmax
ai2Ai
Fi(ti, ai, ⌧i, . . . , ⌧n).
For each ti, Berge’s maximal theorem implies that Gi is nonempty, compact-valued, and
upper-hemicontinuous on ⇥nj=1M(Aj).
For any (⌧i, . . . , ⌧n), Fi is continuous on Ai and Fi-measurable on Ti. Then Lem-
ma III.14 (page 70) and Lemma III.39 (Application, page 86) of Castaing and Valadier
(1977) assert that Fi is Fi ⌦ B(Ai)-measurable and Gi admits an Fi-measurable se-
lection. Thus DTiGi(·,⌧1,...,⌧n) is not empty. Moreover, it is convex, compact-valued, and
upper-hemicontinuous on ⇥nj=1M(Aj) by Theorem 3.13
Consider a correspondence  from ⇥nj=1M(Aj) to itself:
 (⌧1, . . . , ⌧n) = ⇥ni=1DTiGi(·,⌧1,...,⌧n).
11The existence of pure strategy equilibria can be also obtained based on the purification method and
the existence of behavioral strategy equilibria, see the last paragraph in Section 4.2.3.
12Indeed, the “countably-generated” condition imposed on Fi for each i 2 I can be relaxed. Suppose
that Assumption (P’) is satisfied except that Fi is not required to be countably generated. A sub- -
algebra Gi of Fi can be induced by ui as explained in Footnote 10. Since Fi is setwise coarser than Ti,
the sub- -algebra Gi is also setwise coarser than Ti. Then Assumptions (P’) and (RD) are satisfied for
Ti and Gi, i 2 I. Thus, one can still conclude the existence of pure strategy equilibria by Theorem 11.
The “countably-generated” condition is imposed on Fi since it represents the information di↵useness
generated by the payo↵ function, and should be properly rich as described by “countably-generated”.
13Note that Gi(ti, ⌧1, . . . , ⌧n) ✓ Hi(ti), where Hi is a correspondence from Ti to Ai such that Hi(ti) ⌘
Ai for all ti.
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Then it is clear that  is nonempty, convex, compact-valued, and upper-hemicontinuous
on ⇥ni=1M(Aj). By Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed-point theorem, there exists a fixed point
(⌧ ⇤1 , . . . , ⌧
⇤
n) of  . Thus for each i, there exists some f
⇤
i 2 LTi0 (Ti, Ai) such that f ⇤i is a
selection of Gi(·, ⌧ ⇤1 , . . . , ⌧ ⇤n) and ⌧ ⇤i is induced by f ⇤i .



























i (ti), a i, ti) d⌧
⇤
 i d i.
The first equality holds due to the definition of Ui, second equality holds based
on Assumption (I) and the Fubini’s theorem, and the third equality relies on change of
variables. By the choice of ⌧ ⇤, we have that (f ⇤1 , f
⇤
2 . . . , f
⇤
n) is a pure-strategy equilibrium.
Remark 9. There is a substantial literature on the existence of pure strategy equilibria
with general action spaces and more structures on the information spaces, e.g., atomless
Loeb spaces (see Khan and Sun (1999)) and saturated probability spaces (see Wang and
Zhang (2012) and Khan and Zhang (2014)).14 Our Theorem 11 obviously covers the
existence results in incomplete information games with saturated information spaces. In
particular, an atomless probability space is saturated if and only if each of its countably-
generated sub- -algebras is setwise coarser than itself. Thus, if Ti is saturated for each
i 2 I, then the relative di↵useness condition is satisfied for Ti and the countably-generated
sub- -algebra Fi, which is induced by the payo↵ function ui for each i 2 I.
It is also worthwhile to point out that a saturated probability space, which can be
endowed with uncountably many independent random variables with the uniform dis-
tribution on [0, 1], could be too rich to be the information space for one single player.
More importantly, the widely used private information spaces are usually Polish spaces
in various applications of games with incomplete information. But Polish spaces will be
excluded if one adopts the assumption of saturated probability spaces, since they cannot
contain any countably-generated part. Our result does not have this restriction.
14Note that the atomless Loeb spaces are also saturated probability spaces.
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4.2.3 Undistinguishable Purification
In this section, several equivalence conditions for strategy profiles will be discussed. We
shall introduce the notion of undistinguishable purification which refines the standard
purification concept and prove its existence based on the relative di↵useness assumption.
As a result, the existence of pure strategy equilibria can be also obtained.
Universal Equivalences
In this subsection, we will propose the notions of “universal payo↵/distribution equiva-
lence” by requiring that each player cannot distinguish the expected payo↵s/distributions
on any payo↵-relevant information subset.
Definition 7. Let f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) and g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) be two behavioral strategy
profiles.
1. For player i, the strategy profiles f and g are said to be distribution equivalent on
the event E 2 Fi if
R
E fi(ti, ·) d i(ti) =
R
E gi(ti, ·) d i(ti). The strategy profiles f
and g are said to be universally distribution equivalent if for each player i 2 I,R
E fi(ti, ·) d i(ti) =
R
E gi(ti, ·) d i(ti)15 on every event E 2 Fi.
2. For player i, the strategy profiles f and g are said to be payo↵ equivalent on the
event E 2 Fi if UEi (f) = UEi (g). The strategy profiles f and g are said to be
universally payo↵ equivalent if for each player i 2 I, UEi (f) = UEi (g) on every
event E 2 Fi.
3. Suppose that f is a pure strategy profile. For player i, fi is said to be belief
consistent with gi if fi(ti) 2 supp gi(ti) for  i-almost all ti 2 Ti. Moreover, f is
said to be belief consistent with g if they are belief consistent for each player i 2 I.
The following result is clear, and its proof is given for completeness.
Lemma 13. Suppose that (S,S, P ) is an atomless probability space, G is a sub- -algebra
of S and X is a Polish space. For any two S-measurable measure-valued mappings h1
and h2 from S to M(X), if for any event D 2 G,Z
D
h1(s, ·) dP (s) =
Z
D
h2(s, ·) dP (s),
15When fi is a pure strategy,
R
E fi(ti, B) d i(ti) =  i
 
E \ f 1i (B)
 
for any Borel subset B ✓ Ai.










 (s, x)h2(s, dx) dP (s)
for any G ⌦ B(X)-measurable integrably bounded mapping  .









1D(s)1B(x)h2(s, dx) dP (s).
Fix an G ⌦ B(X)-measurable integrably bounded mapping  . Without loss of gen-










 (s, x)h2(s, dx) dP (s)
by the monotone convergence theorem.
The following proposition shows that the universal payo↵ equivalence can be deduced
by the universal distribution equivalence.
Proposition 8. Suppose that Assumptions (I) and (P’) hold. If behavioral strategy
profiles f and g are universally distribution equivalent, then they are universally payo↵
equivalent.
Proof. Fix player i 2 I. Given any E 2 Fi, it su ces to show UEi (f) = UEi (g).
By Fubini’s theorem, we have





ui(a1, . . . , an, ti)
Y





















j for each j 6= i, which implies that V fi (ai, ti) = V gi (ai, ti) for any ai 2 Ai and
ti 2 Ti.
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Since f and g are universally distribution equivalent, on every event E 2 Fi,Z
E




















In this subsection, we will introduce the notion of “undistinguishable purification” and
prove its existence. Furthermore, based on the existence results of behavioral strategy
equilibria, the existence of pure strategy equilibria for general action spaces can be
obtained via the purification method.
The following fact is shown in Lemma 4.4(iii) of Hoover and Keisler (1984).
Fact 1. Suppose that (S,S, P ) is an atomless probability space, G is a sub- -algebra of
S, and X is a Polish space. If G is setwise coarser than S,16 then for any G-measurable
mapping h1 from S to M(X), there exists an S-measurable mapping h2 from S to X,
such that
R
D h1(s, ·) dP (s) =
R
D h2(s, ·) dP (s) for any event D 2 G.
In the following we will present a purification result, which is beyond the framework
of games with incomplete information. The proof follows from Fact 1 and Lemma 13.
Proposition 9. Under the conditions of Fact 1, for any G-measurable mapping h1 from
S to M(X), there exists an S-measurable mapping h2 from S to X, such thatZ
D
h1(s, ·) dP (s) =
Z
D
h2(s, ·) dP (s)
16In Lemma 4.4(iii) of Hoover and Keisler (1984), S is assumed to be conditional atomless over G;
that is, for every D 2 S with P (D) > 0, there exists an S-measurable subset D0 of D such that
0 < P (D0 | G) < P (D | G) on some set of positive probability. This means S cannot coincide with
G on D, otherwise D0 2 GD (modulo null sets) and the strictly inequality cannot hold. Hence, this
assumption is equivalent to the setwise coarseness condition since we directly assume that S and G are
di↵erent on any non-trivial subset.
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 (s, x)h1(s, dx) dP (s) =
Z
D
 (s, h2(s)) dP (s)
for any G ⌦ B(X)-measurable integrably bounded mapping  .
Now we are ready to give the definitions of purification and undistinguishable purifi-
cation.
Definition 8. Suppose that f is a pure strategy profile and g is a behavioral strategy
profile.
1. The pure strategy profile f is said to be a purification of g if they are distribution
equivalent and payo↵ equivalent on Ti for each i 2 I, and belief consistent.
2. The pure strategy profile f is said to be an undistinguishable purification of g if
they are universally distribution equivalent, universally payo↵ equivalent, and belief
consistent.
The first definition is standard, and the latter one strengthens the first one by re-
quiring that the expected payo↵s/distributions are the same on any payo↵-relevant in-
formation subset.
Proposition 10. If a T -measurable pure strategy f is universally distribution equivalent
to an F-measurable behavioral strategy g, then f is belief consistent with g.
Proof. Fix player i. Define a mapping c from Ti ⇥ Ai to R as c(ti, ai) = 1supp gi(ti)(ai).
Then c is Fi⌦B(Ai)-measurable.17 Since f and g are universally distribution equivalent,
by Lemma 13 we haveZ
Ti





c(ti, ai)gi(ti, dai) d i(ti) = 1.
Therefore, c(ti, fi(ti)) = 1 for  i-almost all ti 2 Ti, which implies that fi(ti) 2 supp gi(ti)
for  i-almost all ti 2 Ti.
17This measurability is implied by the measurability of the correspondence supp gi(ti).
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Theorem 12. Suppose that Assumptions (P’), (I) and (RD) hold. Then every F-
measurable behavioral strategy profile has a T -measurable undistinguishable purifica-
tion.18
Proof. Given an F -measurable behavioral strategy profile f , it follows from Proposition 9
that there exists a universally distribution equivalent T -measurable pure strategy profile












V gi (ai, ti)gi(ti, dai) d i(ti) = U
E
i (g).
In addition, Propositions 10 implies that f and g are belief consistent.
Remark 10. The purification results in Dvoretsky, Wald and Wolfowitz (1951) and
Khan, Rath and Sun (2006) can be stated as follows: given a measure-valued mapping
h1 from S to M(X) and at most countably many joint measurable integrably bounded
functions { n} from S⇥X to R, there exists a measurable mapping h2 from S to X which
yields the same expected payo↵/distribution on the entire event S. Khan, Rath and Sun
(2006) showed that the payo↵ equivalence and distribution equivalence are independent
concepts even with the belief consistency (see Examples 1 and 2 therein). In the setting of
games with incomplete information, h1 and { n} can be regarded as a behavioral strategy
profile and the functions {V h1i }i2I which are generated by players’ payo↵s and h1. Then
the above classical purification result can be used to obtain the existence of pure strategy
equilibria as in the proof of Theorem 12 when X is finite.
We strengthen their notions by requiring the equivalence condition on all payo↵-
relevant information subsets and show that universal distribution equivalence implies
universal payo↵ equivalence and belief consistency, which is due to the strengthening of
distribution equivalence universally. In addition, it is worthwhile to point out that in
games with incomplete information, given a behavioral strategy profile f , the undistin-
guishable purification g obtained in Theorem 12 is independent of the payo↵ structure.
That is, f and g are universally payo↵ equivalent for any payo↵ function satisfying
Assumption (P’).
18By F-measurable strategy profile f , we mean that fi is Fi-measurable for each i; similar inter-
pretation applies for the T -measurable strategy profile g. As can be seen, this purification result still
holds without the “countably-generated” condition since this condition is not used in the proofs of
Propositions 8 and 10.
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Remark 11. The purification results in Dvoretsky, Wald and Wolfowitz (1951) and
Khan, Rath and Sun (2006) depend on the assumption of finite actions. One can easily
extend the result to general actions by introducing a randomization device. In particular,
given a probability space (S,S, P ), one could consider the extended probability space
(S 0,S 0, P 0) = (S⇥ [0, 1],S⌦B0, P ⌦ ⌘), where ([0, 1],B0, ⌘) is the Lebesgue unit interval.
Then a purification result can be obtained with the probability space (S 0,S 0, P 0). Sun
(1996) and Loeb and Sun (2006) have obtained purification results with general action
spaces by considering the atomless Loeb space. Subsequently, Podczeck (2009) presented a
purification result based on the super-atomless probability space, and Loeb and Sun (2009)
showed that the general purification theorems on the saturated probability space follow
from the results on atomless Loeb spaces via the saturation property. Further results
of Wang and Zhang (2012) then relax the continuity and compactness assumptions in
earlier results.19
First, it is clear that the purification result with the randomization device is our
special case by letting G = S ⌦ {;, [0, 1]}. Second, for the purification result on a satu-
rated probability space (S,S, P ), one can consider an S-measurable mapping h1 from S
to M(X), which will induce a countably-generated sub- -algebra G. Since an atomless
probability space is saturated if and only if each of its countably generated sub- -algebras
is setwise coarser than itself, the setwise coarseness condition holds for G and S. Hence,
one can get an S-measurable mapping h2 from S to X which is distribution/payo↵ e-
quivalent to h1.
Therefore, our result is more general in the following sense: (1) our result could
allow for any atomless probability space, and is able to cover the purification results
based on randomization device and saturated probability spaces; (2) we strengthen the
purification concept by requiring the purification result universally, while the above results
only consider the purification result on the entire space.
The existence of behavioral/distributional strategy equilibria has been established
with great generality. Milgrom and Weber (1985) proved the existence of distributional
strategy equilibrium by assuming that each player’s information space is a complete
separable metric space. Balder (1988) showed the existence of equilibria in behavioral
strategies. In particular, the private information spaces are measurable spaces. Fu (2008)
19Note that the notion of saturated probability spaces in Loeb and Sun (2009) and Wang and Zhang
(2012) is equivalent to the notion of super-atomless probability spaces in Podczeck (2009), see Fajardo
and Keisler (2002, Theorem 3B.7, p. 47).
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further extended previous results and considered games with more complex information
structure. The following result, which is from Balder (1988), is su cient for our purpose.
Fact 2. In a game with incomplete information  , the action space Ai is uncountable
for each i 2 I. If Assumptions (P’) holds and   is absolutely continuous with respect to
⌦i2I i, then there exists an F-measurable behavioral strategy equilibrium.
Thus, one can also obtain the existence of pure strategy equilibrium via the purifi-
cation approach under the same conditions of Theorem 11; that is, the existence of an
F -measurable behavioral strategy equilibrium follows from Fact 2, and a corresponding
undistinguishable purification can be obtained by Theorem 12, which is clearly a pure
strategy equilibrium.
4.2.4 Concluding Remarks
In the current paper, we propose the relative di↵useness assumption to characterize
the di↵erences between payo↵-relevant and strategy-relevant di↵useness of information.
Based on this assumption, the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with in-
complete information and general action spaces is obtained. Moreover, we introduce the
notion of undistinguishable purification and show its existence.
The model discussed in this paper is simple as the prior is assumed to be independent
across all players’ private information spaces. The relative di↵useness assumption can
be used to deal with more general formulations. For example, we can introduce a new
type of information which is payo↵-relevant for all players. To be clear, suppose that
T0 = {t10, t20, . . . , tm0 } represents the space of common information and T0 the power set
of T0; see Milgrom and Weber (1985). For each i 2 I, player i’s payo↵ function ui will
depend on the action profile, her own type, and the realized common information. The
information structure   will be a probability on
 
T0⇥ (⇥ni=1Ti), T0⌦ (⌦ni=1Ti)
 
. We need
the following conditional independence assumption: for each j 2 {1, 2, . . . ,m},  j =
⌦ni=1 ji , where  j is the conditional probability measure on the product measurable space
(⇥ni=1Ti,⌦ni=1Ti) when the common information is tj0, and  ji is the marginal probability
measure of  j on (Ti, Ti) for each i 2 I. Then Assumption (RD) will be restated
under the probability measure  ji for each i and j. With the conditional independence
assumption, (P’) and (RD), it can be easily checked that the main results on purification
and existence of a pure strategy equilibrium still hold following the similar arguments.
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More generalizations could be achieved along this line. In Radner and Rosenthal
(1982), independent payo↵-relevant and strategy-relevant private information is consid-
ered. Fu et al. (2007) introduced a new concept of strategy-relevant public information,
and Fu (2008) extended the space of public information to be countable and the set of
common information to be a general probability space. In all of these papers, the purifi-
cation results and existence of pure strategy equilibria are restricted in the case of finite
actions. By appropriately adopting the relative di↵useness assumption and appealing
to analogous arguments, our results can be naturally extended to their settings with
general action spaces.
4.3 Bayesian Games with Inter-player Information
and Finite Actions
In this section, we shall define the notion of “inter-player information” for games with
incomplete information and finite actions. After proposing the condition of “coarser
inter-player information”, we show that this condition is not only su cient but also
necessary for the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Purification results of behavioral
strategy profiles will be also considered.
4.3.1 Model
A Bayesian game   can be described as follows:
• The set of players: I = {1, 2, . . . , n}.
• The (private) information space for each player: {Ti}i2I . Each Ti is endowed with
a countably generated  -algebra Ti. Let T = ⇥ni=1Ti and T = ⌦ni=1Ti.
• For each player i 2 I, Xi is a finite set of actions. Let X =
Q
1inXi.
• The information structure:  , a probability measure on the measurable space
(T, T ). For each i 2 I,  i is the marginal probability of   on Ti and (Ti, Ti, i) is
atomless.   is absolutely continuous with respect to
N
1in  i and q(t1, . . . , tn) is
the Radon-Nikodym derivative.20
20This assumption is standard in the literature, see Milgrom and Weber (1985).
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• The payo↵ functions: {ui}i2I . Each ui is an integrably bounded mapping from
X ⇥ T to R such that ui(x, ·) is T -measurable for each x 2 X.
Hereafter, the notation  i denotes the set of all players except player i. Let   i =
⌦j 6=i j. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the mixture of actions of player i
is the simplex M(Xi), and the pure actions in Xi correspond to vertices of M(Xi).
For each player i 2 I, a behavioral strategy (resp. pure strategy) is a measurable
function from Ti to M(Xi) (resp. Xi), and LTii is the set of all behavioral strategies.
LT = ⇥i2ILTii .










A behavioral (resp. pure) strategy equilibrium is a behavioral (resp. pure) strategy
profile f ⇤ = (f ⇤1 , f
⇤
2 , . . . , f
⇤
n) such that f
⇤
i maximizes Ui(fi, f
⇤
 i) for each i 2 I.
Consider the density weighted payo↵ of player i: wi(x, t) = ui(x, t) · q(t) for each
x 2 X and t 2 T . Let Gi be the  -algebra generated by the collection of mappings
{wj(x, ·, t i) : x 2 X, t i 2 T i, 8j 6= i}.
Then Gi ✓ Ti denotes player i’s inter-player information. That is, Gi is player i’s
information flow to all other players, which describes the influence of player i’s private
information in other players’ payo↵s.
4.3.2 Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria
In this section, we will prove the existence of the pure strategy equilibrium in Bayesian
games under an appropriate condition called “coarser inter-player information”. More
importantly, we will show that this condition is necessary for the existence result.
Definition 9. Player i is said to have coarser inter-player information if Gi is
setwise coarser than Ti under  i.
A Bayesian game is said to have coarser inter-player information if each player has
coarser inter-player information.
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Theorem 13. Every Bayesian game with coarser inter-player information has a pure
strategy equilibrium.
Remark 12. For Bayesian games with coarser inter-player information, players’ payo↵s
might be interdependent and types could be correlated. In particular, it is inessential
whether types are independent or correlated, since the derivative q can be absorbed into
the density weighted payo↵.
If Gi is the trivial  -algebra {;, Ti} for each player i 2 I, then players have indepen-
dent priors and private values, and the condition of “coarser inter-player information”
is automatically satisfied since (Ti, Ti, i) is atomless.
In Theorem 13, we show that the condition of “coarser inter-player information” is
su cient for the existence of pure strategy equilibrium. The next theorem demonstrates
that this condition is also necessary.
Given any n   2 and the player space I = {1, 2, . . . , n}, player i has private infor-
mation space (Ti, Ti, i) and inter-player information Gi such that (Ti,Gi, i) is atomless
for each 1  i  n. Let Hn be the collection of all Bayesian games with the player space
I and the above private information spaces {(Ti, Ti/Gi, i)}i2I .
Theorem 14. Given the player space I = {1, . . . , n} for n   2 and the private in-
formation space (Ti, Ti/Gi, i) for each i 2 I, every player i has coarser inter-player
information if either of the following conditions holds:
1. every Bayesian game in Hn with type-irrelevant payo↵s has a pure strategy equi-
librium;21
2. every Bayesian game in Hn with independent types has a pure strategy equilibrium.
4.3.3 Purification
In this subsection, we will consider the purification of behavioral strategy profiles in
Bayesian games with finite actions.
Definition 10. Let f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn) and g = (g1, g2, . . . , gn) be two behavioral strategy
profiles.
21A Bayesian game is said to have type-irrelevant payo↵s if the payo↵ function of each player does
not depend on the type t 2 T .
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1. The strategy profiles f and g are said to be payo↵ equivalent if for each player
i 2 I, Ui(f) = Ui(g).
2. The strategy profiles f and g are said to be strongly payo↵ equivalent if
(a) they are payo↵ equivalent;
(b) for each player i 2 I and any given behavioral strategy hi, the two strategy
profiles (hi, f i) and (hi, g i) are payo↵ equivalent.
3. The strategy profiles f and g are said to be distribution equivalent if for each player
i 2 I, RTi fi(ti, ·) d i(ti) = RTi gi(ti, ·) d i(ti).
4. Suppose that f is a pure strategy profile. For player i, fi is said to be belief
consistent with gi if fi(ti) 2 supp gi(ti) for  i-almost all ti 2 Ti. Moreover, f is
said to be belief consistent with g if they are belief consistent for each player i 2 I.
Now we are ready to give the definitions of purification.
Definition 11. Suppose that g is a pure strategy profile and f is a behavioral strate-
gy profile. Then g is said to be a strong purification of f if they are strongly payo↵
equivalent, distribution equivalent, and belief consistent.
Proposition 11. In a Bayesian game with coarser inter-player information, every be-
havioral strategy profile f possesses a strong purification g.
4.3.4 Proofs
Proof of Theorem 13. Suppose that mi is the cardinality of Xi for each i 2 I. Let




k = 1, a
i
k   0 for 1  k  mi}. The mixture of actions
of player i inM(Xi) can be regarded as elements in the simplex4i, and the pure actions
in Xi correspond to the extreme points of 4i. Denote LGii as the set of all Gi-measurable
functions from Ti to M(Xi). Without loss of generality, it can be viewed as LGi1(Ti,4i),
and embedded in LGi1(Ti,Rmi) endowed with the weak⇤ topology.
By the Riesz representation theorem (see Theorem 13.28 of Aliprantis and Border
(2006)), LGi1(Ti,Rmi) can be viewed as the dual space of LGi1 (Ti,Rmi). Then LGi1(Ti,Rmi)
is a locally convex, Hausdor↵ topological vector space under the weak⇤ topology. By
Alaoglu’s Theorem (see Theorem 6.21 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)), the closed ball
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with radius C   1 (the C-ball) is weak⇤ compact in LGi1(Ti,Rmi). Since Gi is countable
generated, LGi1 (Ti,Rmi) is separable, which implies that the C-ball is metrizable in the
weak⇤ topology (see Theorem 6.30 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)).




closed. That is, for any sequence {gk}k2N 2 LGii such that gk weak⇤ converges to
some g0 2 LGi1(Ti,Rmi), we need to show g0 2 LGii . Since gk weak⇤ converges to
g0 2 LGi1(Ti,Rmi), it also weakly converges to g0 in LGi1 (Ti,Rmi). Following an anal-
ogous argument in the proof of Lemma 12, one can show that g0(ti) 2 co (Ls(gk(ti))) for
 i-almost all ti 2 Ti. Since 4i is closed and convex, co (Ls(gk(ti))) ✓ 4i for  i-almost
all ti 2 Ti. Thus, g0(ti) 2 4i for  i-almost all ti 2 Ti, and g0 2 LGii . Therefore, LGii is
nonempty, convex, and compact under the weak⇤ topology. Let LG = ⇥i2ILGii endowed
with the product topology.
Given a pure strategy profile h, let hi = E i(hi|Gi) 2 LGii , and hki denote the k-th
dimension of hi for each player i 2 I and 1  k  mi. For any distinct i, j 2 I,
x j 2 X j, t j 2 T j, and D 2 Gj,Z
Tj







































































wi(x j, xj, t j, tj)hj(tj, dxj) j(dtj).
The first three equalities are obvious. The fourth and fifth equalities hold since 1D and
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wi(x, t j, ·) are Gj-measurable for any x 2 X and t j 2 T j. The sixth equality is due
to the definition of hj, and the last one is just rewriting the summation as integration.
Thus, for  j-almost all tj 2 Tj,
E j (wi(x j, hj(tj), t j, tj)|Gj) =
Z
Xj
wi(x j, xj, t j, tj)hj(tj, dxj). (4.1)
Fix player 1. For any t1 2 T1 and x1 2 X1, we haveZ
T 1




























w1(x1, x2, h (1,2)(t (1,2)), t 2, t2)h2(t2, dx2) 2(dt2)  (1,2)(dt (1,2))






w1(x1, x 1, t1, t 1)h 1(t 1, dx 1)  1(dt 1),
where the subscript  (1, 2) denotes the set of all players except players 1 and 2. The first
equality is due to the definition of density weighted payo↵. The second equality is due
to the Fubini property. The third equality holds by taking the conditional expectation.
The fourth equality is implied by Equation (4.1). Then the previous four equalities are
repeated for n  2 times (from T3 to Tn). This procedure is omitted in the fifth equality,
and finally leads to the last equality. One can repeat the argument and show that for
any i 2 I, xi 2 Xi and ti 2 TiZ
T i






wi(xi, x i, ti, t i)h i(t i, dx i)  i(dt i).
(4.2)
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For each i 2 I, let Fi be a mapping from Ti ⇥Xi ⇥ LG to R defined as follows:





wi(xi, x i, ti, t i)g i(t i, dx i)  i(dt i).
It is clear that Fi is Ti-measurable on Ti and continuous on LG, where LG is endowed
with the weak⇤ topology. For each i 2 I, the best response correspondence Gi from
Ti ⇥ LG to Xi is given by
Gi(ti, g1, . . . , gn) = argmaxxi2XiFi(ti, xi, g1, . . . , gn).
For each ti, Berge’s maximal theorem implies that Gi is nonempty, compact-valued,
and upper-hemicontinuous on LG. For any xi and (g1, . . . , gn), Fi is Ti-measurable.
Then Gi(·, g1, . . . , gn) admits a Ti-measurable selection. Thus, E i (Gi(·, g1, . . . , gn)|Gi)
is nonempty. Since Gi is setwise coarser than Ti, by Corollary 9 and Theorems 9 and 10,
it is convex, weak⇤ compact-valued, and weak⇤ upper-hemicontinuous on LG.
Consider a correspondence from LG to itself:
 (g1, . . . , gn) = ⇥ni=1E i (Gi(·, g1, . . . , gn)|Gi) .
It is clear that  is nonempty, convex, weak⇤ compact-valued, and weak⇤ upper-hemicontinuous
on LG. By Fan-Glicksberg’s fixed-point theorem, there exists a fixed point (g⇤1, . . . , g
⇤
n)
of  . Thus for each i, there exists some Ti-measurable selection f ⇤i of Gi(·, g⇤1, . . . , g⇤n)
such that g⇤i = E
 i (f ⇤i |Gi).
With the strategy profile (f ⇤1 , . . . , f
⇤





























i (ti), x i, ti, t i)g
⇤
i (t i, dx i)  i(dt i) i(dti).
The first equality holds due to the definition of Ui. The second equality holds based
on the Fubini property, and the third equality relies on Equation (4.2). By the choice
of (g⇤1, . . . , g
⇤
n), we have that (f
⇤
1 , . . . , f
⇤
n) is a pure strategy equilibrium.
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To prove Theorem 14, we first consider an auxiliary game.
Example 4. Consider an m⇥m zero-sum “matching pennies” game   with asymmetric
information. There are two players, and the action space for both players is A1 = A2 =
{a1, a2, . . . am}, m   2. The payo↵ matrix for player 1 is given below.
Player 1
Player 2
a1 a2 a3 · · · am
a1 1  1 0 · · · 0
a2 0 1  1 · · · 0







am  1 0 · · · 0 1
Player i has a private information space Li = [0, 1] and (l1, l2) follows the uniform
distribution ⌧ on the triangle of the unit square 0  l1  l2  1. Then it is obvious
that the Radon-Nikodym derivative of ⌧ with respect to the Lebesgue measure on the unit
square is
⇢(l1, l2) =
8<:2, 0  l1  l2  1;0, otherwise.
Let ⌧i be the marginal distribution of ⌧ on Li for i = 1, 2. Then the Lebesgue measure
⌘ is absolutely continuous with respect to ⌧1 on [0, 1] with the Radon-Nikodym derivative
 1(l1) =
1
2(1 l1) if 0 < l1 < 1 and 0 otherwise, and ⌘ is absolutely continuous with respect
to ⌧2 with the Radon-Nikodym derivative  2(l2) =
1
2l2
if 0 < l2 < 1 and 0 otherwise.
The two probability measures ⌧1 and ⌧2 are both atomless. Let ⇢0 be the corresponding
Radon-Nikodym derivative of ⌧ with respect to ⌧1 ⌦ ⌧2:
⇢0(l1, l2) = ⇢(l1, l2) ·  1(l1) ·  2(l2) =
8<: 12(1 l1)l2 , 0 < l1  l2 < 1;0, otherwise.
As is well known, there exists a measure preserving mapping hi from (Ti,Gi, i) to
([0, 1],B, ⌧i) such that for any E 2 Gi, there exists a set E 0 2 B such that  i(E4h 1i (E 0)) =
0. For i = 1, 2, let ⇡i be a probability measure on (Ti, Ti) which is absolutely continu-
ous with respect to  i with the Radon-Nikodym derivative  i(hi(ti)). Since  i(hi(ti)) is
positive for  i-almost all ti,  i is also absolutely continuous with respect to ⇡i.
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Proof of Theorem 14.
(1) First we consider the following 2-player game  0, and then extend it to an n-player
game. Player 1 and 2’s action spaces and payo↵s are the same as in the game  . The
private information space for player i is (Ti, Ti, i), q(t1, t2) = ⇢0(h1(t1), h2(t2)), and the
common prior   has the Radon-Nikodym derivative q with respect to  1⌦  2. It can be
easily checked that  i is the marginal probability measure of   for i = 1, 2.
Suppose that  1 has a pure strategy equilibrium (f1, f2). Let E1j = {t1 2 T1 : f1(t1) =
aj} and E2j = {t2 2 T2 : f2(t2) = aj} for 1  j  m. Then we shall show that for  2-
almost all t2 2 T2 Z
E11




and for  1-almost all t1 2 T1,Z
E21




Suppose that ↵ and  ↵ are the equilibrium payo↵s of player 1 and player 2, respec-






1 . For j = 1, . . . ,m, let
C1j =
(




















Now we define a new strategy for players 1 and 2 as follows:
f 01(t1) =
8<:aj t1 2 C1j \ ([1k<jC1k) ,a1 otherwise;
and
f 02(t2) =
8<:aj+1 t2 2 C2j \ ([1k<jC2k) ,a1 otherwise.
We claim that player 2 can choose the strategy f 02 and get a nonnegative payo↵.
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If player 2 takes action aj+1 at state t2, then his interim expected payo↵ isZ
T1













1. if t2 2 C2j , then choosing the action aj+1 gives player 2 a strictly positive payo↵;
2. if t2 2 T2 \
 [1jmC2j  , then player 2 is indi↵erent between any action and gets a
payo↵ 0.
Thus, player 2 can choose the strategy f 02 and guarantee himself a nonnegative payo↵,
which implies that ↵  0. Similarly, one can analyze the payo↵ of player 1 and show that
↵   0. As a result, ↵ = 0, which implies that  1
 [1jmC1j   = 0 and  2  [1jmC2j   =
0. As a result, Equation (4.3) holds for  2-almost all t2 2 T2, and Equation (4.4) holds
for  1-almost all t1 2 T1.
For  2-almost all t2 2 T2,
R
T1




















m for  2-almost all t2 2 T2. That is, for  2-
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Thus, ⇡1(E1j ) =
1
m . In addition, ⇡1(h
 1
1 ([0, h2(t2)])) = ⌘ ([0, h2(t2)]) = h2(t2) for  2-
almost all t2 2 T2. Therefore, ⇡1(E1j \ h 11 ([0, h2(t2)])) = ⇡1(E1j ) · ⇡1(h 11 ([0, h2(t2)]))
for  2-almost all t2 2 T2. Since {[0, h2(t2)]}t22T2 generates the Borel  -algebra on [0, 1]
modulo null sets, {h 11 ([0, h2(t2)])}t22T2 generates G1 on T1 modulo null sets, which
implies that E1j is independent of G1 under ⇡1. As m is arbitrary, we have proved that
for any natural number m   2, there exist m disjoint subsets {E1j }1jm which are of
measure 1m and independent of G1 under ⇡1. Thus, G1 is setwise coarser than T1 under
⇡1. Since ⇡1 and  1 are absolutely continuous with respect to each other, G1 is setwise
coarser than T1 under  1. Similarly, one can show that G2 is setwise coarser than T2
under  2.
We extend the game  0 to an n-player game  2. Players 1 and 2 in  2 share the
same payo↵s, action sets and private information spaces with those in the game  0.
Other players in  2 are dummy in the sense that player k has private information space
(Tk, Tk, k), and only one action set Xk = {a} for 3  k  n. The common prior  
is absolutely continuous with respect to
N
1in  i with the Radon-Nikodym derivative
q(t1, t2). Hence, the payo↵s of all players in the Bayesian game  2 are type-irrelevant.
If  2 has a pure strategy equilibrium, then the analysis above shows that players 1 and
2 have coarser inter-player information.
For any 3  j  n, one can construct a new n-player game  j in which players 1 and
j are active while all other players are dummy. The payo↵ functions, action sets and
private information spaces of players 1 and j are defined similarly as those of players 1
and 2 in the game  2. Adopting the above argument, it can be shown that players 1 and
j have coarser inter-player information. Therefore, all players have coarser inter-player
information.
(2) Now we construct a new game  00 based on the game  0 above. Suppose that
players 1 and 2’s action spaces and private information spaces are the same, while the
payo↵ of player i in the game  00 is given by vi(x, t) = ui(x) · q(t) for each x 2 X and
t 2 T , where ui is the payo↵ function of player i and q is the Radon-Nikodym derivative
in the game  0. Players have independent types and the common prior   =  1 ⌦  2. It
is obvious that the game  00 is essentially the same compared with the game  0 if one
considers the density weighted payo↵. Extending the game  00 to an n-player game with
2 active players and n   2 dummy players, then one can follow the proof in (1) and
show that the two active players have coarser inter-player information if the game  00
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has a pure strategy equilibrium. Since those two active players are arbitrarily chosen,
all players have coarser inter-player information.
Proof of Proposition 11. Given any behavioral strategy profile f , xi 2 Xi and ti 2 Ti,
let









For any µi 2M(Xi), define
W (µi,f)i (ti) =
Z
Xi
V fi (xi, ti)µi(dxi).
Let ci(ti, xi) = 1supp fi(ti)(xi) for each ti 2 Ti, xi 2 Xi and i 2 I. Denote cµii (ti) =R
Xi
ci(ti, xi)µi(dxi) for any µi 2 M(Xi). Then given any behavioral strategy hi, we
slightly abuse the notation by letting W (hi,f)i (ti) =
R
Xi










i (xi, ti), ci(ti, xi)
⌘
: xi 2 Xi}.
We have









By Theorem 8, we have E i(Hfi |Gi) = E i(co(Hfi )|Gi).
For each i 2 I, (fi,W (fi,f)i , cfii ) is a measurable selection of co(Hfi ). Thus, there is a Ti-
measurable mapping gi from Ti toXi such that E i(gi|Gi) = E i(fi|Gi), E i(W (gi,f)i |Gi) =
E i(W (fi,f)i |Gi) and E i(cgii |Gi) = E i(cfii |Gi). Then E i(gi|Gi) = E i(fi|Gi) for each i
implies that f and g are distribution equivalent.
Given any ti 2 Ti and xi 2 Xi,























wi(xi, x i, ti, t i)
Y
j 6=i
E j (gj|Gj) (tj, dxj)  i(dt i)






wi(xi, x i, ti, t i)
Y
j 6=i




wi(xi, f i(t i), ti, t i)  i(dt i)
= V fi (xi, ti).
The third and fifth equalities are due to Equation (4.2), and the fourth equality holds
since E i(gi|Gi) = E i(fi|Gi) for each i 2 I. Thus, W (hi,g)i (ti) = W (hi,f)i (ti) for any hi





























Thus, f and g are strongly payo↵ equivalent.










ci(ti, xi)fi(ti, dxi) i(dti) = 1
which implies that c(ti, gi(ti)) = c
gi
i (ti) = 1 for  i-almost all ti 2 Ti. That is, gi(ti) 2
supp fi(ti) for  i-almost all ti 2 Ti, fi and gi are belief consistent. Since i is arbitrarily
chosen, f and g are belief consistent.




Beginning with Shapley (1953), the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in
discounted stochastic games has remained an important problem. Given that stochastic
games with general state spaces have found applications in various areas in economics,
the issue on the existence of an equilibrium in stationary strategies for such games has
received considerable attention in the last two decades. However, no general existence
result, except for several special classes of stochastic games, has been obtained in the
literature so far.1
Nowak and Raghavan (1992) and Du e et al. (1994) proved the existence of correlat-
ed stationary Markov perfect equilibria in stochastic games.2 They essentially assumed
that there is a randomization device publicly known to all players which is irrelevant
to the fundamental parameters of the game. Stationary Markov perfect equilibria have
been shown to exist by Nowak (2003) and Duggan (2012) for stochastic games with
some special structures. Nowak (2003) studied a class of stochastic games in which
the transition probability has a fixed countable set of atoms while its atomless part is
a finite combination of atomless measures that do not depend on states and action-
s, i.e. a mixture of constant transition kernels. Duggan (2012) considered stochastic
games with a specific product structure, namely stochastic games with noise – which is
1We shall only discuss those papers which are the closest to our results here. For detailed discussions
about the literature of stochastic games, see Du e et al. (1994), Duggan (2012), Levy (2013), Nowak
and Raghavan (1992), and their references.
2Du e et al. (1994) obtained additional ergodic properties under stronger conditions.
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a history-irrelevant component of the state and could influence the payo↵ functions and
transitions.
Our main purpose is to show the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in
stochastic games under a general condition called “(decomposable) coarser transition k-
ernels” by establishing a new connection between the equilibrium payo↵ correspondences
in stochastic games and a general result on the conditional expectations of correspon-
dences. In a typical stochastic game with a general state space, there could be four
sources of information that are generated respectively by the action correspondences,
the stage payo↵s, the transition probability itself and the transition kernel. As long as
there is enough information in the first three sources that can not be covered by the
information conveyed in the transition kernel, one would expect the total information
that comes from the four possibly di↵erent sources to be essentially more than the infor-
mation from the transition kernel eventwise, which is exactly the condition of “coarser
transition kernels”.3 When we do not have a coarser transition kernel, we can still work
with the case of a “decomposable coarser transition kernel” in the sense that the tran-
sition kernel is decomposed as a sum of finitely many components with each component
being the product of a “coarser” transition function and a density function.4
Theorem 15 below shows that under the condition of a coarser transition kernel,
a stochastic game always has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. A very simple
proof of that result is provided connecting Theorem 8 to the existence problem. We
point out that stochastic games with sunspot/noise have coarser transition kernels; and
thus our result covers the existence results for such stochastic games while no product
structure is imposed on the state space. We then consider the more general case with
a decomposable coarser transition kernel and prove in Theorem 16 the existence of a
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium. Proposition 12 extends to the case with atoms
and presents an existence result that includes that of Nowak (2003) as a special case.
We will also illustrate the minimality of our general condition from a technical point of
view.
3It is worthwhile to point out that the consideration of such information gap arises naturally in
economic models. For example, the geometric Brownian motion, which is widely used in asset pricing
models, has strictly increasing information filtrations – the information at a previous time is always
coarser than the information at a later time eventwise; see, for example, Du e (2001, p.88). Note that
the usual sample space of a geometric Brownian motion is the space of continuous functions endowed
with the Wiener measure, which has no natural product structure.
4Such a density function is allowed to carry any information within the model. Thus, the transition
kernel itself may have the possibility of carrying the full information in the model.
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The rest is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents the model of discounted s-
tochastic games. In Section 5.3, we propose the condition of a (decomposable) coarser
transition kernel (on the atomless part) and prove the existence of stationary Markov
perfect equilibria in several contexts. The minimality of this condition is also illustrat-
ed. In Section 5.4, we discuss the relationship between our results and several previous
existence results. Section 5.5 concludes the paper. This chapter is based on the paper
He and Sun (2013c).
5.2 Discounted Stochastic Games
Consider an m-person discounted stochastic game:
• I = {1, · · · ,m} is the set of players.
• (S,S) is a measurable space representing the states of nature.
• For each player i 2 I, Xi is a nonempty compact metric space of actions with its
Borel  -algebra B(Xi). Let X =
Q
1imXi, and B(X) the Borel  -algebra on X.
• For each i 2 I, Ai is a nonempty, S-measurable, compact valued correspondence
from S to Xi, Ai(s) is the set of feasible actions for player i at state s. Let
A(s) =
Q
i2I Ai(s) for each s 2 S.
• For each i 2 I, ui : S ⇥X ! R is a stage-payo↵ with an absolute bound C (i.e.,
for all i 2 I, (s, x) 2 S ⇥X, |ui(s, x)|  C for some positive number C) such that
ui(s, x) is S-measurable in s for each x 2 X and continuous in x for each s 2 S.
•  i 2 [0, 1) is player i’s discount factor.
• Q : S ⇥X ⇥ S ! [0, 1] is a transition probability representing the law of motion
for the states.
1. Q(·|s, x) (abbreviated as Q(s,x)) is a probability measure on (S,S) for all s 2 S
and x 2 X, and for all E 2 S, Q(E|·, ·) is S ⌦ B(X)-measurable.
2. Q(·|s, x) is absolutely continuous with respect to   for all s and x and q(·|s, x)
(abbreviated as q(s,x)) is the corresponding Radon-Nikodym derivative, where
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  is a countably-additive probability measure on (S,S). It is a common
assumption that the state space (S,S, ) is countably generated.5
3. For all s 2 S, the mapping q(·|s, x) satisfies the following continuity condition
in x: for any sequence xn ! x0,Z
S
  q(s1|s, xn)  q(s1|s, x0)   d (s1)! 0.
The game is played in discrete time and past history is observable by all the players.
The game starts from some initial state. If s is the state at stage t and x 2 X is the
action profile chosen simultaneously by the m players at this stage, then Q(E|s, x) is
the probability that the state at stage t+ 1 belongs to the set E given s and x.
For a Borel set A in a complete separable metric space, M(A) is the set of all Borel
probability measures on A. A strategy of player i is a measurable mapping fi from
the past history to M(Xi) which places probability 1 on the set of feasible actions. A
stationary Markov strategy for player i is an S-measurable mapping fi : S ! M(Xi)
such that fi(s) places probability 1 on the set Ai(s) for each s 2 S. Given a sta-
tionary Markov strategy f , the continuation values v(·, f) give an essentially bounded











The strategy profile f is a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium if the discounted
expected payo↵ of each player i is maximized by his strategy fi in every state s 2 S.
By standard results in dynamic programming, it means that the continuation values v
solve the following recursive maximization problem:









vi(s1, f)Q(ds1|s, xi, x i)
⇤
f i(dx i|s), (5.2)
where x i and X i have the usual meanings, and f i(s) is the product probability
⌦j 6=ifj(s) on the set of actions of all players other than i at the state s.
5It means that there is a countable subset D of S such that S is generated by D together with the
 -null sets.
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5.3 Main Results
In this section, we will show the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in
stochastic games with a general condition called “coarser transition kernels”. We use
this condition in three di↵erent contexts. The minimality of the condition is also demon-
strated in the last subsection.
5.3.1 Stochastic Games with Coarser Transition Kernels
We follow the notation in Section 5.2; and assume that the probability measure   on
the measurable state space (S,S) is atomless. Let G be a sub- -algebra of S.
Definition 12. A discounted stochastic game is said to have a coarser transition
kernel if for some sub- -algebra G of S, q(·|s, x) is G-measurable for all s 2 S and
x 2 X, and G is setwise coarser than S.
The sub- -algebra G of S can be regarded as the  -algebra generated by the transition
kernel q(·|s, x) for all s 2 S and x 2 X. Let SA, Su and SQ be the sub- -algebras of S
that are generated respectively by the action correspondences Ai(·) for all i 2 I, the stage
payo↵s ui(·, x) for all i 2 I and x 2 X, and the transition probability Q(E|·, x) for all
E 2 S and x 2 X.6 The sub- -algebras SA, Su and SQ can be viewed as the information
carried respectively by the action correspondences, the stage payo↵s and the transition
probability. The  -algebra S, which contains SA, Su, SQ and G, represents the total
information available for strategies.7 If G is setwise coarser than S, then S will coincide
with G (modulo null sets if necessary) when restricted to D. Thus, the condition of
coarser transition kernel simply means that the total information available for strategies
is more than the information conveyed in the transition kernel on any non-trivial event.
As long as there is enough di↵erent information in the action correspondences, stage
payo↵s and transition probability which can not be covered by the information from
the transition kernel, one would expect the total information in S that comes from four
possibly di↵erent sources to be strictly more than that in G eventwise. This is exactly
our condition.
6Note that the information generated by the transition probability and the information generated
by the transition kernel could be di↵erent.
7That is, the strategies must be S-measurable.
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Theorem 15. Every discounted stochastic game with a coarser transition kernel has a
stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Let LS1 (S,Rm) and LS1(S,Rm) be the L1 and L1 spaces of all S-measurable mappings
from S to Rm with the usual norm; that is,




LS1(S,Rm) = {f : f is S-measurable and essentially bounded under  },
where k · k is the usual norm in Rm. By the Riesz representation theorem (see Theo-
rem 13.28 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)), LS1(S,Rm) can be viewed as the dual space
of LS1 (S,Rm). Then LS1(S,Rm) is a locally convex, Hausdor↵ topological vector space
under the weak⇤ topology. Suppose that V is a subset of LS1(S,Rm) such that for any
v 2 V , kvk1  C, where C is an upper bound of the stage payo↵ function u. Then V is
nonempty and convex. Moreover, V is compact under the weak⇤ topology by Alaoglu’s
Theorem (see Theorem 6.21 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)). Since S is countable gen-
erated, LS1 (S,Rm) is separable, which implies that V is metrizable in the weak⇤ topology
(see Theorem 6.30 of Aliprantis and Border (2006)).
Given any v = (v1, · · · , vm) 2 V and s 2 S, we consider the game  (v, s). The action
space for player i is Ai(s). The payo↵ of player i with the action profile x 2 A(s) is
given by




A mixed strategy for player i is an element in M(Ai(s)), and a mixed strategy profile is
an element in
N
i2I M(Ai(s)). The set of mix strategy Nash equilibria of the static game
 (v, s), denoted by N(v, s), is a nonempty compact subset of
N
i2I M(Xi) under the
weak⇤ topology. Let P (v, s) be the set of payo↵ vectors induced by the Nash equilibria
in N(v, s), and co(P ) the convex hull of P . Then co(P ) is a correspondence from V ⇥S
to Rm. Let R(v) (resp. co(R(v))) be the set of  -equivalence classes of S-measurable
selections of P (v, ·) (resp. co(P (v, ·))) for each v 2 V .
By the standard argument, one can show that for each v 2 V , P (v, ·) is S-measurable
and compact valued, and co(R(v)) is nonempty, convex, weak⇤ compact valued and upper
hemicontinuous (see, for example, Lemmas 6 and 7 in Nowak and Raghavan (1992)).
Then the correspondence co(R) : V ! V maps the nonempty, convex, weak⇤ compact set
V (a subset of a locally convex Hausdor↵ topological vector space) to nonempty, convex
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subsets of V , and it has a closed graph in the weak⇤ topology. By the classical Fan-
Glicksberg Fixed Point Theorem, there is a fixed point v0 2 V such that v0 2 co(R)(v0).
That is, v0 is an S-measurable selection of co(P (v0, ·)).
Proof of Theorem 15. Given v0, I(S,G)Pv0 = I
(S,G)
co(Pv0 ) by Theorem 8. There exists an S-
measurable selection v⇤ of Pv0 such that E(v⇤|G) = E(v0|G). For each i 2 I, s 2 S and
x 2 X, we haveZ
S
v⇤i (s1)Q(ds1|s, x) =
Z
S

























By Equation (5.3),  (v⇤, s) =  (v0, s) for any s 2 S, and hence P (v⇤, s) = P (v0, s).
Thus, v⇤ is an S-measurable selection of Pv⇤ .
By the definition of Pv⇤ , these exists an S-measurable mapping f ⇤ from S to
N
i2I M(Xi)
such that f ⇤(s) is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the game  (v⇤, s) and v⇤(s) is
the corresponding equilibrium payo↵ for each s 2 S.8 It is clear that Equations (5.1)
and (5.2) hold for v⇤ and f ⇤, which implies that f ⇤ is a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium.
5.3.2 Stochastic Games with Decomposable Coarser Transition
Kernels
As in Subsection 5.3.1, we follow the notation in Section 5.2 and assume the probability
measure   on the measurable state space (S,S) to be atomless. In this subsection, we
will relax the assumption in Subsection 5.3.1 that the transition kernel q is measurable
with respect to the sub- -algebra G. We will allow the transition kernel q itself to
be S-measurable, but require q to be decomposed as a sum of J components with each
component being the product of a G-measurable transition function and an S-measurable
function. A stationary Markov perfect equilibrium still exists in such a case.
8Note that v⇤ is indeed the corresponding equilibrium payo↵ for  -almost all s 2 S. However, one
can follow the standard argument to modify v⇤ on a null set such that the claim holds for all s 2 S, see
Nowak and Raghavan (1992) and Duggan (2012).
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Definition 13. A discounted stochastic game is said to have a decomposable coarser
transition kernel if G is setwise coarser than S and for some positive integer J ,
q(s1|s, x) =
P
1jJ qj(s1, s, x)⇢j(s1), where qj is product measurable and qj(·, s, x) is G-
measurable for each s 2 S and x 2 X, qj and ⇢j are all nonnegative, and ⇢j is integrable
on the atomless probability space (S,S, ), j = 1, . . . , J .
Note that when a discounted stochastic game has a decomposable coarser transition
kernel, the collection of mappings {q(·|s, x)}s2S,x2X themselves may not be G-measurable
since the ⇢j for 1  j  J are required to be S-measurable.
Theorem 16. Every discounted stochastic game with a decomposable coarser transition
kernel has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
Proof. Following the same argument and notation as in Subsection 5.3.1, there is a
mapping v0 2 V such that v0 2 co(R(v0)). Let H(s) = {(a, a · ⇢1(s), . . . , a · ⇢J(s)) : a 2
Pv0(s)}, and co(H(s)) the convex hull of H(s) for each s 2 S. It is clear that H is S-
measurable, integrably bounded and closed valued. Then I(S,G)H = I(S,G)co(H) by Theorem 8,
which implies that there exists an S-measurable selection v⇤ of Pv0 such that E(v⇤⇢j|G) =
E(v0⇢j|G) for each 1  j  J . For each i 2 I, s 2 S and x 2 X, we haveZ
S




























By repeating the argument in the last paragraph of the proof for Theorem 15, we can
obtain the existence of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
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5.3.3 Decomposable Coarser Transition Kernels on the Atom-
less Part
In Theorems 15 and 16, we assume that the probability measure   is atomless on (S,S).
Below we shall consider the more general case that   may have atoms. To guarantee
the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria, we still assume the condition of
decomposable coarser transition kernel, but now on the atomless part.
1. There exist disjoint S-measurable subsets S1 and S2 such that S1 [ S2 = S,  |S1
is the atomless part of   while  |S2 is the purely atomic part of  . The subset S2
is countable and each point in S2 is S-measurable.9
2. For s1 2 S1, the transition kernel q(s1|s, x) =
P
1jJ qj(s1, s, x)⇢j(s1) for some
positive integer J , and for s 2 S and x 2 X, where qj is nonnegative and product
measurable, and ⇢j is nonnegative and integrable on the atomless measure space
(S1,SS1 , S1), j = 1, . . . , J .10
Remark 13. By the continuity condition on the transition kernel, one can easily deduce
that for all s 2 S and any sequence xn ! x0,Z
S1
  q(s1|s, xn)  q(s1|s, x0)   d (s1)! 0.
  q(s2|s, xn)  q(s2|s, x0)  ! 0
for any s2 2 S2 such that  (s2) > 0.
Definition 14. Let G be a sub- -algebra of SS1. A discounted stochastic game is said
to have a decomposable coarser transition kernel on the atomless part if G is
setwise coarser than SS1 under   and qj(·, s, x) is G-measurable on S1 for each s 2 S
and x 2 X, j = 1, . . . , J .
Proposition 12. Every discounted stochastic game with a decomposable coarser transi-
tion kernel on the atomless part has a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium.
9This assumption is only for simplicity. One can easily consider the case that S2 is a collection of at
most countably many atoms.
10It is clear that for any E 2 S, the transition probability Q(E|s, x) = RE\S1 q(s1|s, x) d (s1) +P
s22S2 1E(s2)q(s2|s, x) (s2) for any s 2 S and x 2 X.
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Proof. Let V1 be the set of  -equivalence classes of S-measurable mappings from S1 to





= 1 for all s 2 S2, F =
Q
i2I Fi. Let V2 be the set of mappings from S2
to Rm bounded by C; V2 is endowed with the supremum metric and hence a complete
metric space.
Given s 2 S, v1 2 V1 and v2 2 V2, consider the game  (v1, v2, s). The action space
for player i is Ai(s). The payo↵ of player i with the action profile x 2 A(s) is given by
 i(s, x, v










i (s2)q(s2|s, x) (s2). (5.4)
The set of mixed strategy Nash equilibria in the game  (v1, v2, s) is denoted asN(v1, v2, s).
Let P (v1, v2, s) be the set of payo↵ vectors induced by the Nash equilibria in N(v1, v2, s),
and co(P ) the convex hull of P .
Given v1 2 V1, f 2 F , define a mapping ⇧ from V2 to V2 such that for each i 2 I,
v2 2 V2 and s2 2 S2,






 i(s2, xi, x i, v1, v2) i(dxi|s2)f i(dx i|s2). (5.5)
Let   = max{ i : i 2 I}. Then for any v1 2 V1, v2, v2 2 V2, x 2 X and s 2 S2,   i(s, x, v1, v2)   i(s, x, v1, v2)     i X
s22S2
  v2i (s2)  v2i (s2)  q(s2|s, x) (s2)
  i sup
s22S2
  v2i (s2)  v2i (s2)      sup
s22S2
  v2i (s2)  v2i (s2)  .
Thus, ⇧ is a  -contraction mapping. There is a unique v¯2 2 V2 such that⇧i(f i, v1)(v¯2)(s2) =
v¯2i (s2) for each i 2 I and s2 2 S2. Let W (v1, f) be the set of all   2 F such that for






 i(s2, xi, x i, v1, v¯2) i(dxi|s2)f i(dx i|s2). (5.6)
Let co(R(v1, f)) be the set of  -equivalence classes of S-measurable selections of
co
 
P (v1, v¯2, ·)  restricted to S1, where v¯2 is generated by v1 and f as above. Denote
 (v1, f) = co(R(v1, f))⇥W (v1, f) for each v1 2 V1 and f 2 F .
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By the standard argument, one can show that  is convex, compact valued and
upper hemicontinuous (see, for example, Nowak (2003)). By Fan-Glicksberg’s Fixed




) 2 V1 ⇥ F . Let v20 be the mapping from




through the  -contraction mapping ⇧ as
above. Then, v1
0
is an S-measurable selection of co P (v10 , v20 , ·)  restricted to S1; and























Following the same argument as in the proof of Theorem 16, one can show that there
exists an S-measurable selection v1⇤ of P(v10 ,v20 ) such that E(v1⇤⇢j|G) = E(v10⇢j|G)
for each 1  j  J , where the conditional expectation is taken on (S1,SS1 , S1)
with  S1 the normalized probability measure on (S1,SS1). Hence, for any s 2 S and





, s) = P (v1⇤, v20 , s). Thus, v1⇤ is an S-measurable selection of P(v1⇤,v20 ),
and there exists an S-measurable mapping f 1⇤ : S1 !
N
i2I M(Xi) such that f 1⇤(s)
is a mixed strategy equilibrium of the game  (v1⇤, v20 , s) and v1⇤(s) the corresponding
equilibrium payo↵ for each s 2 S1.
Let v⇤(s) be v1⇤(s) for s 2 S1 and v20(s) for s 2 S2. Similarly, let f ⇤(s) be f 1⇤(s) for
s 2 S1 and f 20(s) for s 2 S2. For s1 2 S1, since v1⇤ is a measurable selection of P(v1⇤,v20 )
on S1, the equilibrium property of f 1⇤(s1) then implies that Equations (5.1) and (5.2)
hold for v⇤ and f ⇤. Next, for s2 2 S2, the identity  i(s2, x, v10 , v20) =  i(s2, x, v1⇤, v20)
implies that Equations (5.7) and (5.8) still hold when v1
0
is replaced by v1⇤, which means
that Equations (5.1) and (5.2) hold for v⇤ and f ⇤. Therefore, f ⇤ is a stationary Markov
perfect equilibrium.
5.3.4 Minimality of the Condition
In the previous three subsections, we show the existence of stationary Markov perfect
equilibria in discounted stochastic games by assuming the condition of a (decomposable)
coarser transition kernel (on the atomless part). This raises the question of whether our
condition is minimal and, if so, then in what sense.
The central di culty in the existence argument for stochastic games is typically due
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to the failure of the fixed-point method. As shown in Subsection 5.3.1, the correspon-
dence R, which is the collection of selections from the equilibrium payo↵ correspondence
P , will live in an infinite-dimensional space if there is a continuum of states. Thus,
the desirable closedness and upper hemicontinuity properties would fail even though P
has these properties. To handle such issues, the main approach in the literature is to
work with the convex hull co(R). We bypass this imposed convexity restriction by using
the result that I(S,G)G = I(S,G)co(G) for any S-measurable, integrably bounded, closed valued
correspondence G provided that G is setwise coarser than S. Moreover, for the condition
of a decomposable coarser transition kernel (on the atomless part), we assume that the
transition kernel can be divided into finitely many parts. The following propositions
demonstrate the minimality of our condition.
Proposition 13. Suppose that SD coincide with GD on D with  (D) > 0. Then there
exists a measurable correspondence G from (S,S, ) to {0, 1} such that I(S,G)G 6= I(S,G)co(G).
Proof. Define a correspondence G(s) =
8<:{0, 1} s 2 D;{0} s /2 D. We claim that I(S,G)G 6= I(S,G)co(G).
Let g1(s) =
1
21D, where 1D is the indicator function of the set D. Then g1 is an S-
measurable selection of co(G). If there is an S-measurable selection g2 of G such that
E(g1|G) = E(g2|G), then there is a subset D2 ✓ D such that g2(s) = 1D2 . Since D
is a G-atom, for any S-measurable subset E ✓ D, there is a subset E1 2 G such that







































2 (D) > 0 by choosing E = D. However,  (D2) =
1
2 (D2) by choosing
E = D2, which implies that  (D2) = 0, a contradiction.
The key result that we need in the proof of Theorem 16 is I(S,G)H = I(S,G)co(H). The
question is whether a similar result holds if we generalize the condition of a decomposable
coarser transition kernel from a finite sum to a countable sum. We will show that this
is not possible. Let (S,S, ) be the Lebesgue unit interval (L,B, ⌘). Suppose that
{%n}n  0 is a complete orthogonal system in L2(S,S, ) such that %n takes value in
{ 1, 1} and RS %n d  = 0 for each n   1 and %0 ⌘ 1. Let ⇢n = %n + 1 for each n   1
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and ⇢0 = %0. Let {En}n 0 be a countable measurable partition of S and qn(s) = 1En
for each n   0. Suppose that a transition kernel q is decomposed into a countable sum
q(s1|s, x) =
P
n 0 qn(s)⇢n(s1). The following proposition shows that the argument for
the case that J is finite is not valid for such an extension.11
Proposition 14. There exists a correspondence G and a selection f of co(G) such that
for any  -algebra G ✓ S, there is no selection g of G with E(g⇢n|G) = E(f⇢n|G) for any
n   0.
Proof. Let G(s) = { 1, 1} and f(s) = 0 for all s 2 S. Then f is a selection of
co(G). We claim that there does not exist an S-measurable selection g of G such that
E(g⇢n|G) = E(f⇢n|G) for any n   0.
We show this by way of contradiction. Suppose that there exists an S-measurable
selection g ofG such that E(g⇢n|G) = 0 for any n   0. Then there exists a set E 2 S such
that g(s) =
8<:1 s 2 E; 1 s /2 E. Thus,  (E)  (Ec) = RS g⇢0 d  = RS E(g⇢0|G) d  = 0, which
implies  (E) = 12 . Moreover,
R




S g d  =
R
S E(g⇢n|G) d   0 = 0
for each n   1, which contradicts the condition that {%n}n 0 is a complete orthogonal
system.
Thus, our condition is minimal in the sense that, if one would like to adopt the
measure-theoretical approach as used here to obtain a stationary Markov perfect equi-
librium, then it is the most general condition.
5.4 Discussion
In this section, we shall discuss the relationship between our results and several related
results.12
Correlated equilibria
It is proved in Nowak and Raghavan (1992) that a correlated stationary Markov
perfect equilibrium exists in discounted stochastic games in the setup described in our
11It is a variant of a well known example of Lyapunov.
12As mentioned in Footnote 1 in the introduction, we only consider those results that are most relevant
to ours.
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Section 5.2. Du e et al. (1994) obtained ergodic properties of such correlated equilibria
under stronger conditions. They essentially assumed that players can observe the out-
come of a public randomization device before making decisions at each stage.13 Thus,
the new state space can be regarded as S 0 = S ⇥L endowed with the product  -algebra
S 0 = S ⌦ B and product measure  0 =   ⌦ ⌘, where L is the unit interval endowed
with the Borel  -algebra B and Lebesgue measure ⌘. Denote G 0 = S ⌦ {;, L}. Given
s0, s01 2 S 0 and x 2 X, the new transition kernel q0(s01|s0, x) = q(s1|s, x), where s (resp.
s1) is the projection of s0 (resp. s01) on S and q is the original transition kernel with
the state space S. Thus, q0(·|s0, x) is measurable with respect to G 0 for any s0 2 S 0 and
x 2 X. It is obvious that G 0 is setwise coarser than S 0. Then the condition of coarser
transition kernel is satisfied for the extended state space (S 0,S 0, 0), and the existence
of a stationary Markov perfect equilibrium follows from Theorem 15. The drawback of
this approach is that the “sunspot” is irrelevant to the fundamental parameters of the
game. Our result shows that it can indeed enter the stage payo↵ u, the correspondence
of feasible actions A and the transition probability Q.
Decomposable constant transition kernels on the atomless part
Nowak (2003) considered stochastic games with transition probabilities as combina-
tions of finitely many measures on the atomless part. In particular, the structure of the
transition probability in Nowak (2003) is as follows.
1. S2 is a countable subset of S and S1 = S \ S2, each point in S2 is S-measurable.
2. There are atomless nonnegative measures µj concentrated on S1, nonnegative mea-
sures  k concentrated on S2, and measurable functions qj, bk : S ⇥ X ! [0, 1],
1  j  J and 1  k  K, where J and K are positive integers. The transi-
tion probability Q(·|s, x) =  (·|s, x) + Q0(·|s, x) for each s 2 S and x 2 X, where
 (·|s, x) =P1kK bk(s, x) k(·) and Q0(·|s, x) =P1jJ qj(s, x)µj(·).
3. For any j and k, qj(s, ·) and bk(s, ·) are continuous on X for any s 2 S.
We shall show that any stochastic game with the above structure satisfies the con-
dition of decomposable coarser transition kernel on the atomless part.
13For detailed discussions on such a public randomization device, or “sunspot”, see Du e et al. (1994)
and their references.
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for any E 2 S. Then µj is absolutely
continuous with respect to   and assume that ⇢j is the Radon-Nikodym derivative for
1  j  J .





0), if s0 2 S1;
 (s0|s,x)
 (s0) , if s
0 2 S2 and  (s0) > 0;
0, if s0 2 S2 and  (s0) = 0.
Then Q(·|s, x) is absolutely continuous with respect to   and q(·|s, x) is the transition
kernel. It is obvious that the condition of a decomposable coarser transition kernel
on the atomless part is satisfied with G = {;, S1}. Then a stationary Markov perfect
equilibrium exists by Proposition 12.
Noisy stochastic games
Duggan (2012) proved the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in s-
tochastic games with noise – a component of the state that is nonatomically distributed
and not directly a↵ected by the previous period’s state and actions. The exogenously
given product structure of the state space as considered by Duggan (2012) is defined as
follows:
1. The set of states can be decomposed as S = H ⇥R and S = H⌦R, where H and
R are complete, separable metric spaces, and H and R are the respective Borel
 -algebras. Qh(·|s, a) denotes the marginal of Q(·|s, a) on h 2 H.
2. There is a fixed probability measure  on (H,H) such that for all s and a, Qh(·|s, a)
is absolutely continuous with respect to  and ↵(·|s, a) is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative.
3. For all s, the mapping a! Qh(·|s, a) is norm continuous; that is, for all s, all a and
each sequence {am} of action profiles converging to a, the sequence {Qh(·|s, am)}
converges to Qh(·|s, a) in total variation.
4. Conditional on next period’s h0, the distribution of r0 in next period is inde-
pendent of the current state and actions. In particular, Qr : H ⇥ R ! [0, 1]
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is a transition probability such that for all s, all a, and all Z 2 S, we have
Q(Z|s, a) = RH RR 1Z(h0, r0)Qr(dr0|h0)Qh(dh0|s, a).
5. For -almost all h, Qr(·|h) (abbreviated as ⌫h) is absolutely continuous with respect
to an atomless probability measure ⌫ on (R,R), and  (·|h) is the Radon-Nikodym
derivative.
In the following we show that the condition of a coarser transition kernel is satisfied
in noisy stochastic games.
Proposition 15. Every noisy stochastic game has a coarser transition kernel.




R 1Z(h, r) (r|h) d⌫(r) d(h) for all Z 2 S. Let G = H ⌦ {;, R}.
It is clear that ↵(·|s, a) is G-measurable, we need to show that G is setwise coarser than
S under  .
Fix any Borel D ✓ S with  (D) > 0. Then there is a measurable mapping  
from (D,SD) to (L,B) such that   can generate the  -algebra SD, where L is the unit
interval endowed with the Borel  -algebra B. Let g(h, r) = h for each (h, r) 2 D,
Dh = {r : (h, r) 2 D} and HD = {h 2 H : ⌫h(Dh) > 0}.
Denote gh(·) = g(h, ·) and  h(·) =  (h, ·) for each h 2 HD. Define a mapping





. Similarly, denote fh(·) = f(h, ·) for
each h 2 HD. For -almost all h 2 HD, the atomlessness of ⌫h implies ⌫h     1h ({l}) = 0
for all l 2 L. Thus the distribution function fh(·) is continuous on L for -almost all
h 2 HD.
Let  (s) = f(g(s), (s)) for each s 2 D, and D0 =   1([0, 12 ]), which is a subset of
D. For h 2 HD, let lh be max{l 2 L : fh(l)  12} if fh is continuous, and 0 otherwise. It
is clear that when fh is continuous, fh(lh) = 1/2. For any E 2 H, let D1 = (E⇥R)\D,
and E1 = E \HD. If  (D1) = 0, then
 (D0 \D1) =  (D0) =
Z
HD
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1D\D0(h, r) d⌫h(r) d(h) =
Z
E1











⌫h     1h   f 1h
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Hence, D is not a G-atom. Therefore, G is setwise coarser than S and the condition of
coarser transition kernel is satisfied.
By Proposition 15, the existence of stationary Markov perfect equilibria in noisy
stochastic games follows from Theorem 15 directly.
Theorem 17 (Duggan (2012)). Every noisy stochastic game possesses a stationary
Markov perfect equilibrium.
5.5 Concluding Remarks
We consider stationary Markov perfect equilibria in discounted stochastic games with a
general state space. So far, only several special classes of stochastic games have been
shown to possess equilibria, while the existence of such equilibria under some general
condition has remained an open problem. In the literature, the standard approach for
the existence arguments is to work with the convex hull of the collection of all selections
from the equilibrium payo↵ correspondence. We adopt this approach and provide a very
simple proof of some existence results under the general condition of a (decomposable)
coarser transition kernel. The minimality of our condition is illustrated. As shown in
Section 5.4, our results strictly generalize various previous existence results.
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